The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 9, 1921. AMERICA’S SECOND THOUGHTS

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 166, 9 April 1921, Page 6

The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 9, 1921. AMERICA’S SECOND THOUGHTS

American dissatisfaction at being excluded from what the Secretary ot State. (Mr- Hughes) calls participation in the victories of the Allied and Associated Powers at once suggests the conclusive answer that America is “excluded” solely by her own act. The Allies not only aid not exclude her from participation in the peace settlement, but gieatlv regretted her . withdrawal, and would gladly welcome her renewed co-operation on any reasonab.** terms. At this stage the protest embodied in the Mandate Note would be addressed more appropriately to the members and late members of the Republican majority, in the United States Senate (including President Harding and. some other members of his Administration) than to the . Allied nations. . Although in this sense and to this, extent the Note misses fire, it no doubt has a highly important practical bearing on international. aifairs. Detail issues apart, it. is likely to be welcomed by the Allied Powers as a specific indication that America is inclined ,to take an active part in promoting the stable international settlement in which, from the standpoint of material interests as well as on higher grounds, she is quite as profoundly concerned as any other nation. It is now.fairly certain that the policy of isolation is losing favour in the eyes of the American Government. Before the election, for instance, MRHarding said that, as soon as a resolution terminating the state of war with Germany was subhiitted to him he would sign it. In his latest reference to this question, only a few days ago, he said that although there was no practical way in which the United States could ratify the Treaty of Versailles, on the other hand there was no need for the immediate passage of the Knox peace resolution. The Administration would move cautiously and prudently to solve the situation. .He in. sisted that he had no definite plan, and declined to discuss a possible programme. This attitude is marked by common sense. It, of course, rests with the United States to find some means of re-establishing the working understanding with the Allies, which, so far as they are. concerned, need never have been interrupted. . She cannot expect to dictate, to the Allies on selected issues. In her absence and without her help they shouldered the burdens of the peace settlement, and naturally they do not regard with favour the idea of undoing their work at this late stage. No doubt, however, it is quite open to America to confer with the Allies on such aspects of the settlement as are still of adjustment. Her influence in such matters is likely to be. measured by her willingness, to share the the Allied nations have assumed as mandates and in other respects. So far as mandates are concerned, America has herself, or her Republican Senators, alone to thank for anything that is anomalous in the existing state of affairs. The Allies delayed the allocation of mandates as long as possible, in the hope of securing American co-operation, and went out of their way to urge the United States to accept a mandate over Armenia. America’s general protest against the disposal of late enemy territories counts for little in view of her earlier 'refusal to share the responsibilities and burdens of the peace settlement ; but even now the Allies might be. glad if she offered her co-operation, to undertake some rearrangement of mandate obligations. Although the immediate situation is not without its difficulties, there are welcome signs of an increasing recognition by the Government and people of the United States that they arc bound'on all grounds to take a responsible part with" the Allied nations in assisting to restore and maintain normal conditions throughout the world. Actual experience has already afforded a very striking demonstration of the extent to which American prosperity and welfare are dependent upon the conditions ruling in other parts of the world.. . The facts of the economic position were tersely summed up not long ago by Mr. ' Hoover, now American Secretary of Com-

Tn America we are faced by widespread unemployment, which is not due to overproduction. Our production has been normal, but. we have a congestion of products duo to lessened consumption in Europe. So closely knit is the economic fibre of the world that the situation in Europe has reached the dinner-table of every citizen of the United States. We must make it financially possible for Europe to buy our raw materials.

While a policy of isolation, even, if it were practicable, is manifestly incompatible with the interests of the United States as an industrial and trading nation, there are. other directions in which she obviously has everything to gain from a policy of international op-operation. It is becoming plainer every day that unless her statesmen are prepared recklessly to subordinate American interests they cannot afford to neglect the opportunity that now offers of at once safeguarding peace in the Pacific, and taking a practical step towards the limitation of armaments. The familiar facts of the case were, effectively stated by . thp Commonwealth Prime Minister (Mu. W. M.’Hughes) in a speech which is reported to-dav. His statement that in securing the friendship of Japan wc cannot make an enemy of America, expresses a view' that is practically universal throughout the Empire, and British opinion undoubtedly favours a renewal of the Japanese Treaty “in some modified form acceptable Io Britain, America, and Jannn.” The utterances of Japanese Ministers imply that Japan would readily agree to broaden the existing

Treaty on these lines, and if America consents to participate, the way will be open to an understanding which would afford concrete guarantees of peace not only in the Pacific, but over a wider field. America has as much to gain, as any other nation from substituting conditions of settled peace for a competition in armaments which would involve the risk or likelihood of future war, and unless she is content to embark on a policy of militarism for its own sake, can hardly reject an understanding with Britain, and Japan. Although the American Government, has not publicly defined its attitude on this question, it may be hoped that the Imperial Conference, when it meets in June, will find the way to some extent at least prepared for such a mSclification of the AngloJapanese Treaty and enlargement of its scope as the Commonwealth Prime Minister has suggested.