SUPREME COURT.

Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2110, 9 February 1870, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.

IN BANKRUPTCY. This Day. (Before Mr Justice Ward.) Re Louis Court. — The appointment of Mr Bathgate as trustee was confirmed, and the bankrupt's last examination was fixed for the 2Gth inst. IN BANCO. Macassey v. Massey. —Mr Cook obtained a rule nisi to set the nonsuit obtained herein. Dunedin Waterworks Company v. Drummond. —On the application of Mr Macassey, leave was reserved to state a case for the Court of Appeal. Reid v. Fulton.- — The argument in this case was adjourned hy consent until tomorrow. Young v. Smith. —ln this case, a rule nisi had been obtained for a new trial. Mr Macassey showed cause, and premised his remarks hy pointing out that the nonsuit could not be granted, as it must go for all points, whilst on one of the causes of action raised in this case, the jury had found for the plaintiff, and in the other had found for the defendant hy his Honor’s direction. With regard to the second ground on which the rule had been obtained —viz., that the words disclosed were applicable to the plaintiff in his trade or business —there was abundant evidence on that point. With regard to the second point, that the words used hy the defendant were not libellous, the true answer was that they appeared on the record, and the proper proceeding to have been taken was to move for an arrest of judgment, on the ground that the declaration failed to disclose any cause of action, or hy proceeding in error. It was for the Judge to say whether the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, and it was for the jury to say whether or not they bore that meaning. Not only did the jury find that in tins case—and to look at the words themselves it would be found so—but they found that the true inference to he drawn from them was that they reflected upon the plaintiff’s character. There could he no doubt that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in his capacity of auctioneer, and there was also the fact that he would have been employed but for the statements made. The third ground was, that the communications to the witnesses Driver and Harris were made on a privileged occasion. The words were used at a conversation between three gentlemen, who were to a certain extent interested in the sale of certain property; and the communication would have been privileged hut that there was abundant evidence to go to the jury of malice on the part of the defendant. As to the other ground—that there was no evidence of the actual words spoken—he submitted that if it was found there was any evidence to go to the jury, the verdict would not bo disturbed. The defendant had an opportunity of going into the witness box to refute the statement of the plaintiff, hut ho did not do so, and the circumstance was to lie regarded strongly by the Court—in fact, the ease of the plaintiff' was strengthened by the defendant’s absence. Mr Barton argued at considerable length that the rule should he made absolute. Rule made absolute, with costs.