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SUPREME COURT.

CRIMINAL SITTING. Wednesday, April 29. (Before His Honor Mr /Justice Chapman and a /Special Jury,) REGINA V. LONG. We giye the substance of his Honor’s Charge to the jury : Murder was the unlawful and felonious killing of one man by another with, as it was technically called, malice and aforethought. Firing at a man and killing him was a case of malice aforethought, unless there were circumstances in the case which would lead the jury to take another view. If the jury considered ther& was gross orhasty provocation, it was in their province to negative the prima facie evidence of malice afore-thom-ht, give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt, and find him guilty of manslaughter. Life might be taken in self-defence, and in some ; ca#es in defending property, under such circumstances as would justify the jury in acquitting altogether. The suggestion was set up by prisoner’s counsel that there was such a terror spread round the House on the night in question, such reasonable ground of teiror, as to justify prisoner, i i defence of his property, in firing at deceased ; the second suggestion that prisoner did not intend to kill deceased, but to frighten; and the tendency of a weapon of that descript on to become, when the trigger was being pulled, depressed, in the muzzle. There seemed to be something reasonable in the second suggestion—he was now merely speaking of the tendency—shat the trigger in being pulled should have a natural tendency to depress the muzzle. His Honor next laid down the circumstances under which a jury wo ild acquit ,on the ground of excusable or justifiable homicide. If a man had reasonable apprehension that his house would be attacked, and that himself was in danger, ami fired and killed a man, the whole circam stances of the ease would be taken into con., siderafion by the Jury, and the prisoner might be acquitted. Was there anything in the cake

to justify a reasonable man to apprehend ! auoh. an attack ? That was the point i It was for the jury to say, as to the breaches of law at Green Island as disclosed by the evidence, whether there was such a state of larrikinism or rowdyism as to generate in the neighborhood a feeling of terror. Now, it was stated in evidence that Long kept a very respectable house ; indeed, one of the witnesses suggested that he was too respectable for that occupation in life. Moreover, of the eight years of his life, and for the last four years at Green Island, not one witneshad made a single suggestion against his conand he was • escribed as a quiet, civd. obliging, kind, cha itable, peaceful man. 1 his evidence as to character was calle-l to establish from antecedents the improbability of prisoner committing the crime. If one were asked that it was likely a man described wtb all these favorable epithets would i ommit murder, or manslaughter, the answer would at once.jae, “certainly not.” Evidence of character'established the antecedent improbabil ty, but it must give way before positive evidence. Where there was a doubt, and where there were two or three hypotheses as to guilt nicely balanced, good character might be thrown in and turn the’ scale. But r,he best evidence of goid character was not to weigh in the minds of the jury, if the case for the prosecution were proved. The throwing of atones and kicking at. Long’s door by the deceased were attacks which any one inside the house might fairly treat as hostile. Mr Barton was very wise in not denying that the deceased fell by a shot fired by the prisoner, and in devoting all his energies to show that the killing was accidental. The juestion for the jury to determine was this : Was all the jury had heard from the witnesses sufficient to justify the belief that the crowd was about to attack the bouse ? There was an assignable cause for the disturbance: thedeceased had been turned out and kicked by the big fellow outside the house, and the strong suspicion would come into the mind that it was the deceased that was making the disturbance. Taking that into consideration, and the evidence of Laidlaw that the crowd was quiet —allowing for the usual amount of vocal noise, high talking, and exclamations in crowds—was there anything in the whole ©f the circutnstances described to make the jury believe there was any chance of the house being at tacked, or that there was any danger to his family or property to justify him in firing (that was, if he hred at deceased intentionally) at and killing a fe low creature ? I’hen came the suggestion of accident—and before he came to this he explained to them the difference between murder and manslaughter. There must, to constitute manslaughter, he a reasonable provocation, and

accused must not have time to cool. Had prisoner time to cool after he fired the shot? His determination, coupled with other circumstances, might induce the'jury to find the minor offence ; at all events, it was slightly against the hypothesis of intending' to tire in the air. Did he intend to fire in the crowd, or was deceased the object of his animosity ? The reasonable presumption that the deceased was the only person who made any disturbance seemed to favor the hypothesis that he fired at him, and not at the crowd. The leading thought running through prisoner’s mind was the protec don' of his property. He ,did not think the difference was very great' as to whether the words were uttered before or after the firing. If they were certain' accused remained there long enough to see the effect of his shot, no doubt such an expression—‘‘that is the way I serve such as ye for damaging my property” would be strong evi nence of preconcerted determination, and would be sufficient to establish, or rather confirm, the supposition of the malice aforethought which always attached the felonious killing in the first instance until the contrary be shown. If the words were utthred before the firing, they pointed to a person in a state <-f irritation, and would app y more on the hypothesis of manslaughter than tha f - of murder. If these words had been uttered after the shot was fired, and it was proved prisoner was aware his shot had 'aken effect, there would, as Mr Barton had observed, have been strong proof of malice ; but there was no proof prisoner was aware the shot had taken effect—the words might have been uttered almost at the very moment the shot was delivered. Probably the whole transaction did not occupy many seconds. It was for the jury to say whether such an accident as the pull of the trigger causing the to be depressed, and so accidentally, leading to the deceased being shot, happened on the occasion, Would they accept the hypothesis he had last mentioned, or that of murder, or that of manslaughter ? and between the two last he would invite them to consider most carefully. If they considered accused had committed wilful murder, it would be their duty to bring in a verdict to_ that effect; or to find him guilty on the minor offence if they had any reasonable doubt as to the existence of malice aforethought. The jury retired to consider their verdict at twenty minutes pnst five, and returned into court at twenty minutes past seven o’clock.

The Foreman: Your Honor, the members of the jury wish to ask the Court a question prior to giving a decision. His Honor ; What is it ? The Foreman : In the event of our returning a verdict of manslaughter, can the jury accompany that verdict with the remark that the manslaughter is of an aggravated form? ; His Honor; The yerdict must be one'of wilful murder or manslaughter. I can simply take either of those verdicts. The Foreman then said the jury found the prisoner guilty of manslaughter.' Mr Barton : We may thank the Press for pot having a recommendation of mercy attached to it. His Honor : I don’t know that. The verdict of the jury should not be commented upon. I have no doubt they have given a conscientious verdict! Remove the prisoner till Friday. Mr Barton: Of course we can call witnesses to speak ,to Long’s character ? His Honor : I don’t think it is necessary, lam satisfied; so is the jury. Mr Barton : I atn pot sure of that.

The prisoner was then removed, and will be brought up for sentence $t IJ tomorrow.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD18740430.2.11

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Evening Star, Issue 3490, 30 April 1874, Page 2

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,427

SUPREME COURT. Evening Star, Issue 3490, 30 April 1874, Page 2

SUPREME COURT. Evening Star, Issue 3490, 30 April 1874, Page 2

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