Evening Post. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1929. FIVE POWERS AND TWO

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 140, 10 December 1929, Page 10

Evening Post. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1929. FIVE POWERS AND TWO

When President Hoover and Mr. Mac Donald reached a basis of Anglo-American naval agreement there was, in some quarters, the impression tfiat this had only to be submitted to a conference to be enlarged into a new Five-Power Treaty. Less optimistic observers gave warnings that there was much yet to be accomplished. Japan might be suspicious, and Italy and France might be suspicious also, besides presenting new difficulties of their own. The cordial reply given by Japan to the invitation to the Conference showed that she -was willing to co-operate, and would examine any difficulties with a sincere desire to remove them. France and Italy also accepted the invitation, but they did not commit themselves in advance to acceptance of anything. M. Briand's naval memorandum now shows that Franco-

Italian parity, if insisted upon, may become a big stumbling-block. France seeks to exclude it from the discussion at the outset, and to work instead on the defensive needs of the two countries. At the same time, the French Ministry has prepared a table of "co-efficients of defence" which would allow France treble the strength assigned to Italy. At present France and Italy have parity in battleships, and in other categories France has aSO per cent. lead. Acceptance of the co-efficient table would allow France to build as she wished.

Such a table is not likely to appeal to the delegates who will be sent to London by Signor Mussolini. The Duce may not entertain the designs sometimes attributed to him of making the Mediterranean an Italian sea, but he will certainly never agree to such a division of strength that Mediterranean parity can be destroyed just as quickly as France can rush her reserve ships through the Straits of Gibraltar. The fact that France and Italy accepted equality at the Washington Conference is not helpful. The French representatives have been criticised ever since for permitting this, and they will be doubly careful not to extend the principle to all naval categories. Yet at present Italy is pressing strongly for parity. France's answer is that parity means for her inferiority in the Mediterranean, since she must spread her fleet over other oceans. This was the difficulty that confronted America and Britain in their discussions of parity. Actual equality would mean for Britain inferiority in the seas where the American strength was concentrated. We do not know yet how the difficulty was overcome; but we know that America has not accepted the French table of co-effi-cients which shows the British Empire to be entitled to twice the American strength.

Britain has made substantial concessions to satisfy America and gain a friendly understanding. Having settled their own differences, the two great naval Powers should be in a position to help compose the differences of the others; but it is doubtful if their position is so strong as it should be. The Anglo-American negotiations aroused suspicion in spite of the care taken by Mr. MacDonald to "allay misgivings. France remembered the reception in America of the Anglo-French Naval Accord, and, though this year's negotiations avoided the mistakes of last year's (and particularly the mistakes in procedure), French misgivings have not been entirely removed. France will judge the Anglo-American understanding on its results. This being so, any attempt to intervene in the Franco-Italian negotiation would reawaken suspicions that, back of the Anglo-American understanding, there was an Anglo-Saxon plot to dictate to the rest of the naval Powers. It would appear safer, then, to allow Italy and France to argue until they seek an outside opinion. The French memorandum does not exclude all hopes of settlement. Even the table of co-efficients is presented with the statement that "the calculations do not take into account political realities." One of these political realities is that Britain and America, though unequal on the tables, are ready to assent to equality in fact. That agreement is not likely to be upset by the failure of other Powers to reach a similar understanding. Britain and America have abstained from concluding a treaty of their own, and they are both prepared for modifications which may be suggested by other Powers, but they will not agree to destroy what has been built merely because France and Italy will not work together in extending the structure.