NOT HARD RULE

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 23, 22 October 1942, Page 6

NOT HARD RULE

Officer Appointments And Age Limit ACTION AT BOTH ENDS OF SCALE It was his personal decision, though the practice was common throughout the British Empire, to limit the granting of first appointments to commissioned ranks to men under 30, said the General Officer Commanding tiie New Zealand Forces, Lieut.-General E. Puttick, D. 5.0., N.Z.S.C., in an interview with "The Dominion” yesterday. He explained that the rule was not, however, as hard and fast as might be imagined. For instance, iu the officer, cadet training units at the present moment more than 30 per cent, of the personnel were over 30, all selected under the present regulations, which gave senior commanders absolute discretion in the matter. It was not the best 'of conditions, said General I’uttick, to find a subaltern of 35 under a company commander of 23. Such a disparity could not be avoided in the -ranks, but could to a large extent in the case of officers. There were distinct advantages in men under 30 as second-lieutenants. On active service they had an extremely hard part, and at the end of a May when the ranks were resting the officer still had a lot to do. This called for special physique. An artificial bar had to be fixed, but these existed in all walks of life. Divisional and district commanders were empowered to send men over 30 for training as officers provided they bad the same qualities of leadership, physique and strength of character ns vounger candidates. His aim was .to get tiie best leaders, and no question of sentiment, economics and other considerations could be allowed to enter into it. It was a tragedy to get bad leaders. General Puttick said it was not pretended that all men apoiuted to commissions in the past five or six months necessarily measured up to standard, but at the time the Army began its considerable expansion it was faced with great difficulties. It had tens of thousands of recruits waiting for training whom the recruit depots could not accommodate and they had to be sent direct to units, and there trained by n.c.o.’s who could not be sent in large numbers to officer cadet training units, because they were needed to train these men. It was unfair to these n.c.o.’s, but nothing else could have been done iu the emergency. So prospective officers had to be selected from men with less experience than the available n.c.o.’s. If any officer was found unsatisfactory for his job, there were means of removing him from it. At the other end of the age scale, steps were also being taken in the interests of maximum efficiency. Many older officers had stepped into the breach when the need was great. Now as the Army gained experience so there was a wealth of younger men coming forward who ■were able to move up while the older men at. the top moved on. He had taken steps himself to see that, those officers who were too old in age, or physical condition, for active field service were posted to the Reserve of Officers. From there he hoped they would join up with the Home Guard. There they would be of great value, for the Home Guard had a number of officers who were appointed not so much for their military experience as for the factor? that they were able to give time to building up the organization in its infancy, and were respected in their communities. Incidentally, approximately 8000 Home Guard officers and n.c.o.’s had done short courses at schools of instruction. There might in this total bo a number who had done two or more courses.