ITALY AND FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 28, Issue 87, 7 January 1935, Page 6

ITALY AND FRANCE

The visit of the French Foreign Minister to Rome is in pursuance of an intention M. Laval’s predecessor, the late M. Barthou, was about to carry out, before he was assassinated, with a view to improving the relationships between Italy and France. T here is room for considerable improvement. The two countries have been at odds ever since the Peace Treaty on the of naval equality in the Mediterranean, rival interests in North Africa, and the policy of encirclement pursued by France in her Southern European diplomacy. Until the two countries could be brought closer together there was always a danger that a crisis in the Balkan States would place them in opposite camps. The murder of the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, with its subsequent interplay of international politics demonstrated that a better understanding between France and Italy was essential to the peace of Europe, and the political and territorial integrity of Austria.

According to the Rome correspondent of the London Morning Post, such an understanding, to be of any real value, must be “final, complete, and durable.” What the nature and scope of the agreement which it is M. Laval’s mission to promote will be remains to be seen. A Press message in September last announced that the two countries were about to conclude “a political, military, and economic accord of vast scope.” An important part of the agreement, it was suggested, would provide that France would desist from naval rivalry in the Mediterranean, leaving that area to Italian domination and concentrating her naval strength in the Atlantic and near her colonies. Another was that a huge sum in Italian securities was to be underwritten by the Bank of France. Italy, it is well known, is pinched for money. France, on the other hand, has a great deal to gain by the removal of anxieties concerning the future of Italian policy. She would rather have Italy as an ally than as an enemy, especially in view of the growing public sentiment in Britain against any kind of Anglo-French pact which would commit that country to armed assistance in the event of another crisis.

Such a pact, of course, would emphasise the present trend of European diplomacy toward the old system of national groupings and balances, but it is the only kind of arrangement that Signor Mussolini, who has no enthusiasm for the League of Nations, would be likely to consider. It would also appeal to him as an opportune and effective counter to the recently consummated Balkan Pact, the inherent principle of which is to present a strong front to Italian policy in Central and South-Eastern Europe. These considerations suggest that the proposed Franco-Italian agreement is the child of necessity rather than of inclination. However that may be, it will certainly be a distinct gaijijor jhe jieacc of Europe if it is consunimated,