The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, SEPT, 1, 1939. PEACE STILL IN DANGER

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20031, 1 September 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, SEPT, 1, 1939. PEACE STILL IN DANGER

The greatest difficulty must have been experienced during the past few days, even in the most optimistic circles in retaining the belief that the prospects of peace for Europe continued reasonably good. With reports swinging first to one side and then to the other almost hourly, strong hopes could have been buoyed up only by (he fact that the Peace Poor remained open if but slightly ajar. Not the least tantalising feature of the news -—no matter from what source it may have emanated—-was that, when bright spots appeared on the war-clouded horizon, they were most pleasingly vivid, whereas, when the shadows deepened, the outlook, at once, became truly ominous. It will, too, never be forgotten that there was no abatement of effort on the part of neutral nations to persuade Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to assist in creating an atmosphere of goodwill whilst London and Berlin continued their historic, diplomatic struggle under the grim German threat that the brief period available for negotiations might alas! prove all too short. Frankly, millions upon millions of people throughout a vigilant world must have felt, all through this terrible period of suspense and tension, that nothing short of a miracle would require to happen if the grisly spectre of war were to be driven off. In many quarters, the mere fact that the negotiations were still going on probably proved the sheet-anchor of all hopes for the best. But, then again, it must have been far from comforting when it became clear that Herr Hitler’s first note to Britain had not provided a satisfactory basis even for a truce.

In his desperate task of trying to bring Herr Hitler to his senses, Mr. Chamberlain was, assuredly, faced with enormous difficulties right from the outset. As soon as the negotiations opened, he would find himself confronted by a German leader as arrogant and as stubborn as the exKaiser had proved on the eve of the Great War. Maybe, at the start, the fact that it was Herr Hitler himself who had made the first of the new series of diplomatic moves may have been regarded by many people as a good omen. But, subsequently, a very different opinion would be held when it was learned, on the authority of Mr. Chamberlain, that Herr Hitler, in indicating the position which Germany took up, “left Britain in no doubt of his views as to the urgency of settling the Polish question.” This unveiled threat could only be taken to mean that Germany had gone so far that she was not prepared to retreat unless the difficulty could, at once, be settled to her entire satisfaction. In the light of Germany’s imposition of the condition that she would tolerate only a slight c|elay, what, perhaps, is most surprising is that Britain should have agreed to negotiate with her at all! If extreme urgency did come into the matter, it was certainly not on account of fear on Germany’s part that Poland intended to attack her. Nor should anybody have been deceived by Herr Hitler’s action in professing that Germany was desirous of “an Anglo-Ger-man understanding that would be of 4 complete and lasting character.” In the circumstances in which this glib statement was made, it could be considered only as a bribe intended to sway Britain from her path of duty not only to Poland but also to France and her other allies.

No matter how hard one might try to convince oneself that Germany might not be actuated entirely by bad faith in her attitude towards'Poland, all the facts, unhappily, indicate the contrary. Even if her earlier, calculated crimes against law and order in Europe could be left out of consideration, she stands self-condemned on account of her persistent bullying tactics over Danzig and the Corridor. Even after Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of the Peace Front, had become engaged with Herr Hitler in exploratory negotiations having for their object—as far as Britain was concerned, at any rate — the discovery (if possible) of a way out of the impasse, Germany unashamedly continued to build an armed wall against Poland, in addition to depriving her of most of, (if not all) the rights which she had enjoyed in Danzig. Germany’s latest action in massing troops in Slovakia at such a delicate stage of the Chamberlain-Hitler negotiations could admit of no excuse, and, then, because Poland felt compelled to answer this further threat by calling up additional reserves, Germany Had the audacity to declare that Poland had “finally precipitated a measure of danger.” Nothing could have been more shocking than Germany’s cool, calm and deliberate action, at such a critical juncture, in augmenting her aggressive steps against Poland. Peace for Europe would appear now to rest only upon the slender chance that Germany may, before it is too late, see the wisdom of placing reasonable proposals before the Polish Goverftment.