BRITAIN’S OFFER

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20032, 2 September 1939, Page 6

BRITAIN’S OFFER

| peaceful discussion, in the present I state of tension, are, however, obvious, and the longer tension is maintained, the harder will it be for reason to prevail. These difficulties, however, might be mitigated if not removed provided there could, for an initial period, be a truce on- both sides, and indeed on ail sides, to press polemics and to all incitement. Examination of Complaints “If such a truce could be arranged, then at the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side, and also the treatment of minorities. It is rerasonaible to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them —with the aid of a neutral intermediary if both sides should think that would be helpful. But I feel bound to say there would be a slender hope of bringing such negotiations to a successful issue unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed toy other Powers. The British Government would be ready, if desired, to make such a contribution as they could to the effective operation of such a guarantee.

DIRECT PARLEYS DANZIG AND CORRIDOR WIDER ADJUSTMENTS AIR OF CONFIDENCE ESSENTIAL PRIOR FACTOR (British Official Wireless.) Reed. 1 p.m. RUGBY, Sept. 1. Communications recently exchanged between the British and German Governments are published as a White Paper. The correspondence begins with a letter addressed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, on behalf of ithe British Government, to Herr Plitler. on August 22. fie opened with a reference to the precautionary measures which Britain had started to take, and said: “These steps, in the opinion of the British Government, have been rendered necessary toy military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of the GermanSoviet agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin .to indicate that intervention in Poland need: be reckoned with.

“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations I have put before you.

“No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter - Britain’s obligation to Poland, which the 'British Government has stated, in public, repeatedly and plainly, and which it is determined to fulfil.”

Emphasising the British Government’s intention that there should be no possibility of misunderstanding its attitude, as it was sometimes alleged there had been in 1914, Mr. Chamberlain made a striking affirmation, which he cited in the House of Commons on August 24, that if the case should arise it “A resolved and prepared to employ, without delay, all the forces at its command,” adding, “and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once we are engaged.” Dangerous Illusion “It would be a dangerous illusion to think that if war once starts, it will come to an early end, even if success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be waged should have been secured.”

The' letter then proceeds as follows to its end: “Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. lam certain it is desired neither by our people nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and -Poland which could not, and should not, be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails to-day. “We have been, and af, all times will be ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you. Difficulties in the way of any