BELGIAN MAGINOT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20056, 30 September 1939, Page 2

BELGIAN MAGINOT

THE LESSON OF 1914 DEFENCE OF MEUSE EXPERT’S SUMMARY FORTS AND TANK TRAPS Twenty-five years ago “the cockpit of Europe’’ was a stock phrase for Belgium, so named because her soil and people have been trampled on by successions of invaders to the plains of France. From 1600 onwards Belgium for two centuries was repeatedly the battleground of Europe, but in 1839 she was, by solemn declaration of France, Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia, declared a permanently neutral State. Belgium rested on the promise until August 2, 1914, when Germany tore up the “scrap of. paper,” and on August 4 crossed the frontier.

Political and diplomatic moves and measures to safeguard her neutrality apart, Belgium has rested less on assurances since 1918, and, lacking a great man power, has built up frontier fortifications more complete and far more formidable than were the old forts of 1914.

It is not by chance that Belgium has suffered from the heels of invaders down the centuries, for geography has made her the way of the aggressor from the east. Liddell Hart lias, summarised the nature of the country and the steps taken by Belgium to defend herself in his “Defence of Britain. ’ Strategically, he wrote, Belgium may be compared to a roughly drawn figure 8 in which the upper circle is about twice the size of the lower circle. At the top of the upper circle is. the low-lying plain of Flanders, with its "net-work of canals and irrigation channels; the rest of it is gently undulating country. The lower circle is filled by the wooded arid mountainous Ardennes. Along the right side of the upper circle, across the intersection, and down the left of the lower circle runs the deepcut valley of the Meuse. In the first stretch it covers the heart of BelgiurriA. in the second it offers a convenient route across the waist of Belghift into' France which Germanic iiiv-uaers have many times used in the past; in the third stretch it forms a back-stop to the Ardennes_ and thereby strengthens the natural protection they provide to the frontier of France in this region.

“The defence problem of Belgium turns on the course of the Meuse, and its solution, largely depends cn the maintenance of the obstacle to an invader that is offered by this greal natural moat;,” he .says. “If if is lost there are other lines of resistance behind, but any withdrawal; from the Meuse involves the abandonment of important areas of Belgian territory, while no rearward line equals its advantages for defence."

Danger in new Direction

For the Belgians the obvious plan of defence is to make sure of holding the Meuse moat- while utilising the Ardennes as a buffer to absorb the shock of any hostile advance that comes that way, but, he says, they have tb reckon with the possibility of having to meet danger in a new direction, where they are more vulnerable, on their Dutch flank, for an advance through Holland would not only strike Belgium where she has in the past been least prepared for defence, but would stretch her available forces to a greatly increased extent.

■ Giving his impressions of a recent tour of the frontiers, Captain Hart wrote of the immensely strong natural defences of the Ardennes —if used for resistance and not for attempted rapid movement. Much of this country is heavily wooded, with deep-cut rivers, and at many points (Where the roads cross them a handful of machine-guns could hold up an army corps. Chains of pillboxes cover the approaches to main road centres, and elsewhere natural barriers are strengthened by art. Ardennes to the Liege Gap

The evidence of the new fortifications beyond the Ardennes to the .Liege Gap is still more profuse. On the outskirts of Liege is the first "line of security,” in a chain of pillboxes permanently manned, and beside them movable anti-tank barricades Which can be swiftly pushed into position to block the road. Liege lies in the trough of the Meuse, with high cliffs walling it on either side, so that the toads leading from Germany descend by steep and narrow valleys. The strength of the line of security lies in the fact that an invader is unable to leave the roads ahd outflank- its posts.

