PREMIER SPEAKS

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 191, 9 May 1940, Page 9

PREMIER SPEAKS

Further Post For Mr. Churchill

(British Official Wireless and P.A.)

RUGBY, May 7.

What is regarded bymany as the most important Parliamentary occasion since Britain went to war began when the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, rose in a crowded Chamber amid loud and long cheers from his supporters. The galleries were full and in the distinguished strangers’ gallery sat Professor Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The House followed the statement with close attention. Tenseness was revealed at one moment when Opposition interjections caused the Premier to invoke the Speaker’s authority. Mr. Chamberlain was cheered at the end. The Opposition leaders spoke immediately after Mr. Chamberlain. The debate was continued by back-benchers and the Blouse listened with special interest to a critical speech from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, whose role in connexion with Zeebrugge will be recalled. Mr. Amery spoke next. The Secretary for War, Mr. Stanley, was the last speaker. The'debate will be continued tomorrow. Asking for co-operation of all parties, the Premier announced that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill; had now been authorized by the Cabinet to give guidance and direction to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Mr. Churchill would have responsibility for the supervision of military operations day by day. This would ensure that every aspect of military policy was examined and that decisions would be followed with speed and energy.

The Premier’s statement fell into three parts—on explanation of the reasons for the attempt to take Trondheim, am account of the execution of that plan, and the eventual decision to abandon it, and discussion of the political organization at home. After paying a tribute to the skill of the British naval arid military forces in effecting the withdrawal from Namsos in a single short night without any loss in the operation, and after describing the bombing of a convoy of transports next day by 50 enemy bombers, resulting in the loss of only one British and one French destroyer, although the ships were dependent for defence solely on anti-aircraft Are, Mr. Chamberlain said that the news of the withdrawal from southern Norway had come as a profound shock to the public, but it was desirable not to exaggerate the extent and importance of the check to the Allies. France had shown remarkable steadiness, and, as in England, the only effect of the reverse had been to stiffen the people’s determination. Turkey remained unperturbed. Egypt continued to strengthen her defences. In the Middle East the position had been quietened by the reversion to the normal Allied Fleet distribution in the Mediterranean. Two Adverse Factors. Analysing the reasons why the Allies decided to try to take Trondheim though knowing the serious difficulties and risks, the Prime Minister mentioned the urgent and repeated appeals from the Norwegian commander. It was made clear to the Allies that unless they were ready to assist in the only way the Norwegians themselves felt effective—by an attack on Trondheim—the Norwegians were not likely to feel able to resist, and the whole country would have fallen at once into German hands.

The Premier said: “I believe that the failure of the plan was due to two factors: First, our inability to secure aerodromes from which to operate our fighters, and secondly, the rapid arrival of German reinforcements. “We always believed that if our troops could get ashore they would not suffer heavy casualties from the air, and in fact that proved to be the case, but 'the absence of fighters enabled the enemy to attack our communications and hinder our reinforcement, while his own land communications enabled him to bring up an everincreasing superiority of strength. “It became clear that we could only maintain our forces in the Trondheim region by such a concentration of men, material's, and aircraft as would have drawn off an altogether undue proportion of our totai forces. In the special circumstances we decided to carry the campaign in Norway elsewhere with greater vigour and effect.” Later Mr. Chamberlain said it was quite obvious that the Germans had made certain gains. It was equally clear that they had paid a heavy price for them. It was too early to say on which side the balance was fiuglly inclined, because the campaign was not yet finished. A large part of Norway was not in German hands, and the Government was still on Norwegian soil. It would rally round itself the remainder of the Norwegian forces and carry on the fight against the invader in which Britain should be at their side. Alternatives Weighed He argued that there was general agreement on the necessity for securing Narvik, but allowed that there might be inquiry why the Government sent an expedition to Trondheim which would be faced with local enemy superiority in the air and the proba billty of meeting strong enemy reinforcements. He explained that the governing consideration was the wish of the Norwegian Government and High Command. The British Government, he said, felt it must run the risk and “do our best to give help to a brave people who with extraordinary courage, in spite of their tiny numbers and the fact that they had almost forgotten what war meant, had had the stamina to stand up to the German bully and make an effort to save the freedom and independence of their country.

“I feel myself,” Mr. Chamberlain added, “that if we had refused to answer the call made to us from Norway we should have justified the reproach that our only object in Scandinavia was the iron ores of Sweden and that we cared nothing for the freedom of small nations.” lie said. Mr. Chamberlain made it clear Hurt the possibility of an assault on Trondheim itself had been weighed and never ruled out. The effectiveness of the landings at Narnsos and Aj-dabatiw*

