The Dominion FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1921. A NAVAL HOLIDAY

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 94, 14 January 1921, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1921. A NAVAL HOLIDAY

Although the question of naval disarmament in the Pacific is giving rise to a great deal ot discussion, it can hardly be brought to a head until the new .Republican Government takes office in the United States in March next. It is rather difficult in these circumstances to follow the Japanese newspaper which is quoted in on of to-day’s cablegrams as stating that America is taking the lead in the movement, while Britain and Japan are silent. As a matter pt fact, apparently trustworthy indications are afforded that both 811 - ain and Japan are ready to consider a naval holiday, wheicas America is proceeding with a naval programme which aims at the establishment of the most powerful fighting fleet in the world. It is, oi course, well known that Japan also is forwarding a big programme of battleship construction. M hue there is no justification for the assertion that the United States is taking the lead in a movement for naval disarmament, it may be true that American public opinion strongly favours action on tries* lines. Certainly the course of discussion in the United States and in other countries is making it increasingly manifest that the Powers immediately concerned cannot neglect the possibilities of a naval holiday without detriment to tlm interests of their own people and those of all other nations. Ihe merits of the proposal are tojrought out and emphasised even m what is said by its critics and opponents. The latest example-in -point appears in some observations by Mr. Josephus Daniels, who is nearing

the end of his term as Secretary for the Navy. . Mb. Daniels is in favour of convening a representative conference of the nations to discuss the limitation of naval armaments; but he thinks (ashe was reported yesterday) that ‘ a naval holiday between Britain, Japan, and the United State.s would breed suspicion and distrust, and not secure a permanent reduction of armaments.” _ If this is tho most damaging criticism that can be brought to bear on the project it is presumably assured of sufli overwhelming support, as will make its adoption certain. No one who calmly considers the facts can doubt that Mr. Daniels has raised a bogey, and that he is confusing one thine with another. If a naval holiday implied a close and exclusive alliance between Britain, Japan, and the United States, it might indeed breed suspicion and distrust in the minds of other nations—that is to say, it might give rise to the idea that the three Powers were abstaining from naval competition one with , another only in order that they might the more easily dominate the rest of the world. It would be fantastic, however, to suggest that any development of this kind is contemplated or is within the bounds of practical possibility. A naval holiday in tho Pacific implies no pooling , of, naval strength bv the Powers primarily concerned. Initially, it would substitute for a wasteful competition in armaments, based on national fears and jealousies, a more reasonable scale of naval strength, determined with an eye to the requirements of coast defence and the protection of commerce. More than this, the proposal offers a means of givinir a far stronger lead in the limitation of naval armaments throughout the world than could be given in any other way. A full and complete antidote to the suspicion and distrust Mb. Daniels anticipates would be provided if Britain, Japan, and the United States, in coming to terms regarding a- naval holiday, made it as clear as they very well might that their most essential aim was to promote the international limitation of armaments which must be brought about if tho resources of civilisation are to be applied to the best effect, and the world is to be spared the horrors of recurring war. In urging that nothing should he done until all the nations arc abto to agree upon a, common course of action. Mr. Daniels gives beggarly couns-d. Although his own country, Britain, ami Japan arc manifestly in a position io give a strong and "effective load, he recommends practically that the world, should.bo allowed to pursue n, drift which

leads to overwhelming disaster. The recent experience of the world in the compilation of peace treaties and in related affairs has" made it only too clear that relief from the burden of armaments might long bo sought in vain if initiative were paralysed until the ideas of all nations, great and small, were brought into perfect harmonv. Britain. Japan, and America are in a position to cut the Gordian knot. They will endanger their own future as nations and that of modern civilisation if they are unable to give unitedly the bold lead in the limitation of armaments for which the world is waiting. It is almost incredibly futile to suggest (as Mb. Daniels does) that in giving such a lead they will-breed suspicion and distrust. " It is not by limiting armaments, but by arming extravagantly. that nations breed suspicion and distrust and sow the seeds of future war.

The real danger at present is not that a purposeful lead in disarmament may defeat its purpose’, but that one or other of the nations Concerned may prove to be incapable of the breadth of outlook which would make a naval agreement possible. Such an agreement really requires of those who enter into it an attitude as enlightened and disinterested as is implied in membership of the League of Nations. It cannot but be a ground of anxiety, therefore, that there is no assurance meantime that the United States will join the League. The natural corollary to her continued refusal to join would be the adoption by her Government of a policy of narrow and self-centred isolation in matters of naval and foreign policy—the perpetuation, that is to sa.v, of the attitude to which she has been reduced, perhaps temporarily, by the wrangling of political factions. There is no lack of enlightened counsel in the United States regarding the policy she ought to adopt in international affairs, but whether this counsel will prevail remains to be seen. A measure of hope appears meantime in the fact that foremost memyers of the Republican Party are numbered with those who advocate cooperation with other nations in maintaining the peace of the world. For instance, Mr. Elihu Root, who may possibly become Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when Mn. Harding takes office, cabled to the latter from Europe last August in the following terms:— z It is very unwise to declare the League dead. ... It would not be true. . . .

In my opinion a new deal h?re from the beginning by abandoning the Versailles Treaty is impossible To attempt it would bring chaos and an entire loss of results of the war and general disaster ■ involving) the United States. The only possible course js to keep the Treaty, modifying it to meet the requirements of the Senate reservations and the Chicago platform (of the Republican Party) and probably in some other respects.

Up to the present Mr. Harding has shown little appreciatiqn of this sound advice, but the hope has not disappeared that Mr. Root and other Republican leaders who share his views may yet be, enabled to take an important part in shaping the policy of their partv in office. Should affairs take this course, good prospects will appear of the United States participating in a naval agreement and in other measures calculated to safeguard international peace. If, however, those elements in the Republican Party which are bitterly partisan and narrow in outlook gain the upper band prospects of the United States either entering into a naval agreement or joining the. League of Nations will tend to disappear.