ASIA'S ETHIOPIA?

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 4, 6 January 1936, Page 5

ASIA'S ETHIOPIA?

FATE OF NORTH CHINA'

JAPANESE POLICY

Repercussions of the Halo-Ethio-pian conflict already are being foreshadowed in the Far East, wrote N. J. Timperley from Peking to the "Christian Science Monitor" recently. Here in North China hardly anybody has doubted that the Japanese militarists would find in the present preoccupation of the western powers a heaven-sent opportunity to extend their influence upon the Asiatic mainland.

Day by day an accumulation of evidence has pointed to a clear-cut intention on the part of the Japanese Army to convert the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Suiyuan, and Chahar—virtually the whole of North China dewn to the Yellow River—into what military propagandists describe in their pamphlets as "a paradise of harmonious SinoJapanese relations."

First intimation that rapid crystallisation of political tendencies in this part of the world' might be expected was conveyed in a remarkably forthright statement of policy issued to the Japanese Press from the headquarters of Major-General Hayao Tada, commandant of the Japanese garrison, at Tientsin, roundly attacking the Central Government and hinting plainly at the desirability of an autonomous government in North China. TO BRING PEACE. "To put an end to these activities and bring about peace," Major-General Tada is quoted as having declared, "a new political setup, politically as well as economically separate from Nanking, is necessary. North China's annual revenues amount to 130,000,000 yen and. would be more than enough to maintain such a setup.. However, North. China has always been exploited by; General Chiang and his military, clique, and more than half of this sura has to be transmitted to Nanking. This results in the impoverishment of the masses. We must do everything in our power to rescue the suffering, if only in the interests of justice." Official disclaimers in Tokio have failed to remove the impression that this represents the viewpoint of an influential section of Japanese military opinion. Major-General Tada's views are reliably reported to have received confirmation at a conference of highranking Japanese army officers at Dairen when it was decided to request the Chinese Government to root up; all causes of trouble in North China, "failing which the Japanese Army would insist upon divorcing \ North China from Nanking's control, including the withdrawal of Central .Government troops and complete severance of financial relations." Conditions have seldom been more favourable for the implementation of the Japanese Army's expansionist programme. The Peking Political Council, which the Japanese had hoped to manipulate to their advantage but which in practice acted as a check upon Japanese aggression, has been dissolved. The personnel of the provincial administrations has been reshuffled in accordance with Japanese ideas. SUPPLANTED. General Shang Chen, the Governor of the Hopei Province, who had always been regarded as a strong advocate of centralisation, has been supplanted in the Javanese favour by General Sung Cheh-yuan, former. Governor of Chahar, who has been given the command of the Peiping and Tientsin garrisons and is expected to prove more pliable. A political vacuum has been created and Japanese pressure is being applied directly upon the provincial leaders, before whom tempting offers are being, dangled. In some quarters the view is held that the Japanese are using North China merely as a pawn in a much. larger game. The threat to establish an independent regime is being held over the head of the Central Government, it is suggested, in the hope that far-reaching political concessions may, be extracted. But this leaves out of account a number of important economic factors. The Japanese Army is well known to be bent upon the exploitation and development of North China's natural re sources in order to have at its command a readily accessible supply of raw materials in time of war. It had been hoped that the capital for this development might be furnished jointly by Chinese and Japanese financiers. NOT FORTHCOMING. So far, however, this capital lias not been forthcoming from either side. With one exception the principal Chinese bankers are controlled from Shanghai and the Shanghai bankers have shown a reluctance to enter into any engagements with the Japanese under present conditions. Similar difficulty is being experienced in coaxing money out of the pockets of the Jai* anese investor. Enormous sums Ct money have been invested in Ma*» chukuo with disappointing results an 3 there has already been in Japanese financial circles a good deal of ad* verse comment upon the reckless c* portation of capital to the new Stat*: Should it prove impossible to «t* ploit North China through normal in* vestment channels, some observer! foresee the likelihood that in order tfc carry its grandiose schemes into effecj the Japanese Army must.be driven ta the establishment of a Japan-Manchi* kuo-North China economicylbloc, wilfe the yen as the chief medium of <sSf change. And the formation of such » bloc presupposes political action alontf the lines indicated by Major-General Tada's statement, for only thus would it be possible to secure the complete financial control which might make intensive economic exploitation feasible.