AUSTRALIA’S ROLE IN PACIFIC

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 27, 27 October 1942, Page 4

AUSTRALIA’S ROLE IN PACIFIC

Internal Problems DIVIDED COMMAND DIFFICULTIES

By Telegraph. —Press Assn. Copyright.) (Received October 26, 8.30 p.m.) NEW YORK, October 25.

Hanson Baldwin, writing in the "New York Times,” says: "After ten

months of war in the Pacific, Australia’s role in it -is still uncertain. The campaign in the 'Solomons is not based on Australia. Primarily it is based on Hawaii, and secondarily on New Zealand and New Caledonia. "The battle of the Solomons is not primarily an effort to protect the supply line to Australia, for under present strategy Australia has become a. secondary base. It is a battle to break Japan’s power by pushing northward toward Rabaul and Truk, the heart of the Japanese-dominated Western Pacific, , . „ “When General MacArthur was assigned the command of the South-western Pacific, it was understood that Australia would be the main'base for any such move. Australia may yet become the main base of a powerful. Allied etfort, but the reason its potentialities are not yet fully developed is partly internal problems indigent to Australia and partly shipping shortage. . “The strategic problem is further complicated by the division of the Pacific into two separate areas. General MacArthur s position as commander-in-chief is rendered difficult by Australia’s internal problems. Warwick Fairfax, referring to the serious Japanese threat to lort Moresby recently asked whether the margin of time given by the arrival of Allied reinforcements was not somewhat narrow and also whether the fact that Australia might have to be defended partly in New Guinea was generally appreciated, adding that any retort to the effect that it was first necessary to concentrate on the defence of Australia is not, I think complete. As Fairfax wrote, such a reply is far from complete, but it contains inferentially part of the explanation of what has been wrong in Australia. MacArthur Hampered. "Like so many other nations and like some of our own leadership, Australia was a long time too preoccupied in the defence of her own soil to pay proper attention to New Guinea. Nor was this the fault of General MacArthur who in some ways is supreme commander in name only. He has been hampered by a number of factors, firstly, by the unfortunate proposal made that the United States nominate him as president, which General MacArthur has not supported. Australian polities also must be considered since they weigh heavily in the war’s balance 'sheet as in . the case of all the other United Nations. "The position of any American or any non-Australian as supreme commander of both American and Australian troops is naturally somewhat difficult. The circumstances under which General MacArthur arrived in Australia when the country was in dire danger of invasion naturally strengthened Mr. Curtin’s political position. The Australian War Cabinet naturally continued to reserve a considerable share of authority—military decisions have not always been General MacArthur’s. The normal difficulties of waging a coalition war have been increased in Australia by the labour problem, about which Australians, themselves are 1 complaining. There is no question, in the opinion of many Australians, that, labour’s insistence on ‘its rilghts,’ its determination to work no more than the stated number of hours, excluding Saturday afternoons and holidays, and its general attitude to the war have hampered the full development of the United Nations’ war effort in Australia. The labour attitude is best described as complacency. Many workers seem, primarily interested in retaining peacetime privileges. Australians are open-hearted, friendly and hospitable and treated our troops as brothers, but as a result of the labour situation what has been accomplished in Australia is largely the result of our own efforts.” "Our troops in many instances unloaded convoys, replacing stevedores who were not required to work after the whistle. We built airfields, roads and cantonments. The Australians helped, but insofar as labour was concerned their help has by no means been what was hoped for. There are other problems which are only the reflection of a casual, easy, carefree mind too common in many of the United Nations. , , x "But the full development of Australia as the main base of operations is handicapped by more than internal problems. Shipping is a major factor, because the long supply lines to Australia impose .a great strain to keep Australia supplied, yet the only way in which an offensive can be developed from Australia is across the seas. This means ships. Any offensive from Australia must be amphibious. This means not only transports and cargo ships but also battleships to protect them. Limited Naval Force.

"General MacArthur has only a very limited naval force, insufficient to support a strategic push northward. Some of his vessels have been attached to the South Pacific forces in the Solomons offensive. General MacArthur’s bombers have also supported this offensive by heavy attacks against Rabaul and the northern Solomons bases. In other words, the forces under the command, of one pt the two great strategical commanders in the Pacific have supported the forces under the commander of the other and vice Ve “When the commands of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were defined, strategic problems were complicated by division of the Pacific into two separate areas, lumping Australia, Nw Guinea, part of the Solomons, the Netnerlands East Indies, and the Ihihppines as one strategic unit, under r P e ? e!? j MacArthur, but excluding New Zealand Truk aud New Caledonia. When the Solomons campaign was mapped out, toe dividing line between, the authority or Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur ran squarely through Guadalcanal. to centralize authority under the navy, which conducted the campaign, the line was moved westward, putting all Guadalcanal and the southern Solomons under Admiral Nimitz, but today the line still divides the Solomons. All the Ja P anea ® bases in the northern Solomons and also Rabaul lie on General MacArthur s side, though our first footholds in the southern Solomons are on Admiral JNimitz’s side. • ‘This division is not necessarily a serious handicap, but poses problems, particularly should Australia some day become the base for a great counteroffensive. That in turn is dependent on a solution of the shipping shortage, remedial measures to solve Australia s internal difficulties, and determination of the strategic role Australia must play in the Pacific.’.’