RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT,
Tins Dav. (Before A. C. Strode, Esq., R.M.) JUDGMENT. Cole v. Murray and Another.—ln delivering judgment in this case, his Worship said : —Heaving considered the points raised in defence of this action, I have come to the conclusion that the defendants are Jointly liable for this claim. Bindley on Partner-
ship lays this down ; That every member of an ordinary partnership is its general agent for the transaction of its business in the ordinary way, and the firm is responsible for whatever is done by any of the partners when acting for the firm, within the limits of the authority conferred by the nature of the business it carries on.' Whatever, as between the partners themselves, may be the limits set to each other’s authority, every person not acquainted with limits is entitled to assume that each partner is empowered to do for the firm whatever is necessary for the transaction of its business, in the way in which that business is ordinarily carried on by other people. Again, in the case of Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. and W., 79, ibis laid down that—“ One partner Las implied authority to hire servants to perform the business of the partnership ” ; and in a note to that case it is stated that a servant of the firm is a servant of each of the partners, and may be described accordingly in an indictment for stealing the separate property of one of the partners. It seems to be laid down that when two persons repose mutual confidence in each other by entering into partnership, the act of one becomes the act of both, to persons outside the firm, in anything connected in the ordinary way of business with the partnership. 1 don’t think that the fact of Murray refusing the hiring in this particular case, would abridge the powers of Fuller to hire servants for the business of the firm in tho ordinary way. Judgment for plaintiff, L 3, together with costs. APPLICATION FOR APPEAL. Mr Barton said, in tho case of 0010 v. Murray, ho understood the decision was in favor of the plaintiff. It was a case that involved the result of many other transactions besides the one in which tho action was brought. He therefore asked leave to appeal. His Worship said he would give every assistance in. his power, but he had not the power to do it. It was not a question of leave. He never refused leave, but he had not the power. In cases involving amounts from L 5 to L2O he could grant leave, but under Lo he had not the power. Mr Barton said that, although the case was only for L 3, it was a very important one.
His Worship agreed that the case involved very important questions —there could be no doubt of that. He thought it very bad taste of the parties to act as they had done ; but, of course, he had nothing to do with that. Mr Barton said that one point had not struck him at the time the case was heard ; there was an action pending between the parties, and the commencement of the suit terminated the partnership. The public were bound to take notice of the proceedings in the Court. He would apply for a rehearing on the point he bad urged, and he thought he could cite cases in support of his argument. His Worship pointed out that the application might be opposed, and Mr Barton withdrew. Civil Casks. Wilson v, Fynmore.—For firewood supplied, LI 4s. The defendant pleaded nonliability, as he ordered the wood merely as agent for his father, with whoiq he was at that time living, but who has since left the Province. Judgment for the defendant. George Harris v. Thomas "Cunningham.— Iss. The defendant pleaded non-liability as the boots were delivered to him against his will. The plaintiff said the defendant was a shoemaker in his employ. He had given an order for a pair of boots, which on being supplied proved to be of such disgracefully had quality that after two days’ wear they were returned on his hands. He had sent them to defendant to let him see them, and they were thrown away by him. He therefore sued for the value. His Worship said had the defendant confined himself to refusing to take the boots back, he would not have been liable, but having thrown the hoofs away, he had deprived Mr Harris of his property, and was clearly liable. Judgment for the plaintiff. W. Palmer v. J. Eddison. L7 6s 3d, balance of account for drapery supplied. Judgment by default for the plaintiff. Sam# v. Christina Stewart. —L 4 18s 6d, the amount of an lOU for drapery supplied. The defendant denied having signed the lOU produced, and was required to sign her name. Judgment for the plaintiff for the amount.
Same v. Susan Hosden. —L 4 12s 9d, the amount of an lOU. The defendant pleaded non-liability, and that sho could not write. Judgment for plaintiff, L 4 12s 9d.
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Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2181, 4 May 1870, Page 2
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848RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT, Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2181, 4 May 1870, Page 2
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