FACTOR OF AIR POWER

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 192, 10 May 1940, Page 9

FACTOR OF AIR POWER

(By Telegraph,.—Press Assn.—Copyright.) LONDON, May 8. Replying for the Government at the end of the momentous debate in the House of Commons, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, first emphasized that the disadvantage of Britain not having the initiative was due to the failure in the last five years to maintain air parity with Germany. “In this war we have frequently been asked why we do not take the initiative,” he said. “The reason is our failure to regain and maintain air parity with Germany. Our numerical deficiency in the air has condemned, and will condemn us for some time, to much difficulty, suffering, and danger, which must endure until more favourable conditions are established.” It was no use thinking about this war in terms of the last war. Power in the air had greatly affected the movements of fleets and armies. “We must not exaggerate this new factor, but neither .must we refuse to recognize it,” Mr. Churchill said. After dealing with German exaggerations of British naval losses, Mr. Churchill claimed that though Hitler’s overrunning of vast regions of Norway had had an astonishing and unwelcome effect, the advantages rested substantially with Britain. Mr. Churchill added: “I cannot recede at all from the statement I made, which has been much criticized, that the invasion of Norway by Hitler had been a cardinal political and strategical error.”

In the Norwegian campaign the immense enemy air strength made the attempt to dominate the Skagerrak with surface craft too costly to be adopted. Important forces would be necessary to maintain a. steady surface patrol. Losses inflicted from the air would undoubtedly very soon have constituted a naval disaster.

They had -therefore adopted the submarine blockade, following the opinion of the naval authorities!. This had been a costly success for Germany, for between 7000 and 8000 men. had been dro-wned. Thousands of corpses -had been washed up at -the entrance to Oslo Fiord. What was a loss of 7000 or SOOO men to a totalitarian State? What did that matter to a Government such as they were fighting-? The losses were not announced and criticism was not allowed. If there had -been a cry or a whimper it would probably have been dealt with by a -brutal blow. Risks at Narvik. Mr. Churchill added that the -reason why no big ships had been sent to Narvik on the first day with the destroyers was that the only one available was a battle cruiser. “We have only two battle cruisers,” he said, “and we felt it would inflict very great damage on the balance of the Fleet if we lost one of them. When the War-' spite entered Narvik Fiord the Admiralty was greatly relieved to find that there were no minefields and that no destroyers were lurking in the narrow angle ready to fire a bouquet of torpedoes.” If the Warspite had been sunk they would have been -told -that it was madness! to send one of the most valuable ships into narrow and 1 congested waters. “If you dare and the forfeit is claimed, it is murder of your sailors,”, he said, “and if prudence, withholds you, you are craven, cowardly, inept, and timid.” “We have been asked why we did not enter Bergen and Trondheim in the first few hours,” Mr. Churchill continued. “If -troops were not to be landed the only object of entering the fiords would have been the destruction of the enemy destroyers, which the Fleet Air Arm largely accomplished. “Indisputably it was our duty to help the Norwegians, and therefore the capture of Trondheim was the best way. My thoughts had always been fixed on Narvik, where it seemed we could lay a path leading, to some decisive achievement, but when the German outrage occurred Trondheim was undoubtedly the place for aiding the Norwegians. The joint staffs prepared a plan for two diversionary landings at Namsos and Andalsnes and for a direct landing at Tro'ndheim Fiord.” Result of Early Progress. Mr. Churchill added that the Navy was perfectly ready to carry troops in to Trondheim, and there was no doubt of their ability to do so. The forts at the entrance presented no serious difficulty. The plan was abandoned because the diversionary landings progressed well. It seemed easier to capture Trondheim by this method than to incur the cost of a direct attack. The Admiralty never withdrew its offer or considered the operation navally impracticable, but -the military authorities l entertained' grave doubts about the possibility of landing in the face of enemy air superiority, and therefore the Chiefs of Staffs advised tiiat it was easier to convert the diversionary landings into a main attack. The First Lord said that no one had tlie right to suggest that the Navy withdrew from its undertaking or that politicians! had overruled -the Admiralty. “I -take the fullest responsibility, -together with the other Ministers, for accepting the unanimous view from our expert advisers,” he said.

