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LORD KITCHENER

FRENCH TRIBUTES CORRECT VISION OF THE SCALE OF THE WAR To a French edition of Sir Georg Arthur's "Life" of Lord Kitchener ther are prefixed new prefaces by Marsha Joffre and M. Poincare, the former Pre sident of the French Republic. That o Marshal Joffre is short, like everythin; he says or writes, but enthusiastic. Hi mentions two particular points to Kit chener’s honour. One is that "at a grav. moment, on the eve of the Battle of th< Marne, when it seemed as if the Britisl Army was to give way under pressur of numbers, Kitchener felt that at al, costs it must remain where it was anc fight by our side.” The other is that b; his unhurrying but unresting determin ation to make a big and a good thin; of our New Army he saved France al Verdun; “Ho trusted France he knew that our resistance would give him tim« to range new forces beside us. And sc he was able, at the decisive moment oi Verdun, to send in the nick of time th< British divisions which relieved ours ot the north of rhe Oise and so allowed w to reinforce our defence of Verdun."

M. Poincare writes with equal warmtl in Kitchener’s praise and gives some new details of-tbe early crisis in which Kit chener crossed to France to stiffen th< resolution of Sir John French. M, Poincare explains first that after the "unfortunate frontier battle” Mons-Charle-roi-Namur) Joffre was keen on keeping in touch with the enemy all the way, keeping down the enemy’s pace of advance, and always keeping ready to turn and rend him at the first likely moment. With this view "Joffre desired the British Army to hold its ground abreast ol tile French and not retreat too fasti Bui Marshal French made his movements with excessive independence seeking, above everything, to keep his divisions intact. On Sunday, August 30, General Joffre alarmed at seeing how much French was isolating himself, had telephoned to M. Millerand, our Minister 'of War, that he really feared the British were for the moment no longer disposed to fight. They w,ere retiring on Meaux,' where it looked as though they wished to gain the lower Seine by going round Paris on the south, the instinctive movement of an island people, with its impulse tb get near the sea, which it knows. Next day, Monday, our Com-mander-in-Chief sent me a staff officer to beg me to intervene in such a way that Field Marshal French might not go on retreating too fast but make up his mind to hold up the enemy on the British front. By arrangement with .M. 'iillerand I sent for the British Ambassador, Sir F. Bertie M. Poincare was President at the time). ... I laid before him the misgivings of Joffre, and his request, and he promised to telephone promptly to French. Towards 10 p.m. Sir Francis returned to the Elysee. He brought me an officer bearing a written reply from the British unhappily an inconclusive one. French dwelt on his army’s heavy losses in men ana material. Since leading Mbns, he said, it had been, constantly in action, and it needed a good week to reorganise; and become v real combatant unit again.” , Meanwhile Joffre had been trying, by iirect appeal to French, to restore combined action, and Kitchener in London, sharing Joffre’s fears, was arranging instantly to come to France. "Tho reply that he (Joffre) had gotl from Field-Mar-shal French was not merely as negative as those given to us. It also wronglyattributed to the French command, con-, trary to its declared intentions, a wish to renounce an resumption of the offensive. ’ The misunderstanding was, then, very serious. That it was removed ■ we owe, for the most, part, to Lord Kitchener.”

Kitchener reached Paris on September • 1, and immediately saw the British Ambassador, Tdillerand, and French. His firmness prevailed. M. Poincare adds anote to Kitchener’s terse summary there given: “The final agreement was not reached without difficulty.” French, he says, at first made a sin nd, even i.n the region of Meaux, conditional on Joffre’s detaching troops to guard the Seine between Paris and Havre. .Toffre replied that he was very sorry but lie could not thug weaken his front and that. he meant to pivot on Paris and promptly resume the offensive. According to M. 'Poinca’ire—as also according to General Gd^ieni—it was only on tho very evci of the battle of the Marne that complete joint action was achieved. Once in; French co-operated loyally, “his army fought with magnificent valour, and England took a bril- i liant part, in the joint victory. But, without the repeated action of Lord Kitchener, the co-ordination of effort between the two commands would, perhaps," have not been established, and the battle would have been in danger of being lost.” . . . 7 M. Poincare pays respectful tribute to Kitchener’s prevision of the scale of the war and of the exertions necessary to win it. .Toffre, Foch, the President, and Kitchener met at Dunkirk on November 1, 1914, when the first Battle of Ypres was beginning, and they all discussed thoroughly the prospect of early reinforcements from Esgland. We (the Frenchmen) were naturally eager to see fresh troops come over a»s soon as possible to help in the defence of. French, soil, and some of us, to tell tho truth, had some difficulty in understanding why Kitchener put us off till the summer of 1915, and why, from that time on, the British set up on the coast miliatry establishments calculated for a period of three, years. But Kitchener explained to us with great force and clearness, on the one band, all the Tea- . sons there were for anticipating a war of several years, and,’ on the other, all the obstacles which must inevitably delay for at least six months the preparation of a great British army. One felt in him a deep and reasoned conviction upon which an opponent could not easily get a hold. Those of us who talked with him then, and who perhaps imagined at the time that this stublx>rn advocacy of a very lengthy programme. beteayed a little contrariety or pessimism, ’-ave since bad to recognise that from the beginning of the war Kitchener had on the contrary, a verycorrect vision of the future.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19210409.2.78

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 166, 9 April 1921, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,054

LORD KITCHENER Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 166, 9 April 1921, Page 7

LORD KITCHENER Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 166, 9 April 1921, Page 7

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