DIVORCE LAW

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 223, 15 June 1921, Page 6

DIVORCE LAW

SEPARATION BY MUTUAL CONSENT DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF JUDGES Interesting argument as to tho discretionary powers of a Supremo Court Judge in respect of section 4 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 1920, was heard in the Supreme Court yesterday, during consideration of a petition for dissolution of marriage. This section of tho Act provides: It shall lie lawful for the Court, in its discretion, on the petition of either of the parties to a decree of judicial separation, or to a separation order wade by a Stipendiary Magistrate or by a resident Alagistrate, or to a deed or agreement of separation, or separation by mutual consent when such decree, order, deed, or agreement is in full force and has so continued for not less than three years, to pronounce a decree of dissolution of marriage between the parties, and in making such decree, and in all proceedings incidental thereto, tho Court shall have the same powers as it has in making a decree of dissolution in the first instance.

Tho case, heard before Mr. Justice Salmond, was one in which William George Lodder asked for a decree nisi against Cecilia Rutherford Lodder. Mr. H. R. Blair appeared for the petitioner, and,,.Mr. T. Neave for the respondent. The parties had been separated- from each other since 1908. Mr. Blair said that separation had been effected, under deed, in September, 1908, for mutual reasons, and tho parties had not lived together since.

The petitioner said that he was an engineer, living at I’etone, and that the parties were married on June 1, 1882, in Glasgow. After- their arrival in New Zealand they lived at Petone. The separation was caused by continual disagreements. Petitioner had paid, his wife maintenance, and would continue to do so, having made arrangements for her upkeep in his will. To Mr. Neave: There were no children Of the marriage. Petitioner was 64 years of age, and his wife was 60. He liad no present idea of marrying again. He admitted that his wife had become jealous of another woman with whom he had remained on friendly terms since the separation. He was the chief engineer of the Gear freezing works at Petone. He had nothing whatever to sav against his wife as a woman. To Mr. Blair: His relations with the other woman were perfectly harmless. In opposing x the petition, Mr. Neave said that Mrs. Lodder did not wish a decree made against her. Giving evidence, Mrs. Ixidder said that she had lived happily with her husband for several years. Previous to 1908 she had .been quarrelling with him only a few years. Counsel: Y'ou took objection to his attentions to another lady? Respondent: "Certainly! She added that since, the drawing up of the deed of separation she had lived at Auckland. She opposed the petition on principle. “I have never given-him cause whereby he should have a divorce,” she said. "On religious grounds I 1 ue long to the Presbyterian Church. His Honour: Do you wish to go bac-r to your husband? Respondent: Yes, it he wants me to. I havs never made any suggestion of returning. I think it hard tha after thirtv-nino years of maniago 1 should be branded as a forced womam His Honour commenced to explain the operations of the clause under which a flpuTCO w<LB asked. Respondent interrupted him, saying: "It’s all right for young P«>P p - His Honour, continuing said tho application under clause 4 of the Act di not make any charge nartv A divorce could be obtainea without the commission of any ” f,Ol1 p c6 bv either party, provided they had beei for over three years. Respondent complained that under le no w divorce law she was not allowed "three years’ probation." considered the allowance of -£lto a jear SIMO. She admitted having been offered an increase in allowance if she nould comply with certain conditions. Mr. Neave said the Court should not willingness of both parties £ r JJ* art w “ “du’’K, There I ttlf likelihood of the parties •„ A divorce would mean to in® again. A di orc® T . gh{s whtoh were valuable to her. The dissolution if made, should only be ™ terms, providing for an Uro r T ndentJalfo^andfor p t ud P t faction of the n„n . , h Wfl ITonou'r rem-aiked inab i His no 4K n 4- the respondent teing™ o “ Pe,dtiOner ’ 8 e -uion Mr Neave saying that there was a pec tent has left D M°Z C Blair eaid that the "mutual eonBen order Ct to n riove e the "unju«« Migma 7i%ww° T was P alXs n wlth £ it, he ’contended. The petitioner did, wishjo P h™be made’for the respondent during her life time. Decision was reserved.