ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Dominion, Volume 15, Issue 42, 12 November 1921, Page 7

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS THE OPEN DOOR IN THE EAST DIFFICULT .SITUATION ;f DISCUSSED [Special to ”Thb Dominion.] . (By Drank H. Simonds.) Washington, October 17. Almost more important than the ef--feet of the Washington Conference upon • Japanese-American relations will be its ilater ..influence upon . Anglo-American intercourse. There are, in reality, two almost equally signi‘ficaht questions to be settled, first, whether we are to fight the Japanese to establish ths open door in the Far East, •and, second, whether it is possible for the United States and Great Britain to co-operate in international affairs. ,* '(Few Englishmen and ho Americans interested in promoting sound AngloAmerican, relations wbuld deny that the Paris Cpnference was a disaster, It was a disaster primar y because each of the 'two nations' using the same language managed totally to misunderstand what, the other really meant, and was compelled tq discover later that neither had understood the real conception of the other. That fine breath of mutual confidence which camo during the actual hostilities, when, as allies, Britain, and the United States worked together,'as no one had dreamed would be possible, disappeared, in. the fog of Paris and the domestic political storms which followed. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. Is there danger that the evil effects of Paris may also- attend the ’Washington Conference? It seems .to fne unmistaki ably so. Wo ask from Britain somethin;; which is rather different from any other’ relation in international history. We ask co-operation without contract. At the first effort to' turn the Paris pence Conference into a League of Nations the' American people instinctively took alarm. ' They did not want an alliance, a commitment, anything that smacked of an obligation. Nor do they want it now. Mr.' Harding is just as certain to lie wrecked as was Mi*. Wilson, if lit any stage in the Washington Conference ho agrees to a form of contract, which even by violence can be tortured ' into the semblance of ah alliance. It would be idle to blink the fact that America has had .a dangerous accession of strength end of consciousness of •trength in the last half dozftn years. She ■ is-in the ; mood in which nations really become imperialistic, and, all things con- ' sidere'd, F should say that unconsciously .-Amerca has become the most imperialistic, country .on earth. Her expression of her teniper is quite different , from the German,' but ‘it points unmistakably to-. Ward eventual conflict, in the Pacific. Unless Japan is prepared to consent to accept not in phrase, but in principle find practice the policy of the open door, unless she is prepared to concede equal opportunity in China, America will fight heir, an,d that within ,the next ten years.' In this situation the Washington Conference reduces itself , to> a preliminary skirmish in an approaching shock between two 'nations. .; Now, America will, perhaps uiiyeaspnably, perhaps. illogical* , Ty, but not less clearly, expect to. receive the solid .pupport, of the Brifish Empire. .There is .no.,greater-nor.: nmrq obvious; danger than that British-statesmanship will attempt at-Washington to play I a happy moderating.vrolo between • two nawhich are in,imminent danger of . falling afoul of each -other..- If - that should happen I do not pretend to forecast what will bo the. effect of such a policy upon Britain’s Japanese ally, but I can see fairly clearly what will be its effect upon Anglo-American relatione. , ..'Every enemy, whom Britain has-in the :. United States, will, -strive with utmost eagerness and industry to associate’ Brit; ■: ain with the Japanese. The obvious .. propaganda play •is to present Great Britain as a partner of Japan. •• And Japan is, and will be, presented as the enemy is many quarters. The point at it issue between Japan and America is ..pot one on which Americans are willing to abandon the principle of the Topen , door” for . one of spheres of influence. America cannot be persuaded to take ' absolute control of a fraction, and let. Japan have iv similar mandate for a i fraction. -., . .-> •' '' NO 'COMPROMISE. ; It, may be that the domestic political ( necessities of . Mr. Hording' will compel him to accept a compromise, just as Air. Wilson felt,bound, in,the end to-.accept many compromises in Paris. But his ", fellow-countrymen .did .not accept . ,his ''cmnnromises, n.nd they will not. - accept L , nny, com promise made by- Mr Harding. 'Britain is going ,to deal with q nation ‘ .committed, to absolutes, and it is- pro . cisely this fact which makes war. with Japan likely',. and renders Brit a in’s role ‘ ijs an ally of one nation and a, friend of „.th? other, so difficult, , Mr, Lloyd. .Goqrgp.'s, suggest ion,.of. an' .alliance .between. Britain.. Japan and America- to control, the Pacific not only .fell on hostile ears, but,, ns I. wrote you,'roused instant.and general protest, Arne-' 'ri.cn. says that, .it is a matter of right, Justice, fair, play .that there should be' .equal opportunity, in .the .Far East, that the independence .and .the. integrity of China should be established, and insists that this truth is so unmistakable that there is no need- of an alliance to /demonstrate it or .to fortify it. America says that all open-minded men and wo- ' men must , see the - t "uth, . .and she- i« prepared, to think evil of any one who .Rugesfs.a transaction-..in. dealing-with .the matter. '

