HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

Evening Star, Issue 23378, 22 September 1939, Page 10

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

FATEFUL DAYS BEFORE WAR RECORDS OF NAZI PERFIDY DRAMATIC CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEADERS HITLER'S BLUSTERING TIRADES (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, September 21. (Received September 22, at noon.) A White Paper of 200 pages, entitled ‘ Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Britain and Germany,’ contains 144 separate documents starting with 1984 and the German-Polish agreement, which was the governing factor in the German-Polish relations to January 1939 and ending with Mr Chamberlain’s broadcast to the German people after the outbreak of war. The documents are grouped under headings which themselves tell much of the story of the past six months: —The deterioration of the European situation resulting from German action against Czechoslovakia, the German Polish discussion in April and May, the AngloPolish agreement, developments of the Anglo-German relations and the British attitude to the international situation in April and June, the deterioration of the local Danzig situation on June 3 and July 3, the British attitude from July 10 to 15, the temporary easing of the Danzig situation (July 19 and September 1), the' further deterioration of Danzig from August 4 to 10, the treatment of the German minority in Poland from August 24 to 27. A section is devoted/ to the attempts at mediation by other States, the longest section comprising 66 documents, of which 14 were published on September 1. The White Paper deals with “ developments leading immediately to the outbreak of hostilities.” While the earlier sections are of great importance, interest will centre on the diplomatic correspondence revealing the background of events during the last nine fateful days of August. A FAMOUS LETTER. This section opens with the now famous letter which the Prime Minister addressed on behalf of the British Government to Hitler on August, 22 after the news of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggres-sion pact, and in which Mr Chamberlain again gave a clear statement of British obligations to Poland. Ho stated: “ Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Britain’s obligations.”

A telegram on August 22 from the (British Ambassador in Berlin, published for the first time, reveals that some difficulty was made about granting Sir Nevile Henderson an interview «t Berchtesgaden to deliver the letter. Sir Nevile Henderson reported that Hitler “ was excitable and uncompromising.” His language wae violent and exaggerated, both as regards England and Poland. He began hy asserting that the Polish question would have been settled on most generous terms but for England’s unwarranted support. The telegram proceeded: “I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our guarantee having been given on March 31 and the Polish reply on March 26. He retorted hy saying that the latter had been inspired by a British Press campaign which had invented the German threat to Poland the week before. Germany had not moved in the direction of war any more than she had done during a similar fallacious Press campaign about Czechoslovakia on May 20, 1938. He then violently attacked the Poles, talked of 100,000 German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans, the closing of German institutions, and Polish systematic persecution of German nationals generally.” BLINDLY UNREASONABLE. “ Hitler’s next tirade was against the British support of the Czechs and Poles.» He asserted that the former would he independent to-day if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles would give in tomorrow if Britain ceased to encourage ijhiem to-day. He followed this with a tirade against England, whose friendship he had sought for 20 years, only to see every offer turned down with contempt. “ The British Press was also wehemently abused. I contested every point, and kept calling his statements Jhaccnrate, but the only effect was to launch him on some fresh tirade.” Most of the conversation was recrimination, according to the Ambassador. M At the end Hitler observed in reply to my repeated warnings that the direction of action by Germany would mean war that Germany had nothing to lose and Britain much; that he did hot desire war, but would not shrink fawn it if it became necessary, and that his peoples were much more behind him than in last September. I relied, I hoped, and was convinced, that some solution was still possible without war, and asked why contact with the Poles could not be renewed? Hitler’s retort was that so long as England gave Poland a blank cheque Polish unreasonableness would render any negotiation impossible. I denied the blank cheqne, but this only started Hitler off again.” RESPONSIBILITY PUT ON BRITAIN.

Hitler was calmer at the second talk, it-was reported in a telegram next day, ibok no less uncompromising. He put the whole responsibility for the war Mi Britain and maintained that Britain Mrs determied to destroy and exter--1 Jl». Wja, hft-aaid, 50

years old. He preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60. Hitler said: “ England is fighting for the lessor races, whereas I am fighting for only Germany.”

When the Chancellor spoke several times of his contentions in regard to rejection of his offers of friendship to England, Sir Nevilo Henderson referred to Mr Chamberlain’s efforts at peace and friendship with Germany. “ Hitler said he believed in Mr Chamberlain’s goodwill at the time, but, and especially since the encirclement efforts of the last few months, he did so no longer. I pointed out the fallacy of this view, but his answer was that he was now finally convinced of the rightness of the views held formerly to him by others that England and Germany could never agree.” PACT WITH RUSSIA. In referring to the Russian nonaggression pact, Hitler observed that it was England which forced him into the agreement with Russia. He did not seem enthusiastic over it, but added that once he had made an agreement it would be for a long period. The text of the agreement signed to-day confirms this, and I shall be surprised if it is not supplemented later by something more than mere nonaggression. “WAR SEEMED INEVITABLE.” “ I took the line at the end that war seemed to be quite inevitable if Hitler persisted in direct action against Poland, and expressed regret at the failure of my mission in general to Berlin and my visit to him. Hitler’s attitude was that it was England’s fault, and nothing short of a complete change in her policy towards Germany could now ever convince him of a British desire for good relations.” The first Gorman reply to Mr Chamberlain’s letter was given on August 23, the day of the signature of the NaziSoviet pact, and on August 25 Hitler WAV/.*.V.W.%W.V.V

