CHANGED DAYS

Evening Post, Volume CXVI, Issue 104, 30 October 1933, Page 9

CHANGED DAYS

EUROPEAN ALLIANCES

THE IMPACT OF GERMANY

t WHERE FRANCE STANDS

The change in the relations between Prance and Englaud since th*> advent of the Hitler regime is mainly psychological. There is more sympathy for Franco in England today than at any other time since tho war, writes the Paris correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian." Many Frenchmen who have for years been taught by their Press to distrust "anti-French" and "pro-German" England are now so surprised by the change that they can scarcely believe that.it will last. They fail to appreciate the fact that what their Press used to describe as "antiFrench" was merely anti-Poincare or anti-Tardieu, and that when England seemed to be pro-German it only meant that in her desire to pacify ■ Europe she was determined to give Germany—the Germany of Stresemann and Bruening—a chance; the chance which she fully deserved. ■ England's attitude, to Franco is, of course, different today from what it was two years, or even a year, ago. The usual English criticisms of France's disarmament policy no longer apply today in the same measure as before. While it was possible to believe in tho good will of a man like Bruening, the Germany of Hitler can inspiro nothing but distrust; and it is generally agreed today that if in the past the French placed great obstacles in the way of disarmament with their tremendously elaborate and impracticable security plans, they are today more than justified in demanding an effective and reliable system of control and inspection. Although their demand that any system decided upon should first be given a trial period may sound like another attempt to put off tho evil hour of disarmament, the war menace created by tho Hitler regime is so obvious that it is difficult to criticise the French too severely for wishing to take this additional precaution. STRONGHOLD OF FREEDOM. There is a growing impression here that since the establishment of tho Hitler regime at least the more enlightened section of British public opinion has once again developed a warm fellow-feeling for France. France, whose civilisation is so closely linked with England's own, is one of the last strongholds of personal freedom and ono of tho last great democracies in the world. And although there are some who speak of the imminent downfall of democracy throughput the world, the truth is that nothing has rendered a greater service to tho cause of democracy and increased, by way of contrast, its humanist value and moral prestige than tho regime of Herr Hitler. A Frenchman today is a free man; a German today 5s either a slave or a slave-driver.

"With Germany's ', conversion to Hitlcrism France now stands before the world as the main champion of peace in Europe. In the past her methods of securing peace, such as her constant insistence on tho maintenance of the status quo, have often, and rightly, been criticised. But when there is war in the air it is too late to scrutinise all too critically the methods of those who aro trying to avert it. Besides, it is generally agreed that this is not a time for' territorial revisions—at least, as far as Germany is concerned. Who would bo bold onough to place any of those "subhuman" Poles of the Danzig Corridor under German tutelage after the experiences suffered under Nazi rule by the Jewish "minority"? ISOLATING GERMANY. Whether in the abstract France fs method is good or bad, there can be no doubt that she ia "today endeavouring to save peace- in Europe. Howf Simply by isolating Germany. Up to a point French diplomacy has already been successful. If paper pacts and natural antipathies count for anything tho danger of a concerted military action between Nazi Germany and Communist Bussia—tho nightmare of French diplomatists since RapaHo—has ■been practically eliminated. The Franco-Russian and Russo-Polish nonaggression pacts and the recent multilateral agreement on the definition of the aggressor signed by Russia and her Western neighbours have greatly helped to clear the international atmosphere in Eastern Europe. Even Bessarabia has, by implication, ceased to be one of the danger-zones of Europe. The psychological'value of theso pacts in the countries concerned, and of the Russo-Polish pact in particular, is undeniable. It is sufficient to compare the Moscow and Warsaw papers of to,day with those of threo or four years ago to'appreciate the difference.

To make peace everywhere outside Germany—that is perhaps the most accurate definition of France's present foreign policy. In the East she has succeeded. In the Danube basia sho has, so far, failed. And Italy, on whose support or non-support of Germany the whole future of European peace depends, remains the great unknown i quantity. FRANCE AND ITALY. Italy has borne Franco a grudge sineo the war. Under the Fascist regime tha indolent Italian became nationally and politically arrogant. Ho began to feel that Italy had not been given a fair deal at Versailles; that France, with her relatively small population and her large colonial empire, was the dog in the manger. Fascist propaganda whipped up Italy's grievances against France. For years the French did nothing to counteract this agitation. Instead of making at the right moment a few minor concessions—say, in Tunisia, in connection with the Italian settlers there (which at the time would havo delighted the Italians) —France continued to treat Italy as a poor relation and as a second-class Power, which, of course, only exasperated Italian nationalism. While the French Right treated Italy with condescension, and whilo tho French military had the bad habit of speaking contemptuously of Italy's war record, the ' French Loft were vociferously hostile towards Fascism. In his Socialist days PaulBoncour publicly described Mussolini as a. "Carnival Caesar," and as recently as last year Bonaudcl branded the Italian delegates at a public meeting at Geneva as "assassins of Matteotti." When Briand was Foreign Minister he did his best to pour oil on the troubled waters by instructing the French Press not to snap back when the Fascist Press snapped at France, but the Italians merely felt that ho wag adding insult to injury. At the London Naval Conference, at Geneva, in fact everywhere where Frenchmen and Italians met, relations were cool and strained. In recent years Italy made herself particularly unpopular with the French nationalist Press as the champion of revisionism. The Press of the Left spoke -with increasing irony of "our Latin sister." Everywhere in France the response to Italy's claims and ambitions was purely negative. But % change came in 1932, when Germany occame dangerous.

Sued of the cable news on this page as is no beaded has appeared to "The Times" and Is cabled to Australia and Net? Zealand by special permission, (t should be understood ttiat the opinions nro not those of "Tbe Times" unless expressly staled to he so.