ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20046, 19 September 1939, Page 7

ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION

OBSCURE ATMOSPHERE LONDON VIEW RESERVED M'ANY FACTORS INVOLVED (British Official Wireless.) Reed. 2.30 p.m. RUGBY, Sept. 17. The Ministry of Information has announced that the Soviet Government has communicated to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, the text of the note it has addressed to the Polish Ambassador announcing that an order has been given to the Soviet Army to occupy certain areas of Polish territory.

At the same time the Soviet informed Sir William Seeds that it will pursue a policy of neutrality in the relations between the Soviet and Britain.

Obscurity surrounds the events of the last 24 hours arising from the Soviet’s decision. Official quarters here are still awaiting details, although the telegram received from Sir William Seeds leaves no doubt that earlier reports of the Soviet intention to occupy the Polish Ukraine and White Russia were substantially correct.

It can again be that this move on the part of the Soviet does not take either London or Paris by surprise. Well-informed quarters here point out that it is quite consistent with what lias been known for a long time of the Soviet’s attitude towards the problems arising on her western frontier, in the event of Poland being involved in war. Beyond that, they feel it would be unprofitable at present to speculate and certainly, while no possibility can be excluded in the absence of further information, the tendency here is to treat with the utmost reserve the deductions from the Soviet action which, while giving full value to the Soviet-German pact and to the reported 1 ISoviet-Japanese agreement, appears to fail to take into account many other factors, including the natural conflict of interests in eastern Europe between the Soviet and Germany.

Well-informed quarters here discourage speculative interpretations of the significance of the reported Soviet turn of events—some of which tend to go far ahead of the news itself in forecasting far-reaching developments. What can be said with confidence is that from the date of the SovietGerman pact onwards, the possibility of the reorientation of Soviet policy along 'the lines to which it may now be turning has never been overlooked in responsible circles, and it may 'therefore bo assumed that if the Soviet Government has decided to take the role ascribed to it in current reports, this event did not find the British and French Governments unprepared in their calculations.