PEACE BIDS

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20033, 4 September 1939, Page 7

PEACE BIDS

HISTORIC NOTES BRITAIN—GERMANY EXCHANGES DURING CRISIS HITLER’S CONDITIONS ATTAINMENT OF PEACE WHITE I'APEIi ISSUED (Bloc. Tel. Copyright-—United Press Assn.) (British Official Wireless.) Reed. 3 p.m. RUGBY, -Sept. 1. The White Paper issued ito-day dealing with tiie communications recently . exchanged between the British and German Governments stated that in reply to statements made by the Prime Minister Herr Hitler made a tong communication, dated August 23 and supplemented it with verbal observations to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevilo Henderson, on August 25, which arc recorded in the White Paper. The tenor of these communications was to stress the desirability of improving Anglo-German relations and. regarding relations with Poland to insist on the German claims, while pretending it was the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland, which was preventing the latter Power from negotiating on the German terms, which were represented as the height of magnanimity.

With reference to the precautionary measures taken in Britain and France, Herr Hitler intimated, at this stage, that “in event of these military movements being carried into effect, I shall order the immediate mobilisatioft of the German forces.” Intolerable Provocation Maintaining that the Polish provocations had become intolerable, Herr Hitler announced his determination to abolish these Macdonian .conditions.” He was, however, prepared and determined, after the solution of this problem, to approach England once more with a large and comprehensive offer. The record of the interview with Sir Ncvile Henderson, in the form of the German “verbal communication, continues: "He is a man of great decisions and, in this case also, lie will be capable of being great in his action. He accepts the British Empire and 4s ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal if —; — There followed conditions, including limited colonial demands and leading up to a suggestion for a limitation of arms. . . „ , He referred twice to the point tnat “war between England and Germany could, at best, bring some profit to Germany, but none at all to Poland. The reply which the British Governmerit sent on August 28 is the key document in the series. It was before the delivery was communicated to both the French and Polish Governments. After reaffirming their desire for an Anglo-German understanding, the British Government pointed out in this communication that Herr Hitler’s message had dealt with two groups of questions —those in dispute between Germany and Poland, and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Britain.

Understanding With Britain “In connection with these last, the British Government observes, the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make lo the British Government lor a "moral understanding. These proposals arc, of course, stated in very general form, and would require closer definition, but the British Government is fully prepared to take them, with some additions as subjects for discussion, and they would be ready, if the differences 'between. Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach an agreement. "The condition which the German Chancellor lays clown- is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that the British Government entirely agrees. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from tiie Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and the British Government feels compelled lo point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential lo achieving further progress. The German Government will _oe aware that the British Government intends to honour its pledge. It could not for any advantage offer lo Britain tc acquiesce in a settlement which would put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom it has given a guarantee. * Safeguards For Poland In the opinion c.f the British Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests, and it recalls that in a speech on April 28 last, the German Chancellor recognised the importance ol these interests to Poland. But, as staled by the Prime Minister in his letter on August 22. the British Government considers it is essential for the success of the discussions, which would precede an. agreement, that it should he understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by the other Powers. Herr Hitler replied on. August 23 that Germany had never sought a conflict with England and had vainly endeavoured for years to win England's friendship. Herr Hiller added that he was prepared to settle the Danzig and Polish Corridor difficulties by negotiation on basis of unparalleled magnanimity, but that England’s allegations regarding the German mobilisation against Poland, aggressiveness to Rumania and Hungary, in addition to the declarations about a guarantee dispelled the Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis tolerable to Germany. Act of Menace Herr Hitler continued that' the Anglo-Polish pact could not change Germany’s determination to safeguard her interests. He shared Mr. Chamberlain’s anticipation that a long war

can be anticipated in such an event. Germany, if England attacked her, would be found prepared and determined, preferring every misery and tribulation to sacrificing her national interests and honour. Herr Hitler, referring to the AngloFrench measures of mobilisation, wrote: “Since Germany never intended other than defensive military measures against England and France, and it was not intended at present or in the future to attack either, this announcement could refer only to a contemplated act of menace against Germany. I, therefore, inform Your Excellency that if these military announcements are effectuated I will order the immediate mobilisation of the German forces.” Iler.r Hitler was prepared to fix the longest time-limit. Secondly, his obligations to Italy were not touched because lie could not withdraw from them any more than could England from hers to France. Thirdly, he also stressed his irrevocable determination never again to enter a conflict with Russia. He was ready to conclude agreement with England which would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire as far as Germany was concerned, but also an assurance to the Empire of German assistance regardless of where lit was necessary. ‘ The Fuehrer would then be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments corresponding with the new political situation. He was not interested in western problems, Frontier modification in the west did not- enter into consideration. Germany's fortifications costing millions were her final western frontier. A blessing for England and Germany might result if Britain would consider these ideas. “'lf it rejects these ideas, there will be a war. In no case would Britain emerge stronger. The last war proved ibis. The Fuehrer is a man of an hifintum of decisions by which he is bound. This is my last offer."