The Evening Star MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1870

Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2138, 14 March 1870, Page 2

The Evening Star MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1870

The Southern Cross , of the 4th March, contains a memorandum by Mr Gisbournr, in reply to Earl Granville’s dispatch of October 7th, commanding the removal of the 18th Regiment. Although we look upon the removal of the troops as no disadvantage to the Colony, for we never could see what possible benefit could be derived from paying forty thousand a year for no active service, as a controversial paper, there can be no doubt that Mr Gisborne has the best of it; for he shows that the policy of Earl Granille is an abandonment of the principles and course of action approved by previous Administrations, and that the Colony has been led into arrangements which the Imperial Government were bound to support. The dispatch is too long for insertion, but the following synopsis of it will be read with interest. Mr Gisborne first replies to Earl Granville’s complaint, that the only documents received on the subject of retaining the 18th Regiment, were the addresses to Sir Trevor Chute and the Act pledging the Colony to support the regiment during its retention. Mr Gisborne remarks, that it was obviously intended to offer proposals to the Imperial Government for the regiment being stationed in Hew Zealand in future, and regrets that His Lordship did not wait for those proposals before coining to a decision. He then says : The grounds on which the decision to remove the 18th Regiment is based are to some extent new. They ■ may be broadly stated to be, the possibility of British troops being actively implicated in New Zealand warfare, and the encouragement, by the presence of British soldiers, of the Colony in a policy which the Imperial Government “have always regarded as pregnant with danger.” The objectionable features in that policy, so far as can be gathered from the despatch, seem to be the confiscation of native land, and the non-recognition of Maori authority.

Replying to these reasons Mr Gisborne remarks that Mr Cardwell and Lord Carnarvon, who not only had those reasons before them, but were requested by the Colonial Government to remove all British troops, decided to leave one regiment on condition that a certain sum was contributed by the Colony to Native purposes. Further ; that the Governor and Legislature concurred in opinion that one regiment should be left in the Colony, which should contribute to its support j that the reasons in favor of that course were equally applicable now as they were three years ago ; that in all previous correspondence no intimation of intention to remove the troops was expressed by the Home Government, and the Colony had been invited to propose terms to pay the regiment. With regard to British troops being implicated in native wars, the best reply was that practically, for three years, not an Imperial soldier had been required to leave garrison, although their presence in the Colony had given moral support to the Colonists in their struggles with the Maoris, and “the removal would, in all proba- “ bility, have extended the insnrrec- “ tion, and aggravated its horrors.” Mr Gisborne points out, next, that at a time like the present, when the Native mind is unsettled, and when the chances are even between a general rising or a peaceful settlement, the withdrawal of the troops has a tendency to turn the scale against the Colony. This is the more to be feared as the Ministry are engaged in “ delicate nego- “ ciatious with the (so-called) King “ party, with a view to the isolation of “Te Kooti and other rebels in “ arms The receipt and

“ previous publication of Earl Gran- “ ville’s despatch seriously imperil the “ prospect of success, and justify an “ apprehension of calamitous x’esults.” Throughout the line of argument adopted by Earl Granville, Mr Gisborne remarks “ a pervading spirit ot “ estrangement from the Colony.” Commenting upon this, he reminds his Lordship that “ New Zealand is not an “ alien country,” but although peopled by two races, they are British subjects, and that the present Prime Minister, when Chancellor of the Exchequer in 18G1, stated that “ he did not see how England “ could, with justice, throw the whole “ responsibility of the war on the “ Colony,” that “ the policy which had “ led to the war had net been exclu- “ sively that of the Colony,” and that “ the Home Government had approved “ it, and were so far responsible for “ it.” Mr Gisborne maintains that the war to which Mr Gladstone referred has not yet ceased, and that when Her Majesty assumed the sovereignty of the North Island, the protection of Great Britain was extended alike to loyal Natives and Colonists; and that solemn undertaking precluded the Imperial policy of absolute isolation and denial of moi'al support. After referring to the loyalty of the Colonists* to the Crown, Mr Gisborne addresses

himself to the disapproval of Earl Granville of the Native policy of the Colony, and his insinuation that the presence of the troops would tend to perpetuate it. He points out that no good can result from discussion of the policy, as any lengthened defence of it must be recriminatory to a certain extent. Earl Granville’s principal objection is to confiscation of land belonging to Natives in arms, yet that had been approved by the Duke of Newcastle and Mr Secretary Cardwell ; was sanctioned by Governor Sir George Grey, and concurred in by Lieutenant-General Cameron. This argument is supported by copious extracts from official documents ; and in reply to Earl Granville’s illustration of his opinion, by reference to Te Kooti’s case, “ that the discontent of the “ Natives does mainly arise from the “ confiscation of the lands,” Mr Gisborne quotes from Mr Justice Johnston’s summing up of the evidence at the trial of some of Te Kooti’s followers, in which he shows that Te Kooti s rebellion was not instigated by a desire to repossess land confiscated, or by tribal quarrels, but was purely rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government. Mr Gisborne contends that it is impossible to recognise “ Maori authority,” as suggested by Earl Granville, without compromising the Colony ; and especially should the authority of the Maori King be conceded, it would not tend to pacification, but would render tribes opposed to him our enemies. “Conciliation of Te “ Kooti simply is submission to mas- “ sacre.” The Colonial Government desires to remove every real Native grievance ; but to attempt to buy off those fighting against us by concession of land or authority would be dangerous, because an expression of weakness. Mr Gisborne draws a parallel between the policy suggested by Earl Granville and that followed by the British Government in regard to Ireland, and offers some very just remarks as to the impolicy of publishing a despatch in the English newspapers, so that its substance could be known in the Colony before it reached the Executive. He considers such <a course, apart from its marked disrespect, calculated injuriously to affect the Native mind. He then closes by saying :

Ministers trust that in this memorandum which it has been their painful duty to write in answer to Earl Granville’s despatch, they have not been betrayed by the strength of their natural feelings on a subject of vital importance to the Colony, into any expression [offensive to the Imperial Government, or unbecoming their own position. Their sole endeavor has been to controvert, fairly and frankly the erroneous (as they think) statements and imputations unreservedly conveyed in that despatch, and to represent truly the case of New Zealand in relation to the Empire. They claim that the Colony should be practically recognised as an integral portion of that Empire, and not be thrust out beyond its pale as of infinitely less consideration than a British subject in foreign lands. They ask England for no pecuniary sacrifice; they do not appeal to her compassion ; but they do appeal to those eternal principles of justice, which are as much the duty of the strong as they are the heritage of the weak, and which even the most powerful nation should never withhold from the feeblest suppliant.