PEACE OR WAR

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 288, 31 August 1921, Page 5

PEACE OR WAR

OUR AMERICAN LETTER " X —— THE COMING CONFERENCE WHAT IT MEANS TO THE UNITED •STATES? X By F. H. Simmonds. (Special to Tub Dominion.) New York, July 20. It would bo idle to deny that the Japanese hesitation in accepting tho American invitation to an international conference at Washington to discuss disarmament and Pacific policies has done much to aggravate a disagreeable situation and confirm suspicions which aro very widespread. On the other hand, since one of tho main objects of tho conference itself, must be to clear the air, to demonstrate whether wo are in for trouble or peace in the Far East, even thia form of information is valuable. I think it cannot bo tin exaggeration to eay that in the whole discussion of the Far Eastern question, American attention will be ns clearly concentrated Upon Europe as upon Japan. Our own views of the solution of tho problem of the Pacific are clear. Wo desire nothing beyond the guarantee of equal opportunity for all nations in tho Far East, in China quite as much os in Siberia. We desire to see Chinese Integrity uphold, and wo hope that some form of independence, either within or without Russia, may be found for the old Russian territories fronting on tho Pacific. American Policy in the Far East. TTp to the time of the last presidential Administration the United States had a well-defined policy in tho Far Easts the “open door" had come to rank after the Monroe Doctrine in American. foreign. policy. Unhappily, Mr. Wilson sacrificed at least the appearance of that policy, when ho dictated that LansingIshii agreement, which has wrought so much Farm. Nothing gives a ■ clearer notion of tho incapacity of Mr. Wilson to grasp realities in foreign affairs than this notorious agreement.

In terms tho Lansing-Ishii agreement was no more than an expression of goodwill, designed to abolish unmistakable bad feeling. In phrnse it reaffirmed for us and for Japan, adherence to the twin doctrine of tho Integrity of China and the open door, but, unhpppily. it also gave recognition to the claim made by Japan, that Japan had a special position in the Near East. As everyone familiar with Chinese affairs knows, this declaration was prompi’lv seized upon by the Japanese to justify much which was contrary to the spirit of the document itself.

Tn point of fact, Japan then and thereafter interpreted the Lansing-Ishii agreement as having precisely the character of the British recognition of the special position of Franco with respect of Morocco in 1904. < This, of course, was the last thing Mr. Wilson had in mind, and represents a complete negation of all American policy in the Far East. On top of this case tho Shantung episode in the Treaty of Versailles, ■ which capped' the climax. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now, American feeling about the renewal of the An gio-Japanese Alliance * has been, and remains, that such renewal, now, would still further fortify tho Japanese in their purpose to assert and maintain a policy of supremacy in the Far East. Just as Japan used the Lansing-Ishii agreement to coerce China in tho past, eho would in the future employ the renewal of an Anglo-Japan-ese ' alliance. This would bo true, no matter what limitations were placed upon tho treaty so far as the United States was concerned. We understand that Japan is ready to discuss the limitation of armaments, because it is quite plain that, by herself, Japan cannot hope to rival a country possessing our wealth and resources. We expect that in any conference there will be no real difference of opinion on the subject of armaments, and that some form of "naval holiday" will result. But euch an agreement is conditioned npon the absence of any side-bargain between great Powers. We believe that the British, aa well as tho French and the Italians, will join us in a policy which will prevent naval competition, but beyond this lies the other question, the question of the "Open Door."

"The Open Door.” Rightly or wrongly, there ia a feeling in the United States that in view of American contribution to the common victory, in the world war of the great financial aid extended to our European associates and the post-bellum policy, which has so far avoided insistence upon prompt payment of interest or principal of that debt, the country has at least a reason for expecting sympathetic action on your side of tho water, when-the United States comes to deal with an acute problem of its own. And the "Open Door" problem Is acute, for it may be accepted in Europe as a foregone conclusion that sooner or later war will come in. the Pacific if Japan endeavours to assert there the doctrine of supremacy, of special rights,, above-all, if she pursues a policy resulting, whatever the outward disguises, in tho economic and political subordination of China to Japan. We are desperately in earnest in, our views as to tho Pacific, and it would be a mistake to misunderstand us in this regard.

How Will Europe View it? Being desperately in earnest we are looking to Europe to sea in what spirit our recent associates in a world war are going to view our own interests. Obviously the play of Japan is to associate the British with herself. Coldness or bitterness between the two Anglo-Saxon nations is as welcome to Japan as AngloFrench bickerings have been to Germany. Thus, I do not think it ever passes tho mark t'o say that the future American feeling toward Britain very largely depends upon the British attitude in the new conference. We are not expecting to see a trial of skill, of diplomatic or of political agility. We are hoping, and I think expecting, that frank and open discussion will demonstrate that our .European associates are prepared to stand with us. We believe that their own interests run parallel with ours, wo find expression in the Press of the Dominions which seems to confirm this faith. As we see our policy, it does not go beyond an advocacy of the "square deal,” and nn insistence that mere ratification nr failure to ratify a treaty of pence, closing a .war in which, to say tho least, we contributed as much as Japan, does not bestow or eliminate,rights acquired by tho war. A. portion of tho position Japan holds and insists upon, maintaining results from the defeat of the German. As we see it, all tho fruits of this victory in tho Far East, have been bestowed upon Japan without regard to American rights We have challenged that arrangement, wo shall continue to challenge it, and the attitude of British and Continental nations in view of our challenge, wifi have an important bearing upon ”Ur at tltude toward them in the future. Japan’s Attitude.

The real issue at the moment is whether Europe, and above all the United Kingdom, means to back Jjipan in her assertion of a policy which carries with it the certainty of Japanese

ascendancy in China and in Siberia or whether Europe will back an American policy which does not go beyond the insistence upon equal opportunity for all, predicted upon the integrity or China and the freedom of Siberia, that is, freedom from Japanese annexation, merit or no disarmament, nothing is plainer than that if Japan insists upon a policy of hegemony, employs the German doctrine and the Prussian method, so far as China is concerned, war will ultimately arrive. Every thoughtful American sees this. If tho price of peace is tho resignation of our right to equal opportunity in the Far East, we shall fight Japan, ns we fought Germany when at last tho Germans, by thmi submarine warfare, attempted to forbm us the use of tho seas. Meantime, the important thing, as I have said, is to know, first, whether Japan intends to remain faithful to the policy she has followed so consistently for the past quarter of ft century, with a success which rivals theßismarckian period in German statesmanship, or whether she is prepared to ioin U 3 in an acceptance of tho "open door." Nor is it much lees important to know, as a second fact, where Europe stands in all this controversy. What tho Adriatic problem is to Italy, tho Pacific question is becoming for the United Stated. Moro and more our attention is focused upon the Far East. What tho North African condition is in French eyes, tho Chinese affair is becoming for us, I mean in importance. The enormous fuss we have made over the tiny incident of Yap is a fair indication. And, whatever our statesmen may expect, the country is not looking for" a polite and truly diplomatic performance in Washington, with, nothing settled at the end, and all sorts of facesaving devices employed to blind the public. It wants action and decision. It wants to know wW-ther it must prepare for war or settle down to pence. And. despite all superficial expression of opinion, it knows that peace is possible only on one basis. (Copyright, 1921, by The M’Clure Newspaper Syndicate.}