DEFENCE OF DOMINION

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 48, 20 November 1919, Page 8

DEFENCE OF DOMINION

GENERAL RICHARDSON'S VIEWS

RECONSTRUCTING THE FORCES

NECESSITY FOR AIRCRAFT

Highly interesting and important aspects of defence matters were dealt with by Brigadier-General G. S. Richardson, C.8., C.M.G., C.8.1!., in tho course of an address which ho delivered to officers at tho Wellingon Garrison Officers' Club recently.

"All ranks," said General Richardson, 'must realiso the necessity for defence, for what purpose tho New.Zealand Forces were organised, and how they were to bo used in war. There was great need for standardised instruction on this subject. "The members of tho New Zealand Forces cannot bo united in one common aim if they do not themselves realise tho need for a thoroughly efficient defence, and for what purposo they aro being trained," ho said. "Differences of opinion and doubts among officers and other ranks as to the necessity for defence lead to greater doubts on the part nf the people and lack of unity in tho most vital question, viz.; national safety. What are tho best means of consolidating tho opinions of tho people in regard to tho necessity for defence? How aro tho objections now raised by persons who urge that now the war has been won thero i 6 no further need for military forces to be overcome? NAVAL DEFENCE AND AVIATION. "Is there not a tendency to consider that all wo need in the way of defence, is a strong navy? We are. all conversant with what happened in 1914 and how tho strength and strategy and readiness for war of our Navy ruined Germany's ambitions. Tho necessity for the British Empire being supremely strong*in ssa power has been thoroughly, demonstrated throughout the war, but we have had the lesson' of history lep'eated that naval defence alone will •not onsuro security and a decision. This was tho caso in tho wars of tho Romans ' and CaTthageniiuis—in Ithe Napoleonic wars—in the war between Russia and Japan and again in 1914-19. Sea power and military power go'hand in hand, the ono is tho complement of tho other arid no complete decision can bo gained without both. Previous to the growth of the 'German Navy our supremacy at sea was '-unchallenged, and it was tho superior strength of our Navy which prevented war on several occasions. The complement of that strong Navy was a' small and highly efficient army in the form of - the British Expeditionary Force; and if ive can again ensure tho sarno naval superiority (which is doubtful) we can again afford to havo a small and efficient Army—but we must havo the two (Navy and Army), and the'mili-. tary .organisation in peace must be so organised as to bo capable of expansion ; in., war. • • • "Should wo not realise the value of aircraft for commercial and military development and lay down the foundation for an air. force?■ Only a few flying machines went "to France with tho Expeditionary Force in lilli. . Tho Germans, were superior to us, and it was very irritating to .have hostile machines lying oyer you observing your move-, ments and be,unable to prevent them doing so. Previous to the war we had trained, units in the art of concealment. from aircraft, but we then thought only of small forces. It is a very different matter concealing a large anny from observation from tho air. Tho only way to do so is to get command of the air anil destroy the enemy's machines. This was attempted, but not until 1918 were wo ;roally superior io tho enemy in the air. /So strong did our Air. Force become, and 60 hugo its organisation, that a separate Ministry was formed and a third service was instituted. • We'now have the War Office, Admiralty and Air Board. The co-ordina-tion of these three services is a matter which wo must ensure in peaca and war. "Lack of co-ordination between the Admiralty and War Office at tho beginning of the war has already been commented on in the Press; therefore I am divulging no secrets when I say it wa 1 ? woalc, and New Zealand should learn tho lesson and take'steps to obviate a. repetition in future when this Dominion has its own Navy. Furthermore, the third arm, tho Air Force, makes co-ordination still more difficult. New Zealand has not yet an Air Force, and in the interests of economy may not bo ablo to form , ono for some time,, .but it must ultimately be formed, _ because modern armies cannot operate in the field without aircraft. . Navies must havo aircraft for use stratcgioally and tactically. Harbour defences are incomplete without them. They aro tho .eyes of tho armies, navies, and coast fortresses.

"Whole nations now engage in war—no longer is a small army left to a country's battles while the remainder look on. All Stato Departments and all sections of tho community do their part, therefore provision must in future be made for co-operation and co-ordination between military and civil departments* Cannot we ensure co-ordination between Departments of tho Slate by tho forma tion of a committee consisting of heads of Departments and the circulation of summaries of-what each Department is doing, and in war by tho formation or National Defenco Committees on which various sections of the community are represented? Would tlwro not be _ less opposition to certain forms of national activity if the people were taken into oonfidence by tho Government?"

RECONSTRUCTING THE FORCES. After roviowing tho organisation of the Now Zealand Territorial Force,; General Richardson proceeded to explain his views on tho reconstruction of tho Now Zoaland Forces. In constructing the New Zealand Forces, lie remarked, it was essential that they should be specially organised to carry out tho task vlucli would, probably lx> allotted to them in tho event of war. This principle was observed in regard to the British Army, which provided for an Expeditionary Force and a Home Defence Force, which in 1911 consisted of: 1 Cavalry Division and G divisions' Expeditionary Force; H Territorial divisions, and 14 mounted brigades. Home Defence Territorial Force. Similarly in regard to the armies of the Continent, thoy arc, or wero organised to protect their own countries from invasion, and their resppctivo strengths wero regulated by the 6izo of tho armies of their probable enemies. The Now Zealand Territorial Forco had hitherto existed solely for homo dofonce, and although in 1913 a 6inall Exneditionary Force was sruarantced to tho Imperial authorities, this forco was not organised at the outbreak of' war. Tho war had shown that homo defenco was best assured by the Navy, • Tho scheme of reorganisation must provide for:—(0 Amplo equipment and ammunition; (2) a complete and highlytrained stall'; (3) ample supply of welltraineci ofticcTS with adequate reserves to rcnlaco wastage; (4) well-trained n.c.o.'s; (5) the small force to bo mobilised must bo readv trained and properly equipped to take the field at once. Providing tho remainder of the manhood of the nation were nrouerly classified, and had passed through a short intensive courso of training as Caoots, and learnt to uso a rifle, thev could bo quickly trained, and mado efficient as reinforcements. This did not apply to specialists and technical serviec Dorsonncl, who must be kept in constant training. During tho war reinforcements wero not passed into _ units until thev had been trained. This was n vi'.rr important principle, and any new scheme should provide for this. The military problem now before New Zealand was;—(!) What should bo our minimum peace organisation to permit of its exnansion to the required organisation for war? (2) What minimum traininn should be carried out to ensure efficiency. ami at the. name time not bear undulv on the individual having regard to the necessity for the services of every man in developing the trade and commerce of tho country, tho shortage of iTian-nowcr in' the Dominion, the heavy war debt, and consequently the neert for tho smallest'possible expenditure on defence and all other nun-productivo a» tivities