BRITAIN’S ARMY
LIDDELL HART'S VIEW A LIMITED LIABILITY WAR TRADITIONAL POLICY The health of the Army, like that of any other institution in a democratic an 1 parliamentary country, depends on a just appreciation of its function and some knowledge of its problems by public opinion, writes the military correspondent of the 1 Manchester Guardian.’ A lighting service is itself inherently ill-adapted to public argument and discussion, and must rely to a great extent on independent publicists to represent it before the public forum. In the preface of his latest book, ‘ The Defence of Britain,’ Captain Liddell Hart makes an eloquent appeal for the •single-minded pursuit of truth. All liberal-minded men will subscribe to his plea. But the military problems of a world-wide commonwealth are necessarily complicated, and in the last resort depend on policy. Truth is manysided. The trouble is that there have not been enough Liddell Harts in the last 20 years to shed light on all facets. Captain Liddell Hart has always argued for a return to our “ traditional ” policy of limited-liability warfare. He opens again on this note. We conducted all our major wars until the last on this policy, and had a sustained run of success such as no other modern nation has known. Our main weapon was economic pressure exerted through sea power. A HUGE ARMY RAISED. In the last war we embarked for the first time on the revolutionary innovation of raising a huge army for direct participation in the laud struggle. The result left us exhausted, and this fact contributed materially to the unsatisfactory nature of the subsequent peace. He harps again on the relative strength of the defensive as compared with the offensive under the conditions of modern war, and goes on to express doubts whether decisive victory in war is any longer possible. On wider grounds he questions whether it is even desirable. He describes how he first came to appreciate collective security. “ That conclusion was clearly indicated on strategic grounds alone. But it also took account of the higher aspects of strategy—that a secure base depended on morale, and this in its turn on a secure moral basis.” It was ironical, he goes on, that at the same time as the Government moved towards the idea of returning to our traditional strategy they receded from the idea of collective security, which was its essentia] complement. And “ Munich ” undermined the foundations of both. The result is that we have now been dragged into the course of building a great land force. . . . MEMORANDA QUOTED.
Later Captain Liddell Hart goes on to quote various memoranda that he drew up at the request of Ministers on the subject of Army reform and the best utilisation of the forces available. This makes fascinating reading. It also provides some startling instances of our “ traditional ” policy in action. For instance, in a memorandum drawn up in. November, 1937 (after the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the introduction of conscription by Germany, and the conquest of Abyssinia by Italy, with the Spanish war in progress the Horae-Berlin Axis formed, and Germany, Italy, and Japan having signed the Anti-Comintern Pact), he comes to the conclusion that after making provision for all probable needs of Imperial defence only two _ infantry divisions and one mobile division would be available for assisting the defence, against an aggressor, of any country that we were pledged to support or should consider it an essential interest of ours to support. (The most probable case for support was considered to be France.) He goes on;— “ In the weeks that followed Government opinion moved towards the view that any reinforcement to Franco should be confined to sea and air support and that the organisation of the field force should no longer be directed to that purpose. . . . There was also an inclination to assume that largo savings might be possible in respect of modern equipment such as tanks; indeed, it was suggested that the Tank Corps could be abolished.” One would like to know what the Committee of Imperial Defence had to say on the subject. THE DEFENCE OF IDEALS. Less than a year later the reviewer, who had previously spent the yeans 1920 to 1930 in Germany and knew something of the country and the people, found himself acting as an “ observing officer ” in Czeoho-Slovakia superintending the transfer of the Sudeten territories to the control of the Germany army. He was brought into contact with many Gormans and Czechs From this and from subsequent. contact with candid French friends there was burnt on his brain the bitter lesson* that in future this country could not afford to take more nut of the common pot in the form of security, of Empire, of wealth, or of anything else than she was prepared to put back The modern version of our “ traditional ” policy had been pretty effectively seen through. Neither collective security, nor, for that matter, the continued existence of the British Commonwealth and the ideals for which it stood was possible on a limited-liability basis. The secure moral foundation on which British strategy must ultimately rest depends in the last resort on our willingness to stake everything on the furtherance rather than the defence of the ideals for which we stand. Moral leadership is a rare quality. If we arc not prepared to supply it nobody else is. CREDIT FOR REFORMS MADE. Happily we have moved far since those days, and Captain Liddell Hart treats from inside knowledge the subsequent progress of Army reform and
expansion. His praise of Mr HoreBciisha is well deserved. As one who has Himself wrought hard for Army reform in the years when public) interest in the subject was at low ebb Captain Liddell Hart can legitimately take credit for some of the results achieved. His views on what still remains to bo done must command attention
He is at his best on the subject of training. His study of tactics has led him to the conclusion that only really well-trained infantry, confident in themselves and their weapons, can live on a modern battlefield. Success in Avar will depend more and more on the initiative of the young n.c.o commanding his section of six men, often without the opportunity of referring to an officer. This is a question to which if is impossible to pay too much attention Roth the Regular Army and the Territorials arc now engaged in training greater numbers of men than ever before in peace-time. The Regular Army, in particular, is dealing in the militia with a type of man to which it has not been accustomed. There is scope for new methods, and very often the outside observer can see things that are hidden from the professional, who is inevitably to some extent caught up in a routine. .
THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM. Here he comes to the very core of the matter:
“ A great change in outlook and atmosphere is needed if service in the infantry is to attract the keen young men of this generation. They have heard too much from their fathers about the Somme and Passehendaele. If the infantry spirit is to be revived the causes of its decay must be frankly recognised and adequate treatment applied. The infantry must bo shoAvn, not merely, told, that theirs is a higher role than that of the supporting arms, calling for more skill and initiative than are required of the man who belongs to a gun crew. A proper appreciation of their role should lead them to be regarded as a corps d’elite, not as cannon fodder.” To the citizen soldier soldiering and Avar are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. That end Avill ahvays be a secure peace. It is perfectly true that after 1918 we mis the opportunity of capitalising the fruits of victory. But that Avas the fault of the statesman rather than of the soldiers. It is worth while examining to Avhat extent the return to our “traditional” policy of disinterestedness in the affaire of Europe and the consequent failure of collective security were responsible for the state of affairs that has hoav arisen. This is certainly the predominant impression carried "away after 10 post-war years in Germany, Avhich included five years as liaison officer Avith the French*' Army of the Rhine. In any case, it is doubtful if men Avill give of their best unless they are fighting for victory and the triumph, let alone the defence, of the moral ideals for Avhich they have taken up arms. This applies particularly to the infantry, on Avhom Avill inevitably fall the heat and burden of the clay and the bulk of the casualties, whether in attack or defence.
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Evening Star, Issue 23376, 20 September 1939, Page 10
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1,451BRITAIN’S ARMY Evening Star, Issue 23376, 20 September 1939, Page 10
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