BERLIN VERSION

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20052, 26 September 1939, Page 6

BERLIN VERSION

TIME OF CRISIS HOURS PRIOR TO WAR BRITISH TALKS OMITTBp ENDEAVOURS OF ENVOY TRUE PICTURE CONCEALED (Elec. Tel. Copyright—United Press Assn.) (British Official Wireless.) Reed. Noon. RUGBY, Sept. 25. The German Foreign Office has published a short collection of diplomatic documents on the “last phase of the German-Polish crisis.”

The documents exclude any account of the interviews between iho British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and Herr Hitler on August 23, 25, 28 and 29, or between Sir Nevile Henderson and the German Foreign Minister, Herr Von Ribbentrop on the night of August 30-31. It might have been interesting to have had the German accounts ot these interviews, but it is obvious that readers of the German documents will thus have no means of appreciating their significance or getting a true picture of events

Comparison of the German official publication of the “last phase of the German-Polish crisis” and two British official publications show that 15 out of 26 documents, which is all the former contains, were among the total of 130 made public by the British Government, while the German Foreign Office has omitted a number of documents recording facts of great importance. There is no account of the interviews on August 23, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 31, Sir Nevile Henderson’s records of which were one of the most interesting sections of the second British White Paper, revealing, as they did, the violent and menacing language used by Herr Hitler ana Herr von Ribbentrop. Protest Against Nazi Demand

Readers of the German documents, who had no access to the fuller British publication, would be unaware, for example, that the British Government protested at once against the German demand for the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary in Berlin to receive and accept German demands by midnight cn August 31. They would not know that the German Government, white insisting on August 29 that this demand was not an ultimatum, stated at midnight on August 30 that they regarded their proposals as already rejected, because the demand for the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary had not been accepted. It would have been concealed from them that the German Government refused absolutely the repeated suggestions made by Britain, and accepted by Poland, that the Polish-Ger-man negotiations should take the ordinary form, that is, that any German proposals should be given to the Polish Ambassador for transmission to his Government and that, at midnight on August 30, Herr Von Ribbentrop refused to give the British Ambassador a written communication. stating the German proposals or to suggest to the Polish Government any method of negotiation other than that of facing a Polish plenipotentiary. Clumsy Attempt

Again later in the introduction there is a clumsy attempt by the,omission of dates and times to give the impression that on August 30. Sir Nevile Henderson was given the German proposals, which were explained to him in detail. In fact, on the night of August 30-31, Herr von Ribbentrop’s method of explanation was, in Sir Nevile Henderson’s own words, “to read out a lengthy document in German at top speed.” Herr von Ribbentrop refused to give Sir Nevile Henderson a copy of these proposals, adding that in any case he considered the proposals—which the Polish Government had not seen—were rejected because the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived to accept them en bloc before midnight. The proposals were not given to Sir Nevile Henderson until 9.15 p.m. on August 31, when the German Government again repeated that the proposals were rejected because the Polish Government had not agreed to what, in effect was the German intention to obtain a dictated settlement in Berlin with a series of demands which the Polish plenipotentiary would have been expected to accept without consultation of his Government. As to the method of stating the case, the procedure adopted by Herr von’Ribbentrop has an obvious advantage, so long as it is intended only for those who can be prevented from obtaining fuller information, but it is not likely to impress any who have access to'the statements of both sides. The introduction to the German Foreign Office’s selection of documents’ is no less tendentious than the selection itself. It is implied that the British guarantee to Poland was given before the Polish rejection of the German offer of March, 1939. In fact, the British guarantee was not offered to Poland until after these terms had been refused by the Polish Government as incompatible with Polish independence.