The Dominion FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 1921. GREECE AND THE TURKISH TREATY

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 165, 8 April 1921, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 1921. GREECE AND THE TURKISH TREATY

The campaign, in Asia Minor, m which the Greeks are opposed to the Turkish Nationalists, headed by Mustapha Kemal, has bfcen given little prominence in the cabled news, but it raises issues of great importance not only to the contestants, but to the principal Allied nations. While the later developments of the campaign are in some respects obscure, it is plain that the Greeks have suffered a heavy defeat and ono which conceivably may necessitate a revision of the territorial adjustments effected under the Treaty of Sevres. That instrument _ gave Greece a considerable accession of territory in Thrace, and also the villayet of Smyrna, in Western Asia Minor, an area in which “unredeemed” Greeks had been barbarously misused by the Turks. After the Treaty had been ratified,, howover, the reactionary party in Greece gained the upper hand., M. Veni-, zelos. tho great and gifted leader who nas done so much to rehabilitate his country, was defeated at a general election, and Constantine, the discredited puppet of German intrigue, was restored to the throne. In these circumstances, serious doubts appeared as to • whether Greece was any longer capable of playing tho responsible part assigned to her under the Treaty of Seyres. In France particularly, tho opinion was and is strongly held that Greece under reactionary control is incapable of co-operating effectively with the Allies to establish order in the territory of tho former Ottoman Empire, and France evidently favours a drastic revision of the Ssvres Treaty. Various proposals aiming at some sort of compromise between Greek and Turkish claims relating to Smyrna and other territories were discussed only a few weeks ago at an Allied Conference in London, which was attended by Greek and Turkish delegations. The Turkish Nationalists, or Kemalists, though they are nominally rebels in their own country, were jointly represented with the regular Government on the Turkish delegation. The Conference was Apparently incdnclusive in its results, and a London cablegram of March 14 stated that “Greece prefers to suffer fresh sacrifices in rapid military operations in order to end the indefinite situation'.” Already in contact with the Kemalists on a wide front in Western Asia Minor, the Greeks, thereupon opened an offensive which at first developed prosperously. On tho eve of their late defeat they were attacking the railway junction of Eskishehr, about 120 miles southeast of Constantinople. Capturing this centre they would have ’ had good prospects of driving the Kemalists back upon their base and headquarters of Angora, 120 miles further east. Instead of achieving these results, hewever, the Greeks have been defeated and compelled to make an extended retreat. Unless a renewed and more successful effort is speedily made against the Kemalists, these events are likely to strengthen the demands made in France and elsewhere for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Since revision would of necessity involve considerable concessions to the Turks—that is to say, to the Kemalists, .who in all essentials dominate Turkish policy—it would represent an unqualified misfortune not only to Greece and to racial groups lately the victims of Turkish misrule, but to the Allied nations who made heavy sacrifices in order to bring about the dissolution of tho Turkish Empire and make an end of Ottoman tyranny. No one has more forcibly upheld this view of the matter than M. Venizelos, the statesman to whom Greece owes so much and whom she has so ill repaid. Tn a recent statement to the diplomatic correspondent of the London Observer, M. Venizelos made an eager appeal on behalf of his countrymen, and for the absolute preservation of the Treaty of Sevres. With great good humour, he made light of his own defeat at the polls, and declared that there was no ground for the hard things that had. Ween said, since that event), .agajinst the Greeks. His defeat, be maintained, was in no way remarkable, in view of the war-weariness of the population and other considerations which.ha traced in' detail, notably the irritating effect of longcontinued mobilisation and wan restrictions, his own lengthy absence from Greece in order to attend Allied conferences, and the fact that twelve hundred officers dismissed from the army on account of their pro-German sympathies (had been working against him for three years pieceding the last election. Constantine, he remarked, was negligible ; the Allies would do well to ignore him, and place their faith in the Greek people.

The case for the absolute preservation of the Tieaty of Sevres (M. Venizelos added) is mainly this. 'The net profit which the war has brought to humanity lies, not in the dissolution of AustriaHungary, the disintegration of Tsarist Russia, or tho prostration of Germany, but in tho dissolution of the Turkish Empire. The Austro-Hungarian subject nationalities 1 suffered grievous moral wrongs. But they were not massacred, and their economic interests were well served. The Greeks and Armenians were not only slaves in Turkey; during the war and. since no fewer than a million Armenians and half a million Greeks have been massacred or deported. It is one of those sta.rk, incredible facts which escape attention by reason of their very enormity. How can any civilised man, any wan who has it in his power to influence the fate of these Greeks and Armenians for the future, ever contemplate tho possibility of restoring, in any degree whatever, "the blasting rule of the Turk”? You people of the happy Wr»t simply do net understand the reality of massacre: how should you? Yet I know that you in England have the consistency and commonsense to stick t>- a Treaty which takes temptations out of tho way of the Turks—quite apart from tho positive merits of the Treaty, ns giving Greek's the right to Mong to Greece.

M. Venizelos expressed his firm belief I,hat the Greek army in Asin. Minor was “more than a match lot any Kemalist formation any day. Unfortunately it now seems possible that this confidence was misplaced. It may be agreed that tho Treaty of Sevres “is the only guarantee of stability, peace, and Humanity in the Near East,” but the danger is now in plain sight that Greece may fall hopelessly short of doing her p&rt to enforce the Treaty, and that th* heavily-burdened Allied nations may find it anything but easy to redress her failure. Given a resolute national spirit, it is of course, quite open to Greece to organise a more effective effort for victory and

the enforcement of the Treaty, but the prospects of her doing so are by no means as bright as they would be if Venizelos were still at the head of affairs, with the nation responding freely to his leadership.