FAILED TO ALLOW FOR NAZI THOROUGHNESS

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 188, 6 May 1940, Page 9

FAILED TO ALLOW FOR NAZI THOROUGHNESS

Lack Of Air Base Main Cause Of Withdrawal

(British Official Wireless.)

Received May 5, 7.5 p.tn. RUGBY, May 4. Clearer views of the military operations carried out by the Allies in Norway and the tactical conception which inspired them are now possible. The latter was based on certain assumptions which it can now be seen did not allow enough either for the ingenuity, thoroughness and disregard of conventional restraints of the Nazis or for the failure of the Norwegian authorities to realize the danger which threatened their country. With the knowledge that the Germans were practising amphibious operations, the Allies prepared small forces which would have been sufficient to forestall the Nazi invasion had the call for assistance come in time.

The forces, provided for the purpose of establishing a protecting ring round ports such as Stavanger, Trondheim and Narvik, behind which reinforcements and supplies could have been landed and through which larger forces could have passed when necessary to the assistance of the Norwegian army, were on a scale sufficient to carry through an unopposed landing but were insufficient to do much more than had been planned for them. The rapidity with which the Germans established themselves in the key ports by attacks treacherously executed and treacher- * ously aided by elements suborned within the Norwegian defence organization presented the advance parties of the north-western expeditionary force with problems quite different from those for which they had been prepared.

This force, like the one prepared for Flmlamd before it, was held in readlnasts against the eventuality of a call for help from the country for which it was destined. British and Frencli aid, unlike German “protection,” is not given unasked, nor does it take the form of the forceful seizure of the ports and' aerodromes of the country it purports to be defending. Equipment Dispersed. The troops were derived from forma* tions gathered earlier to help Finland, but much of the equipment of the Finnfeili expeditionary force had been dispersed, and among this—unfortunately as it proved in the event—was a considerable part of the provisions of antiaircraft guns, because the advance parties, after landing successfully, were subjected to very severe attacks from the air. Ainitil-aircraft guns in whatever quantities would probably have been Inadequate to the task of beating oft' ■these attacks, 'and the supreme lesson which emerges from the experience of the Allied troops round Trondheim is that, with the support of fighter planes operating from an air base in Norway, the force sent would have been adequate. not only to its original tasks but to whatever additional demands the early German successes necessitated. ' 'The Allied troops had most valuable support from the R.A.F. long range fighters and from the fleet air arm—support generously acknowledged by the military authorities. One fighter squadron based nearby would have made all the difference between success and failure. Lack of the right .kind of support from the ah’, which it was not possible to provide in time, made inevitable tlie withdrawal of the troops from round Trondheim carried out so skilfully this week. The importance of Narvik in the scheme of ibhe expedition was due In part to the fact that it could provide a centre from which the Allies could operate less menaced by intensive aerial bomibardiment such as was to be expected and was met with further south. The successful landings north and south of Trondheim found early justification in drawing off the enemy and in bringing needed moral support; to the Norwegian forces. The Namsos force, under the command of Brigadier C. G. Phillips, included men from the 49th division, and their landing was unopposed. ’They pressed on toward Trondheim. While the British troops, were pressing forward on the northern coast of the flord, the enemy made use of the mobility afforded them by the presence of German ships in the neighbourhood and delivered a flank attack. For, a time, the British were in a bad position, but they extricated themselves and reformed even though some of the advance troops had been cut off. Andalsnes Landing. The landing at Andalsnes, some 200 miles further south, was carried out under slightly more difficult conditions, but Brigadier H. de Rimer Morgan, D. 5.0., who was in command, carried through the operation despite enemy bombing. It is now known that Brigadier Morgan was immediately faced with a difficult problem. He received an urgent call from the Norwegians for help a considerably long why down the Gudbrands Valley. Without waiting for reinforcements, Brigadier Morgan responded and in a very short time had pressed forward to Lillehammer. His action ig fully endorsed, since it was the essential object of the expedition to bring aid to the Norwegian forces in their resistance to the Nazis aggression. General Paget followed with a French contingent and the German advance was held up. Several enemy tanks were destroyed, but events at the base which .was being formed at Andalsnes made it too difficult to maintain supplies and evacuation was ordered. Persistent bombings were aided by the shortening nights and the landing of further troops and supplies became too hazardous to warrant further attempts. Attack on Namsos. Namsos, too, came in for severe air attacks and some supplies and munitions were blown up. From the military point of view the withdrawal from round Trondheim is regarded by good judges as by no means all to the disadvantage of the Allies, though it is not disputed that politically it cannot but occasion some temporary loss of prestige. Freed from what turned into an unprofitable commitment In the south, (lie commun'd of the north-western expeditionary force is in a better position to pii-li forward vigorously in co-operation with the Norwegian command with a scheme of operations more securely

based. It may be confidently assumed that the Allied military authorities in Norway are fully aware of the intention of the British and French Governments not to abate the effort they promised to make in support of Herr Hitler’s latest victims, Norway To Figlrt On. Though reliable information concerning the present position in South Norway is necessarily scanty, officiate of the Norwegian Government are reported as having stated that the withdrawal of the Allied troops will have no influence on the will of the Norwegian Government to continue the fight for freedom. The Norwegian news agency in Stockholm said the Norwegians have every intention of understanding the difficulty with which the Allied troops were faced during the first period of the war In Norway and that the Allied decision had in no way weakened Norwegian determination to resist the German invasion.

When denying reports that King Haakon and his Government had left Norway, the agency declared that Norwegian forces in the south had inflicted heavy losses on the Germans during the past few days. As regards the reported capitulation of the Norwegian commanded in the Trondelag area, this agency pointed

out this did not mean that all Norwegian resistance had been given up and that these negotiations concerned only his own command. Strong Resistance. The Norwegian garrison in the valley north of Trondheim was still putting up strong resistance and the fort of Hegre, whose tiny garrison of some hundred men had been holding out against the German attackers since the beginning of the invasion and whose fortitude and skill have already earned the widest admiration, was continuing to resist. In Narvik it appears that the Germans are surrounded by the British and Norwegian forces. It has been estimated that there are some 13,000 Norwegians fighting in north Norway.