The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1959. A COMMON STAND

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20028, 29 August 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1959. A COMMON STAND

The publication of the Anglo-Polish mutual assistance pact, at last weekend, must have destroyed any false Slope that Germany still entertained that it would be possible for hei quietly to undertake a coup in connection with Danzig and the Corridor —and get away with the booty. It is true that this history-making agreement does not contain anything that had not previously been made known in respect of Britain’s attitude in relation to the grievous threat that has, for some months, hung over unhappy Poland. Repeatedly, both Mr. Chamberlain and Viscount Halifax had, in firm and unequivocal language, warned Germany that Britain (as well as France) would make common cause with Poland against her if she set about to seize the disputed area or to undermine Poland’s independence in any other manner. Previously, however, Britain’s assurances had not been in the form of a signed agreement, and Herr Hitler and his fellow “war lords” are known to have done their utmost, on that account, to minimise, in the eyes of the German people, the value to Poland of any guarantees that had been given to her by Britain. What now emerges is that Britain’s

solemn pledges to Poland really are as unusual and as remarkable as had been indicated at an earlier stage of the crisis, by her responsible statesmen. Unquestionably, some of the terms do go far beyond the scope of those in any other mutual assistance pact to which Britain had ever before appended her signature or of that of any known agreement that has ever been entered into by any other nations.

What should (and will) never be forgotten is that the much-discussed Anglo-Polish pact owed its novel character to the fact that it was required to be so fashioned that it would meet a brutal type of aggression which Germany alone among the civilised nations of the world had already adopted. Plainly, nobody, even, say, only a year ago, would have dreamt of forecasting that any nation —far less astute Britain—would ever enter upon commitments so broad and so elastic. If an arrangement of such an extraordinary nature had then been projected, the step would have been looked upon as both foolish and dangerous in the extreme. But, in the meantime, the peace-loving nations had, as is well known, witnessed the falling of more than one small country into Germany’s rapacious maw solely in consequence of their inability to defend themselves. Thus it came -about that a counter-move which could not fail to be effective required to be devised. Merely a giance at the Anglo-Polish pact is sufficient to show that it could not have been bettered—at any rate from Poland’s angle—for the purpose for which it was needed. Where it differs from other revealed agreements between nations is that it is not simply a mutual pledge on the part of the contracting parties that, if one should become the victim of aggression, the other must rally at once on her side. Under the terms of this special pact, Britain is committed to go to Poland’s aid in a variety of other circumstances which fall short of an actual attack on the part of an aggressor. If, for example, Poland should decide that any action taken

by Germany .amounts even to only an indirect threat to her independence (but is of such a nature that she regards it as vital to her existence to offer armed resistance) Britain would ' require to go to her assistance. May-

be, there is a secret clause which demands that Poland must, if possible, consult Britain before resorting to armed force; but, all the same, it is conceivable that an might arise when Poland would not have a full opportunity to adopt such a reasonable step before engaging in hostilities. It is unfortunately the case that Britain was not in a position to give Czechoslovakia an equally effective undertaking. What must be borne in mind, however, is that, at the time when something of the kind was needed by her, Britain’s own defensive system had not been brought up to its present high standard of efficiency. Czechoslovakia had received a loose guarantee from France that she would be assisted if she should be unlawfully attacked. But there was a fatal flaw about the arrangement. France had not regarded herself as being under a definite obligation to advance her own military preparations to a point at which, when the fatal hour struck, Germany could have afforded to snap her fingers in her face. That Czechoslovakia had been led by Russia to expect help if ever she required it 'is also well known; but, perhaps, the less that is now said under that particular heading the better. As for Poland, she is, assuredly, in a much more fortunate position than was Czechoslovakia and it ought, at once, to have been apparent to Germany that her “walk over” policy of aggression could not, in the long run, have availed against her. In a second Great War, Poland would need to put up a most stubborn defence in order to escape being paralysed before the full strength of re-armed Britain and of re-armed France could be brought to bear against Germany and Italy. But, even if Poland should have the bad luck to be crippled, the stuiggle on her behalf would not end. Surely, Germany has not forgotten that, when Russia collapsed in 1918, the Great War proved to be far from, over and that, indeed, it was continued by Britain and the other Allies until she and her accomplices were, in turn, forced to sue for peace!