The situation rapidly became worse, and the German thrust north of Oslo developed enormous strength. Therefore it was necessary to withdraw troops or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming forces. He did not believe that there would have been the slightest chance of ultimate success in a struggle between a German army based on Oslo and a British army based on Trondheim. The decision to abandon the attack had saved Britain from a most disastrous entanglement. Sound Decision. (Received May 9, 8.20 p.m.) Referring to the development of the situation in Norway when the German thrust north from Oslo was making it worse, Mr. Churchill said that the Norwegians were unable to hold the mountain passes and could not destroy the roads and railways. The possibility of the arrival of large German forces south of Trondheim had to be foreseen. Intense German bombing of Namsos and Amlalsnes prevented the landing of large reinforcements and even artillery supplies for the troops that had already landed. The decision to withdraw was undoubtedly sound. The withdrawal of 12,000 men—loss than a division—was accomplished with the greatest skill and good luck. , “The question arises whether if we had persisted witli a direct, naval attack it would have been better,” Mr. Churchill said. "I have always believed that (lie Navy could carry troops into Trondheim Fjord, land them and come to grips with the enemy. I would

have been glad to take all the responsibility for an attempt provided it was supported by the experts. “Even if the opinion that wo could have mastered Trondheim by April 25 were correct, could we have brought a sufficient army south from Trondheim to repel the invader? The Germans could be reinforced more quickly than us. There were no means whereby the air superiority could be overcome. We should have been committed to a forlorn operation on an ever-increasing scale. Information to Enemy. “We are now fighting hard for northern Norway, particularly for Narvik, where the conditions are more equal. We are in possession of the Narvik aerodrome. “It is an injury to our war-making capacity that we should be forced to detail this story. We do not learn from the German leaders truthful accounts of all their motives and I hope it will be the last time we confer this benefit on them. We have decided to speak thus plainly because of the cataract of unworthy suggestions and actual falsehoods pouring out to the public in the last few days. “A picture has been drawn of craven politicians hampering the admirals and generals. There is not a word of truth in a suggestion that I proposed more violent action to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet and that they restrained me. “I sympathize with Admiral Keyes’ desire to plan and lead a violent attack on Trondheim and repeat Zeebrugge’s immortal glories, but I am sorry that this impulse has led him to cast aspersions on his old shipmates. I have complete confidence in their sagacity, massive goo'd sense and professional knowledge, and I believe the Fleet has confidence in them. I love to hear tlie German wireless lies about all the British ships that have been sunk so many times over and to survey the fool’s paradise in which they keep their deluded serfs and robots. Balance Analysed. "The Germans claim to have sunk or damaged 11 of our battleships. Actually, two were slightly damaged, but neither was withdrawn from the service for one day. They claimed that three aircraft-carriers were seriously damaged. Actually, one was slightly damaged by a near miss, and she is still in service. The Germans claim to have sunk or damaged 28 cruisers. Actually one cruiser and one anti-air-craft ship was damaged. “We lost 11 trawlers in the Government service. That explains all thes' battleships. “It seems to me that in spite of Hitler’s overrunning Norway the advantages rest substantially with us. Hitler has lost 10 lives for every one of ours. Hitler has compelled a large part of Scandinavia to enter the Nazi empire of hungry land. He has committed an act of self-blockade. Our control of seaborne commerce should become even more effective. The Norwegian corridor no longer exists. Denmark, after her food resources are exhausted, will no longer be achannel of trade. “The British and French mercantile fleets can now rely on the invaluable co-operation of the Norwegian merchant fleet, the fourth largest in the world. The British and French shipping losses since the outbreak of the war are barely 800,000 -tons, and the captures and new ships 'building have already compensated for threequarters of that. “If .Sweden had come to Norway’s rescue, if large numbers of her troops could have entered Trondheim, if her air bases had been at the disposal of-, the Royal Air Force, a very different position might soon have been established. The .Swedish action was like that of many other people who have criticized the British Government.”