The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1920. A FALSE MOVE AT GENEVA

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 62, 7 December 1920, Page 6

The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1920. A FALSE MOVE AT GENEVA

In deciding to break away from the League of Nations unless her amendments to the Covenant are accepted, Argentina has the doubtful honour of striking the first jarring note of any importance since the Assembly opened its deliberations. It is fairly obvious that the attitude taken up by her delegates, under instructions from their Government, is not only without justification, but is directly opposed to her own best interests. > It is plainer now than it was when the Assembly met that membership of the League carries positive advantages. Authorities of eminent standing arc agreed that the proceedings of the last week or two have appreciably strengthened the hopes that are based upon the League as a means of averting war and promoting international cooperation. The representatives of some forty nations assembled at Geneva aro working unitedly on common problems in a give-and-tako spirit which on the whole is in "absolute contrast to that now manifested by -Argentina. Although the League has yet to be conclusively tested, it is already manifest that no country can afford to discard lightly the rights and privileges of membership in such\a family of nations. If it were reasonable to suppose that Argentina is acting purely on her own initiative her intention of quitting the League could only bo regarded as a piece of petulant folly which time and reflection might bo expected to show her the wisdom of retracting. The interest of the occasion centres, however, in tho opinion expressed in one of to-day's cablegrams "that sonio ulterior motive 1 ies_ behind such drastic action in desiring a hasty amendment of the Covenant." Tho best clue to tho ' motives of the Argentine Government is perhaps to be found in the naturo of the principal amendment over which the split has occurred— the amendment which proposes that all sovereign States shall be admitted to tho League, and that smalldr States shall have representation without voting power. The head of tho Argentine delegation (Senoii Pueykkedon) has stated that none of the Argentine amendments are in conflict with the Treaty of Versailles, but this is a palpable evasion of tho .actual facts. If the' Covenant were amended at this stage to provide for the admission of all sovereign States, Germany would automatically acquiro the right to enter the and as an immediate result tho Allied nations would be seriously prejudiced in enforcing some of the most vital clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, notably those concerning reparation. There is no fundamental difference in principle between the supporters and opponents of tho Argentine amendmont. It is agreed that the League must bo."for all humanity," but the. reasonable reservation is made by the Allied nations—and apparently is accepted by almost all other members except Argentina—that' Germany must qualify for membership by satisfactorily guaranteeing the execution of her Treaty obligations. In effect Argentina is demanding that Germajiy should bo admitted unconditionally and placed in a position which very possibly would enable her to evade these obligations. Rather more than suspicion is thus occasioned that Argentina is acting less on her own behalf than as the agent of Germany, and tho suspicion is heightened on consideration of Argentina's somewhat dubious record during the war period. The leading features of that record are no doubt fresh in memory. It may suffice to recall the policy of the Argentine Government following on tho revelation by the American State Department, in September, 1017, that Count Luxburg, the noto-

rious German Charge d'Affaircs at Buenos Aires, had transmitted cipher messages to his Government through the. Swedish Foreign Office, in the oourso of which he recommended, amongst otter things, that certain Argentine ships should be "sunk.I without leaving a trace.'' Although both Houses of the Argentine Congress declared for a rupture of relations with Germany, ana this demand was supported bv popular demonstrations, President liugoyen and his Cabinet persisted in maintaining neutrality, and did so until tho end of the war. The play of German influence in the Argentine, though it was most conspicuously manifested in the attitude of tho Government, was attested in other ways. For instance, in October, 1917, the Buenos Aires correspondent of the London Tiniest supplied further evidence on the subject in reporting the termination of the great strike in which 120,000 railway employees suspended work for twentyone days. Highlly or wrongly (the correspondent wrote) thero has existed and still exists in tho minds of 99 out of every 100 men outside the ranks of the strikers themselves tho conviction that German intrigue. German money, and Uerman designs have been at the root of the strike. It has been everything else you like, industrial, political, socialistic, but at tho very root, unless even* indication ui fault, lay German intriguo. The coincidence between t'lie declaration by both Houses of the Argentine Congress in favour of a rupture of relntions with Germany and the outbreak of the general strike oil the railways is too marked, especially when the analogy of similar strikes at critical moments in Spain (after Count Romanones's declaration), in the United States, and in Russia is taken into account.

Besides interposing a distraction at Che moment when the Argentine Congress had voted for decisive action against Germany, the strike, of course, also served German ends by hampering the transmission of vitally important food supplies to the Allies. Another suggestive indication of .the development of German organisation in Argentina appears in a dispatch the correspondent just quoted sent to his paper on October 5, 1918, more than a month'before the armistice. It reads in part: I am' privately advised that German firms here have recently received infoi> mation that tho war ends this year,' and are advised to v nct accordingly. Spain is the channel of communication. The country which remained neutral in spite of such foul provocation in 1917, and then and subsequently was so obviously a hotbed of German influence and intrigue, is certainly open to the charge of acting with ulterior motives in now demanding that all sovereign States should be admitted forthwith to the League of Nations. , When the victory of the Allies became apparent, President Luqoyen's international policy was freely criticised by'the people of Argentina, many of whom, it is recorded, lamented their country's isolation, and urged that tho Cabinet dd not represent genuine Argentine opinion. President liu/soyex, however, is still in office—his term does not expire untl 1922—and the move made at Geneva suggests that German influence is not less potent than it was in the Argentine. Presumably those who inspired the move hoped to profit by such divisions of opinion as exist in the League Assembly, and by the .absence of the United States. It seems possible, however, that the chief result may be to demonstrate that the League has already attained a degree of cohesion which will not readily be destroyed. Although a number of the iMiropean and Latin American countries sympathise with the Argentine amendments, available information is to the effect that it is unlikely that any other State, with the possible cxcepton of Paraguay, will follow.Argentina's bad example.