The Evening Star. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1874.

Evening Star, Issue 3647, 30 October 1874, Page 2

The Evening Star. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1874.

There is a story told in the ‘ Mail,’ under date May 6, that tends to explain much of the uneasiness that Ims prevailed for some time regarding a probable European war. Our readers hardly need be informed that the c Mail’ is a concentrated edition of the ‘ Times,’ and as that journal has the reputation of acquiring the earliest and best information on foreign politics, even its canards, which, by the way, are not a few, tend to alarm or to sooth the public miud. The sensational heading to the tale is “ Playing with fire,” and it was written by the ‘ Times’ correspondent at Paris. The substance of it is as follows The King of Italy and Prince Bismarck met tu Berlin, and having met they had a talk about the Franco-German war. The conversation is not told verbatim. We are not informed what Victor Emmanuel said, nor how Bismarck replied ; but it appears that the latter expressed his opinion that he had made “ two great mistakes”—he had over-estimated the military force of France, and under-estimated its financial resources. So far the mistakes were on the right side, for both proved immediately advantageous to Prussia ; the armies of Germany proved adequate to the fighting, and the resources of France to the paying sections of the tragedy. The Prince had calculated on a rising of the population pf France m masse; which would have given op portunity for thorough annihilation ; and now that the victory has left France so little injured that Von Moltke says Prussia must remain protected by ‘IOO,OOO armed men for the next fifty years to secure the conquests of five days, Bismarck grumbles, and says;— >

Under all the circumstances it was a mistake not to have overrun the whole of France, to lave gono to Toulon and Maiseilles, to Bordeaux and Bayonne, and to have let the whole country see and feel the power of Germany. As it /’as, more than half the country never felt the war. Departments even got rich upon it. Large profits were made in various districts owing to the great demand for certain things for the new levies ; in other places the prices if the necessaries of life fell in consequence of the cessation of all demand for them from bqsieged Paris. In PrincelßiSMAßCK’s opinion the comcqueuce of the lightness with which the conflict pressed upon two-thiids of France will he a readiness to plunge again into war whenever she discovers, or fancies she discovers, a tVvorable opportunity. Mindful of past sufferings, the North and Mast might be disposed to abstain, but they will be driven forward by the •vouth. Not having overrun the country and reduced it to desolation, Bismarck gives that as a reason for annexing Alsace and Lorraine. Explaining his second mistake, the German Premier is said to have observed that Germany should have

Insisted on nn indemnity large enough to have crippled France financially for many years. Ten milliards would have done this. As it was, the Germans, ignorant of the vast hidden wealth of the country, asked only for a sum which, huge though it was, was almost immediately paid off, and France is now recovering herself, cicatrizing her wounds, and, having a very fertile soil and fine climate, will »oon again be far richer than the comparatively barren country which has carried away her milliards and already nearly run through them. In short, the conviction at Berlin rins to he that the first war or serious diffici. 'y in which Germany may be engaged will serve = v dgnal for France to attack.

T3 wing committed id '-3 two grievous errors, which have i- it the demon, of ie-enge hovering ov r Germany, keeping the people taxed sd heavily that in a few years the heavy ransom received will be absorbed in the cost of a standing army, Prince Bismarck is said to have played the part of a tempter. Seated on the pinnacle which he has 'v ised in Germany, he showed Victor jvimanuel, Nice and Savoy—once Italian States, now under French rule—and said, in effect, “These will I give thee, if I have thy help.” He pointed out the traditional relationship between the family of the King and the Savoyards, and that although in 1860 taey chose annexation to France, it would now be easy to get up an antiFrench agitation. The cry once raised, the rest would quickly follow. The excitable Italians would be fired with a passionate enthusiasm for the redemption of their alienated countrymen ; there would be a rush to arms, and once more the old battle cry of “ Savoia!” would be heard in the van of battle. How could Prussia, for very shame, allow her old ally to engage in an unequal strife? She would feel all her chivalry embarked in the cause of the people that fought by her side in 1806. It would be easy to foster mid encourage that feeling till it overcame more selfish considerations. She would strike in and drag Germany with her. France would again be humbled and weakened, this time more thoroughly and durably than the last, and Italy would regain what never ought to have been taken from her.

