GERMAN AIR POWER

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 16, 14 October 1942, Page 6

GERMAN AIR POWER

Signs Of Decline Seen

(By Telegraph.—Press. Assn.—Copyright.)

NEW YORK, October 12,

“There is evidence on every front of German air weakness,” asserts the military writer of the New York "Herald-Tribune,” Major , Feilding Eliot.

“The German aerial concentrations against Stalingrad have been achieved by draining other fronts, specially the Mediterranean. The Russian Air Force is working more effectively than it could if the Germans possessed strong and well-balanced air power. Moreover, German bombers have interfered little with Marshal Timoshenko’s lines of communication. “The German attacks against Malta have diminished to such an extent that British aircraft and submarines are. again operating from there. United Nations aircraft enjoy complete air mastery in the eastern Mediterranean, and are attacking Axis supply lines and bases even in the harbours of Greece and Sicily almost at will. Little is now heard of German long-range bombers over the Atlantic. “The remaining striking force of the Luftwaffe is apparently concentrated in Norway for attacks against Russian convoys. German fighter squadrons are inadequate to cope with the rising scale of American daylight raids and R.A.F. night bombings. Only Temporarily Quiet. “One is almost tempted to ask where is the Luftwaffe, but we should be indulging in the most dangerous wishful thinking if we supposed German air power was permanently impaired. The truth probably is that the Luftwaffe is only temporarily inactive. Part is being held as a mobile reserve force against the possibility of a British and American attack on the long-exposed western coastline, and another part is likely to >be engaged in training and refitting with new types of aircraft, such as the high-level bomber which is intended for use against Britain during the winter.

“Indications are that the German air strategy, under compulsion of events, if>.now changing from concentrated offensive to active defensive, in which only offensives of limited objective will -be possible,”