which they had preferred first to test, was, he indicated, compromised by the rapid advance of the Germans with tanks, artillery and mortars—an advance which the British authorities had counted upon being delayed by the blowing up by the Norwegians of railway bridges and the effective obstruction of roads. Mr. Chamberlain dealt fully with the complaint that the force and the transports prepared for Finland had been dispersed. He argued that whatever forces were available, they could not have forestalled the Germans unless the Norwegian Government had invited the Allies in first. “Unfortunately,” be said, “in their determination to preserve the strictest neutrality the last thing the Norwegians would do was to allow us to enter their ports unopposed, and consequently we were helpless to prevent the German stroke, which was made easy by treachery inside Norway prepared long ■beforehand.” The force for Finland consisted of advance troops and a second contingent. The advance party had been retained ready to leave, and it was a misconception to suppose that the transfer from France of a second contingent would have delayed its going to the support of the advanced troops if they had been able to establish themselves. The Prime Minister then summed up the reasons for the failure of the plan and assessed the profit and loss from the German and the Allied points of view. A passage in his speech which drew cheers from all parts of the House was his tribute to the magnificent gallantry of the British troops back from the campaign in southern Norway, which he declared, was now at an end. He said they had carried out their task in a way which had added still further to the great traditions of the Army, and in very hard fighting against superior forces with superior equipment they had shown great courage and endurance.

When he referred to the withdrawal from southern Norway as having created a profound shock there were shouts from the Opposition benches of “And still is.” . Extent of Losses. The Prime Minister added: "We tried to damp down unfounded reports because we were anxious to avoid informing the enemy of the true situation. I am afraid that in these circumstances shock and disappointment frre inevitable.

“I have no wish to extenuate anything, but we shall not exaggerate the extent or importance of the check we received. The withdrawal was not to be compared with that at Gallipoli, and large forces were not involved. Actually they were not much more, than a single division. The losses were not really great, nor was any considerable or valuable amount of stores left behind. The Germans suffered far heavier losses of warships, planes, transports, and men. I am aware that the result is not to be measured merely by the losses on the spot. We have to take account of the loss of prestige. “Colour has been given to a false legend of German invincibility on land and discouragement caused to our friends. We must accept that position for ths moment, but we have no need to help the enemy by worsening it. (Cheers.)

“I regret certain polemical comments in the Swedish Press, because they do not help Sweden or the Allies. We are not concerned with recriminations, but with measures that are to be taken in the future. If Sweden decides on a policy of neutrality I trust it will be strictly impartial. “For my part,” he said, “I try to steer a middle course between optimism and defeatism.” (Opposition cries of “Missed the bus!”) Mr. Chamberlain: That is a good example of the way' prejudiced people twist words from their meaning. When I said in a recent speech that Hitler missed the bus I was not referring to the invasion of Norway, which occurred three days later. I was referring to the fact that Hitler did not attack the Allies at the beginning when the disparity of arms was greatest. Coming to the position at home. Mr. Chamberlain asked for a closing of the ranks. There was no division among the Ministers. Four members of the War Cabinet, all directly associated with the military conduct of the war, would speak in the course of the debate. All of them would be replying to criticisms, and all of them were aware of the attempts which had been made to separate them from one another.

He intimated that ills long experience of Cabinet procedure left him uticonviuoed by argument# for ft waaller

War Cabinet, but no doubt other changes in the form of the Government or the functions of individual Ministers might be desirable, and he kept his mind open for such fresh considerations. Regarding the new duties assigned . to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Chamberlain mentioned that after Mr. Churchill had had some experience of the arrangement—revealed by the I Premier on April 11 —by which he (Mr. Churchill) was chairman of military co-ordination in Cabinet he had suggested that he should have closer touch with the Chiefs of Staff. Linder the new arrangement the Staff Chiefs retained their collective responsibility to Cabinet and their individual responsibility to their own Ministers. Post of First Lord. Replying to Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Chamberlain said he was relying on Mr. Churchill to let him know if he found that the new task imposed upon him made it difficult to fulfil his work at the Admiralty, and in such a case he would take steps to relieve him. Mr. Churchill would be provided with a small staff under a senior staff officer, Major-General Ismay, who had been appointed an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In impressive passages the Premier placed the Norwegian incident against the background of wider strategic considerations. Though we will give all the help to Norway that we can and as soon as we can,” he said, “we must not forget that there are other fronts which might at any moment blaze up into a conflagration. Germany, with her vast and well-equipped armies, is so placed that she can at any moment attack at any one of a number of different points. We want to be ready to meet attack wherever it may come. “I am bound to say that while I think the implications of the Norwegian campaign have been seriously exaggerated, and while I retain my complete confidence in our ultimate victory, I do not. think the people of this country yet realize the extent and the imminence of the threat which is impending against us. We may, and if we are wise we shall, learn many usefull lessons from Norway. I am not going to say how our strategy or plans may be affected by these lessons. “The experience of Norway does show us bow swiftly the scene alters in the rapid changes of war. Therefore, let us beware of making such a dispersal of our forces as might suit the purposes of the enemy. Let us beware, also, of bickering and division among ourselves when at present we may be faced by war in its most violent form, directed against this country in the hope of breaking our courage and will-power.” Mr. Chamberlain concluded, “Let us. before the first, trials come upon us, steadily increase our strength till we I are able to deliver blows when ami where we will.” (Loud and prolonged |