But the tempter was foiled. The king of Italy did not take the bait :• — ° Victor Emmanuel is a wary Prince, and mindful of bis people’s true interests. He showed no disposition for fresh military v e n tures. The consequences might be too seriou-. The financial position of Italy had to be considered. Her embarrassments were great, her funds depressed, there was a heavy annual delicit, and the exchange was nearly 20 per cent, against her. This was not a favorable combination of circumstances under which to go to war. Indispensable econony had compelled large reductions of military forces—reductions which had seemed, moreover, to be justified in the case of Italy by her friendly understanding with most of the European Powers and by the improbability that France would be moved oven by regret'for lost influence and by sympathy with the Pope, to risk an aggression. Were Italy rashly to commence a war, she would run the danger of another Custozza, and nothing that Germany could do for her would repair the ill effect of that. Moreover, the very first; consequence of a war would be to send her funds down, perhaps even lower than they were iu 1860 and after - Montana, and to depreciate still further her paper currency, already at so great a discount. In, short, a national bankruptcy would be highly probable and hardly avoidable.

So ends this plausibly-told story, which our readers can accept for what it is worth. In the House of Lords, perhaps in consequence of its publication, Earl Russell moved for “ copies of any correspondence relating to the maintenance of the peace of Europe with the Governments of Germany, Austria, Russia, and France.” He wished to know “ whether the symptoms of agitation and hostility which at present were perceived were the subsiding waves of a past storm or the omens of a coming tempest.” The question, then, was whether the symptoms now perceived were those of an approaching storm, or whether, notwithstanding those symptoms, we might remain for sorqe years in peace and tranquility. If they were the signs of storms, and if the peace of Europe was likely to be disturbed, it would be desirable to know whether her Majesty’s Government would be m that case prepared to take measures to piesei ve the peace of Europe. For his own part, he was convinced that such was the vast influence of England in the councils of Europe that it would be in her power to preserve the general peace. He did not think any Power would venture to disturb it if there was a strong alliance between England and the other Powers to preserve the peace of Europe. * * * * *

There could be no disturbance of the peace of Europe without the infliction of great evils in this country (England). It was not only that trade would suffer, but also the social happiness, the progress of liberty, and the advance of arts ana civilisation would be endangered.

Earl Derby replied cautiously, and, to our minds, not very satisfactorily. He alluded to the events that had occurred, the soreness of feeling between the French and Germans : the one anxious us a nation to recover the lost provinces, the other determined to hold them—and continued :

Now, that ia a condition of things which is known to all, and in referring to it I am merely lemindnig your loniahius of circumstances of n Inch you are aware. The subject is one which must occupy the attention of those who have the car# oi foreign affairs. It may be said that aiere is no use in trying to prevent it, as that, uo what wo may, wu~ will come sooner or ' •ter. I think it was Mr Canning who, in eply . person who made a similar remark to .in, said, Well, if it is to come soener or ...ter I should prefer that it should be rather ;.icer than aooncr.”-(A laugh and “Hear.”) Obviously there is the chance that with time relings oi agitation will subside in men’s !t inds, and that, therefore, there will be a gi enter chance of tlie preservation of peace I think however, your lardships will be of opinion tnat 1 would ue doing a very rash thing if I vinturad to predict what may happen in some years to come. But with all that feeling of uncertainty I must say that if I way judge from

all the information I receive—from the general tone and spirit of the communications which reach me from all parts of Europe—so far as immediate appearances go there is no serious cause fn’apprehension of any disturbance of the peace of Europe.—(Hear, hear.) I now come to the other question. The noble earl asks, in the e%ent of the dangers of war becoming more imminent, what shall we do to preserve the peace. Now, my lords, that is an inquiry n mch cannot be answered in any verv definite teims; but I there cannot be a doubt that, without embroiling ourselves in a quarrel to whicn we were not a party, we should leave no reasonable endeavor untried to preserve peace.

The latest advices rather incline to a less warlike tone, but there is evidently a piling up of faggots that only require the match of an incendiary to set Europe in a blaze.