A DRASTIC MOVE

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 185, 2 May 1940, Page 8

A DRASTIC MOVE

Diversion Of British

Shipping THE MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE (By S.D.W.) Considerable significance attaches to the announcement from London that, “as a precautionary measure, the Government is diverting British shipping from the Mediterranean. This drastic decision, with its farreaching implications, is an earnest of Great Britain’s determination and readiness to meet any crisis that may arise. A precedent is to be found in the similar action taken five years ago at the time of strained relations with Italy arising from the imposition of “sanctions” during the Abyssinian campaign. During 1935 and 1936 there was a great concentration of British naval strength in the Mediterranean. This involved the temporary transfer to that command of many ships from other stations, including cruisers from Australia and New Zealand and submarines from the China Station. Three new destroyer flotillas were organized from vessels in reserve, and minesweepers and trawlers were dispatched hurriedly to the danger zone. At the same time the principal Mediterranean ports used by the British I Icet were equipped with special defences, particularly against air attack. A Vital “Alleyway.” At that time the Mediterranean emergency demonstrated in no uncertain fashion the inadequacy of Britain’s existing naval forces. As a writer in the 1936 edition of “Brassey s Naval Annual” remarked: “The effort required to restrain even a seeondclass naval Power has necessitated denuding our home and overseas squadrons to an extent which would make it extremely difficult for its to safeguadr our ocean shipping if trouble should arise elsewhere. Such,” he adds, “is the position which high diplomacy and idealistic gestures have brought about.” The Mediterranean crisis and the growing Nazi menace opened British eyes to the peril brought about by unilateral disarmament; and the Government set about the long-neglected task of rebuilding the navy. The vast programmes of warship construction pushed on with during the last four years have largely remedied the uncertain position in which Great Britain stood in 1935. Many cruisers and destroyers and other types of ships have been added to the Royal Navy; the great programme of building in hand when the present war started has been rushed to completion, and many more ships have been laid down during the last eight months. The five battleships of the King George V class, each of 35,000 tons and mounting ten 14-inch guns,- are coming into commission and four 40,000-ton ships of the Lion class are well advanced. What Diversion Involves.

The diversion of British merchant shipping from the Mediterranean route is a grave step to take. It means not only the cessation of actual voyages in that sea, but also the diversion of a vast stream of sea traffic to and from India, the Far East and Australia to the much longer route via the Cape of Good Hope. Its effects in slowing up the transit of cargoes was seen clearly five years ago. The outward and homeward route via the Cape adds thousands of miles to British merchant ships’ lines of communication with the East and Australia with corresponding delay to foodstuffs and raw materials. Equally serious is the diversion of the tanker fleet carrying vast supplies of oil from the Persian Gulf and the Dutch East Indies. To tankers engaged in these trades the Cape route means anything from 10 to 14 days’ extra steaming. Apart from its many disadvantages, the diversion of British merchant shipping from the Mediterranean has definite advantages as a protective measure. It frees the Navy from the necessity of having to escort convoys through the narrow lanes of a sea which extends from west to east across 40 degrees of latitude —some 2400 sea miles. The channel between Italy and North Africa is less than 100 miles wide. The southern ports of Italy are so elose to the African shore that the distance can be traversed in a few hours by fast ships and in considerably less than an hour by aircraft. A hostile concentration of naval and air strength in or adjacent to this defile would render the passage of merchant shipping hazardous in the extreme, and conceivably impossible. There are several good harbours on the coast of Sicily which would be convenient bases for torpedo craft and submarines, and both in that island and in Sardinia military aerodromes are known to have been established. Importance of Malta. The only British base within this area is Malta. It lies about 65 miles to the south of Sicily and is therefore within pointblank range of air attack. Whatever the powers and the limitations of the air arm may be, it is a reasonable assumption that air power, if employed on a sufficiently large scale, might of itself render untenable a naval base such as Malta, where anchorage space is limited and the harbour entrance narrow. What view the Admiralty took in 1935 wag made evident by their action in ordering the Fleet out of Malta at the first hint of crisis.

During the latter half of 1935 and the early part of 1936, the greater part of the Fleet was stationed at Alexandria where it was admirably placed to command the Suez Canal. Since that time, and especially during and since the Spanish civil war, much lias been done to strengthen the air defences of Gibraltar, Malta, the Suez Canal and oilier points vital to the British Navy. The lessons of 1935-36 assuredly have been learned by (lie naval staff and those responsible for British security in the Mediterranean.