Next, about six miles from the centre, comes the line of old forts, now modernised! twelve in number, ahd continuous anti-tank and deep wire entanglement across the front. Half a dozen miles further out one comes to the line of the four new forts. Each is surrounded by an immense anti-tank moat. That at Bnttice he estimates to be over two miles round, with a perpendicular concrete wall 15ft deep on the outside and a steep glacis about 40ft. high on the inside; casemates are built in to enfilade the moat. He doubts the necessity of such immense mbats, and adds: “The garrisons consist entirely of armourencased artillery and machine-guns, all underground, so that it is hard to see how ,/tanks eu-uld endanger them.” The country between the forts is filled with a close-linked chain of pillboxes to form a continuous network of fire.

Farther out again, only a few miles from the frontier, is a forward line of posts and defended localities.

Many of the pillboxes nestle in the fields, painted to tone with the background, but in the villages and hamlets one notices apparently brick-built cottages or outhouses which have no windows or else dummy windows. More formidable still, as a barrier to sudden invasion, is the deep belt of prepared demolitions, at bridge after bridge, road, rail, and canal, with sentries continuously on watch. The Meuse north ol' Liege has received similar attention. The natural water obstacle is strengthened by a; chain of casemates, three to the; mile, along the bank, and at the junction, of the Albert Canal and the Meuse is the new fort of Eben Arnael, commanding the passage where the Germans were able to gain a crossing in 1914 and thus outflank Liege from the north. Eben Emael is even larger than the fort of Battice, with a deep water-filled anti-tank moat, and tunnel access to the underground galleries. “The Maastricht Appendix”

North-cast of Liege is the narrow tongue of the Netherlands which has been called the “Maastricht appendix,” a southward projection of Dutch territory which narrows to a neck barely five miles wide. As this is too narrow to be defended by the Dutch, the Belgians have to face the possible danger of a sudden irruption on their own. frontier, formed by the Meuse. Once across the river, an invader would until recently have met with no further serious obstacle, but now the Belgians have constructed a chain of pillboxes along the Meuse, and behind this line runs obliquely the barrier of the Albeit Canal.

“None the less,” says Liddell Hart, “it has to be recognised that this northern flank of Belgium’s defences is relatively more vulnerable than the southern flank, where invasion came in 1914. The risk, of course, would only develop as the sequel to a German violation of Dutch _ territory, but its potential gravity is such that it is not surprising to find that the Belgians look with an anxious eye on the state of their Dutch neighbours’ defences, which may closely affect the effectiveness of their own ” There is reason for this attitude, he believes, for even a casual traveller notes the comparative scarcity of pillboxes at key points, the type of military material, and the training of the’ troops, but 'fnore pillboxes were being constructed (the book was written in the first half of the year) along the German frontier to cover roads and bridges, and were being permanently garrisoned. The delaying power of these garrisons was multiplied greatly by the plan to flood parts of the country and to blow up bridges, but while the number and width of the Dutch waterlines offered a high degree of security against the rapid advance of mechanised forces it would be unwise, he believed, to over-estimate the resisting power of the forces that Holland could assemble to meet an invasion in strength. In the northern part of the country ■it could hardly be expected that more than a brief check could be imposed. For the south of Holland the broad Maas River forms a natural shield, but behind it the Dutch have facilitated the - advance of mechanised forces by draining marshes. An invading force which occupied that, part- of Holland south of the Rhine could dominate the Schelde and Antwerp. threaten Belgium on her leastfortified side, and establish air. bases within 100 miles of the English coast. High Degree of Security Summing the position up, he wrote: "There is good reason to think that Belgium's capacity to defend her neutrality is much greater than in 1914, and that the measures taken in recent years have achieved for her a nigh degree of security against any surprise stroke. Thanks to the existence of numerous waterlines, to the way -she has organised them, and to the network of demolitions that she has prepared, it should be possible for her to offer a much stronger resistance than in 1914. It could not. however, be expected that her own forces should suffice to maintain their resistance indefinitely in the face of a prolonged attack on a large scale, especially, if this wore extended to her northern frontier. The prospects of the offensive anywhere tends to turn on the ratio of .space to density of force. The extent of Belgium's frontiers gives licr a ratio that handicaps defence, though Nature and her own efforts have done much, to reduce its adverse balance.”