The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1939. FAR EASTERN POLICY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20000, 27 July 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1939. FAR EASTERN POLICY

It is almost impossible to judge what effect the so-called agreement between Britain and Japan will have on the Far Eastern situation; it is difficult, indeed, to know exactly what the agreement itself means. As is so often the case in these matters, the real issue tends to be clouded by extraneous comment and by a tendency to infer more than was intended. In the first place, it is necessary to remember that tiro discussions in Tokio so far were concerned with the general background of the Tientsin situation, and it was to this that the agreement related and not to the Far Eastern situation generally. Shorn of ilts verbiage, the agreement is to the effect that Britain recognises that largescale hostilities are in operation in China, for which purpose the Japanese forces must safeguard their own security and maintain public order and must remove any causes which may obstruct them or benefit their enemy. Having recognised this much, and it would be absurd not to do so, Britain affirms that she has nn intention of countenancing any acts or measures which may be prejudicial to a settlement of the Japanese objects. In other words. Britain recognises that a war is in progress and intimates that it is her intention to remain neutral. Logical though this attitude may be, the position is still far from satisfactory. The first point that obtrudes itself is the apparent difference of opinion between Britain and Japan as to the agreement itself. The Japanese Prime Minister, with apparent breach of etiquette, issued a statement in anticipation of the official communique. He asserted that the basic principle evolved applied to the whole of-China and was not limited to Tientsin. On tlie other hand, Mr. Chamberlain made it clear that the agreement was intended to “recognise the background against which the situation at Tient-

sin should be viewed,” and he went on to say that the formula had been agreed upon “in order to clear the way for the Tientsin discussions.” More than that, the Prime Minister insisted that “this had nothing to do with Britain’s China policy, hut was a question of fact." Certain indisputable facts have now been recognised, hut Mr. Chamberlain has insisted that “the declaration did not connote any change whatever in the British policy •in China.” Japanese circles, however, clearly regard the agreement as a retreat by Britain from (lie Far East, so that the two nations are obviously at cross-purposes and it may even he found that what purports to be an agreement will merely he a basis for further disagreement when attempts are made to put it into operation.

After making these allowances, however, there is still, ground for disquiet at what appears to he even a measure of British capitulation. It will not be overlooked that even in the official statement Japan refers to China as “the enemy,” and an enemy in such circumstances presupposes the existence of war; yet. Japan, because it would gravely affect her relations with the United States, declines to make a declaration of war. Britain, in turn, recognises that large-scale hostilities are taking place, hut neglects to demand an unequivocal declaration on the part of the nation responsible for them. On both sides, therefore, there is too much of an atmosphere of make-believe, but, so far as Britain is concerned, this nitittude is, to some extent, excusable. The chief British preoccupation at the present time is not the Far East, which is almost a minor side issue, hut Europe, and it is obvious that she cannot permit a weakening of the position on her own borders by becoming unnecessarily involved at the other side of the world. There seems to be little question that there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the axis Powers to manoeuvre her into such a situation and anything that might he construed as British weakness in the Far East must he considered in relation to possible developments much nearer home.

The one thing that would be fatal to Britain would be to play into German hands by becoming involved in China, and those who might be inclined to criticise her conduct should always hear this in mind, because they would probably be the first to complain if Britain were outwitted by German diplomacy. As it is now, Germany can talk of British capitulation, but secretly she is angered and disappointed that an agreement of any sort has been reached. Rome takes a more sensible view when it declines to exaggerate the importance of the Tokio agreement, and this attitude is endorsed also by the Japanese Minister of Marine who has warned (he nation not to assume that the British Far Eastern policy has entirely changed as a result of the talks. That, in actual fact, does appear to he the correct position, whatever interpretation Tokio might attempt to place upon it for home consumption. The real test of the agreement is not in what it says hut in the effect it will have on the future relations of the two countries. If Japan, for her part, acts on the assumption that she has been given virtually a free hand in China she may be sadly disillusioned, while if Britain goes too far with what might he regarded as concessions to Japan the Government will have to deal with the opinion of its own people.