PANAY INCIDENT

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 22, 27 January 1938, Page 24

PANAY INCIDENT

HOW IT WAS HANDLED

THE PRESIDENT'S PART

The effect of putting the Ludlow war referendum resolution in the Constitution would achieve its undeclared purpose, wrote Arthur Krock,, from Washington to the "New York Times" on December 16. This is—in addition to requiring assent by a popular majority of the voters to a declaration of war, except when our territory is invaded and our citizens are attacked —to shackle the Executive in the conduct of foreign policy in critical times;

I How infinitely more likely to bring on war than avert it such an effect would be is vividly illustrated by the events of this week hi connection with the bombing of the American gunboat Panay by the Japanese forces in China. The. reparations and apologies undertakenl and foreshadowed by the Japanese Government <will go far to remove the dangers of war in the situation. That is t an obvious statement of fact; But if the Ludlow resolution were a part of the Constitution the drag oh Executive authority and action would have, produced a faltering policy. The present condition of the Japanese military mind\ makes it a logical conclusion that such a course, would have been followed by. more outrages, and the result could easily have been war..

The promptness and firmness of the President and the State Department is responsible for the swift realisation at Tokio of the effect of the Panay incident upon the unhampered Executive Government of the United States. Acting under the Constitution airid a representative-form', of Government, the President was free to move forcefully with ; the object of preserving peace. In this, according to all'indications, he will be successful. COURSE NOT POSSIBLE. But under the,revolutionary change in powers prescribed;,by the Ludlow: resolution, a President who was the. -political product of an electorate which had voted the change would have not done-the things Mr. Robsevelt. did.

A resume o£ what happened in Washington this week after the first official dispatches about the Panay came to the .State Department demonstrates the value and efficiency of our present method of handling- foreign affairs, particularly under a President with Mr. Roosevelt's knowledge and iniag> nation. His aides in this field Unite m saying that no department expert is better read in history and diplomatic precedents, and that the President's experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the World War was revealed throughout the grave discussions. When the news, of the bombing arrived, it was, of course, fragmentary. It was" not then certain (as it is now) that the firing on.th^ ships was not an "accident." But it was clear from the first that a serious international incident had occurred, calling for firm action. The Secretary of State entered conference. with the Under-Sec-retary. Their key men were , called in, and what to do and how to do it was the business of the meeting. 1 PRESIDENT IN ACTION. But the President went immediately into action, without waiting for the results of the, conference. He' decided to protest and informed the Department of State of the points he desired to be made. All of them but one had been instantly outlined by Mr. Hull. But that one point helped to strengthen the American protest and make it historic. It was the President's "request" —changed by him from the more diplo-

matic word "suggest"—that the' Emperor of Japan be "advised" that the head of the American State ■ was "shocked and concerned."

This was a masterstroke of diplomacy, although it is something diplomats would probably not have considered or advised. It cut straight through the well-known policy divisions between the' civilian statesmen and the military commanders in Japan. Addressed to the man who, in a sense .b6th sacred and temporal, represents the supreme power of the Japanese State, it thrust all the factions upon the horns of a dangerous dilemma. By taking, no notice of the President's "request" their nation and their Emperor would lose face-in the world. By bringing the request to the Emperor's attention and producing a response, they would make his sacred person a guarantee against the excesses of troops under the undisciplined commanders. WOULD WEAKEN POLICY. In a nation which had advertised its pacifism to the point of writing the Ludlow resolution'into the Consti-. tution no such brilliant and effective handling of the situation would be possible. The required combination was a small group of men with their present constitutional powers, directed by a chief with Mr. Roosevelt's deep' knowledge of international affairs and diplomatic imagination. The more such power is diffused, the larger the effective group. The more the pure democratic process is applied to such matters, the weaker and the .less effective will be action;in acute matters of foreign policy., ~ To follow through the philosophy of the so-called Neutrality Act and the Ludlow resolution is to diffuse the power, enlarge the group, and stifle the action.

This is no objection to those who believe isolation is feasible in the modern world, so long as we have a two-Power navy. It is no objection to those to, whom isolation means "withdrawing" all our commercial roots in Europe and in Asia. • But to reasonable persons it should demonstrate the danger and folly of pacifist proposals. ■