sent for Sir Nevile Henderson and asked him to fly to London to “ put the case” to the British Government. The case, whaoh included an offer of friendship with Britain once the Polish question was solved, was contained in a verbal communication which, along with the first German reply and the subsequent exchanges with the two Governments, was already published in a White Paper on September 1. The present White Paper, however, contains a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson describing the interview at which the communication was handed over. He reported that the Chancellor was absolutely calm and normal and spoke with great earnestness and apparent sincerity. “The conversation lasted an hour,” said Sir Nevile, “ my attitude being that the Russian pact in no way altered the standpoint of the British Government and that I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland, and that I knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question. Hitler refused to guarantee this, on the grounds that Polish provocation might at any moment render German intervention to protect German nationals inevitable. I' again regretted this point, but always got the same answer. “ In the meantime, in view of the increasing tension at Danzig following the appointment of Herr Foerster as head of the Free City, Colonel Beck told the British Ambassador in Warsaw that he considered the situation most grave.” In the telegram Sir Howard Kennard added: “Colonel Beck' has, as requested, instructed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to seek an immediate interview with the State Secretary, and unless lie found the attitude of Herr von Weizacker unsatisfactory he would attempt to examine all the points at issue with a view to ascertaining whether anything can bo done to relieve the present tension.” GOERING’S SIGNIFICANT REMARK. A later telegram the same day from Sir Howard Kennard reads: “The Foreign Minister informs me that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin had an interview with Goering this afternoon. The interview was most cordial, and he told me that FieldMarshal Goering expressed regret that his policy of maintaining friendly relations with Poland should come to nought, and admitted that he no longer had influence to do much in the matter. Field-Marshal Goering had, however, no concrete suggestion to make' beyond what had struck Colonel Beck as a most significant remark, which be requested me to convey to you most confidentially. Field-Marshal Goering stated that the questions of Danzig and so forth were relatively small matters, hut the main obstacle to any diminution of tension between the two countries was Poland’s alliance with Britain.” Sir Howard Kennard’s telegram proceeds* “ Colonel Beck had consulted

the President and Marshal SmiglyR.yclz, and it was decided that if the German Government should put forward a suggestion in any other way the answer could only be categorically in the negative, as Colonel Bock feels that Germany may make every effort to secure a free hand in Eastern Europe by such methods, and ho feels it should be clearly understood that Poland will riot be drawn into intrigue of this nature.”

The telegram adds that Germany was informed that Britain’s clear view was that direct discussion on equal terras between the parties was tiie proper means of negotiation. “ Poland enjoys the protection of the Anglo-Polish Treaty, and Britain has already made it plain, and is repeating it in the reply to Hitler to-day, that any settlement of German-Polish differences must safeguard Poland’s essential interests, and must he secured by international guarantee. We have, of course, seen reports of Hitler’s reply to M. Daladier, but we should not consider the intimation by Poland of her readiness to hold direct discussions as in any way implying acceptance of Hitler’s demands, which would, as made plain above, have to he examined in the light of the principles we have stated.”

A significant document is a long telegram from Berlin reporting the interview at which Sir Nevilo Henderson delivered the reply of the British Cabinet. Sir Nevile Henderson repeated the British readiness to reach an understanding. “It was now or never, and it rested with Hitler.” AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ILLUMINATING MAGAZINE SURVEY 1 PER CENT. FAVOUR GERMANY NEW YORK, September 21. (Received September 22, at 10 a.m.) The ‘ Fortune ’ magazine survey indicated that 83.1 per cent, were in favour of Britain and France; 68.8 believe that Britain and France will win; 24.7 favour a' complete embargo; 29.3 favour unrestricted “ cash and carry” sales; 19.9 favour supplying materials and food to Britain and France and denying Germany; 13.3 favour entering the war on the side of Britain and Franco only if their defeat is likely; 2.3 favour immediate war and sending a United States army to Europe; 1 per cent, urge support of Germany. FOOD COSTS SLIGHT RISE IN AMERICA WASHINGTON, September 21. (Received September 22, ap 10 a.m.) The Secretary for Labour (Miss Perkins) stated that food costs had increased 2 per cent, in the week ended September 19. EXPLOSION IN BONN FIRE IN FACTORY REPORTED STRICT SECRECY MAINTAINED BRUSSELS, September 21, (Received September 22, at 11 a.m.) An explosion and a fire occurred in a factory in the Rhine city of Bonn. There were several casualties. The strictest secrecy is being maintained. NEUTRAL TRADERS DELEGATIONS VISITING LONDON STOCKHOLM, September 21. (Received September 22, at 8 a.m.) Seven delegates, representing industrial and shipping interests, are proceeding to London to negotiate with the British Government on commercial and navigation problems arising from the war. A Danish delegation will also visit London shortly.