»A DANGEROUS LINK. *' The. .United' State?..does not want wat, 'ft is .not'thinking through.to the end 'of. thi> policy which it has unhesitatingMy, adopted with respect of the Far East, but. it.baa committed itself .absolutely to a policy which does.make for war. Japan ’ eannot 'consent to sacrifice what . she must sacrifice to conform to America’s "views of a just settlement in the Far East?. America is. making a moral issue of a political question, and that is, as •■you know, one of the most dangerous 'lines to take!' when it is a question of ' preserving peace. The United States is drifting" toward war with Japan, bo■'cause of getting more and more into tho 'mood of considering the Japanese attitude toward China arid all through' tho Fiir East as iinmoral. Nowyis Britain prepared to back Ama-’ rich. unreservedly and without any idea 'of 'compromise? America' thinks that 'ft Britain is Japan will have to quit. '■'’Atno-ich shys,'' as ' the French say to America and Britain, "give us your sup. '"port, and the enemy, Geffiiany in tho French case. Japan in America’s, will see that it is all up with his hopes.” But America also says that Britain ought to support, her. because she is right.' America will not impute any great virtue to Britain if she does support hoc unreservedly, assuming that ..Britain, has only performed her duty i ‘ but—and this point is capital—if Britain ..does not support America unreservedly then America will hold Britain particepe crimlnis with Japan. What troubles an American in reading British Press discussion of the forthcoming conference is the familiar note ■expressed in various wwye, Lut amounting to the suggestion that Britain Wtll play umpire, mutual friend, moderator. l.Jf Britain tries that vole, my belief ’ii that th* reaction aga.lfi«t her in the United States will be even more con-

eiderable than that reaction which follows Paris. If America, wgre reasonable all would be well.- But she is not reasonable; sho is righteous, if you please. The country says that the American policy in tho Far East is as simple, and as right as the assertion that two and two make, four. What is the need of alliances, of partnerships, .of mutual agreements to establish and maintain this simple mathematical fact? Moreover, if anyone says two and two do not make foul —well, there you are. If anyone siig gests compromising with one who says the result is five or seven or three, then the motives of this third party are instantly open to suspicion. AMERICA DETERMINED.

America i.s as determined to compel: Japan to accept her view of the Par Eastern situation as Britain is to maintain her position as to Upper Silesia against the French. America has the dangerous sense of power, and tho terribly inflammatory conviction of having right all on her side. She has not asked Britain to come to Washington to discuss ii solution of the Pacific.’ Not in tho least: she has asked Britain to come to Washington to agree with America that two and two make four, and make public acknowledgment thereof. If Britain do*:, well and good; if not, so much the worse for Britain and for all concerned. But in any event there is no alliance, contract, association conceivable. -

If Britain agrees with America, if she stands with America in the discussion, if America has Britain's vote in the tests, this much will be accomplished, namely, that a very dangerous moment in Anglo-American relations will pass. Something of the suspicion of Paris will bo laid. But the maximum of possibility is co-operation without contract. The greatest danger is the chance that British policy will be successfully represented to the American people as pro-Japanese. (Copyright, 1921. by the McClure News .paper Syndicate.)