NOTES AND COMMENTS

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 191, 11 May 1944, Page 4

NOTES AND COMMENTS

It is said to be one of the principal aims of -those who command armed forces to seize the initiative. In, the early, days of the war the Germans held that advantage. They decided when and where the next blow should be struck. And the change which has come over 'the scene since those anxious days is made apparent by the admission of the enemy that the initiative now rests with the Allies. A recent cable message stated that among the predictions made by the Nazi Press and radio stations regarding the pending invasion of Europe were that it would commence this month, that the main attack would be across the Channel, with another attack in the south of France and possibly diversionary landings in Denmark and Norway. It would be interesting to know just how predictions of that kind affect German civilians. They must contrast them with their Own speculations as to whether the Fuehrer would direct his next blow at Denmark, or France, Norway or Belgium. In those days the enemy held the initiative. Today he must wait and wonder where the Allied blow will fall. The Nazis in the days that lie ahead must fight where the other side chooses, and the European coast is a long one. ♦ * * * » A most interesting story probably lies behind the brief cable message published recently that General Eisenhower has made a substantial grant to the fund now being raised to relieve distress among the 3000 persons evacuated from a south-western area in Britain to, provide a battle-practice ground for American troops. Some evacuees, it was stated, had lost not only their homes but also their livelihood. References to this wartime development have been few, but some New Zealanders, probably with relatives in or near the area affected, have gleaned something of what happened. It is said that in some cases whole villages had to be evacuated, and as, in these days, the majority of the residents would be either old people or children, the order to move from probably the only home they had ever known would be sadly disturbing. But, unfortunate as developments of that kind must be, they cannot be allowed to prevent the training of units' for the greatest military effort of all history. The Germans themselves expect the Allied forces who will make the invasion of Europe from the north to reach 1,500,000 men, so that training operations will have been on a vast scale, so vast, indeed, that areas had to be evacuated by the civilian population in the middle of winter. It will be a strange tale when the time comes that it can be, told in full.

In the present state of affairs which divides the French roughly iuto three categories—’Achy France, the French underground movement within Vichy Fiance, and those in Free French territory rendering allegiance to the National Committee of Liberation—the extent of the effective assistance which cau be given to the Allies in the impending struggle in Western Europe is necessarily problematical. The most recent estimate of the effective forces Free France has available, published in the “Christian Science Moititor,” fs Something over 300,000 officers and men in North Africa, organized into 10 or 11 divisions, some of them mechanized, ready for immediate action. If the present plan of mobilization is carried out this, it is expected, would be expanded to an army of over 500,000 men, including first-line troops and territorial reserves. In addition it is anticipated that when the Allies enter France they will be joined by several thousands of French irregulars who played an important part in the conquest of Corsica. The resources of the underground movement in France itself may be an important factor if the organization is efficient enough to put the machinery of revolt against the Vichy Government and its forces into quick and effective action At present it must be regarded as an unknown quantity, and it may he assumed, therefore, that the Allies, while they may hope for tangible results from the underground movement, and possibly through their intelligence system have gained some estimate o£4ts strength and its organization for action, have based their plan of campaign on realities rather than on expectations