AN ARMY DICTATOR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 293, 6 September 1919, Page 8

AN ARMY DICTATOR

GENERAL GOETIIALS'S PART IN •' , THE WAR. General Goethals (the builder of the Panama Canal) believes, that-a dictatorship was the making of the American Army's purchase, traffic, and storage department during the war. The General so arranged, matters that ho became an autocrat in his realm, "unhampered by the General Steif or tho Secretary of War," and ho is proud of it. In his testimony 'beforo the Special Committee on War Department Expenditures, ho defended his dictatorial methods in the Quartermaster-General':! office, adopted altor the' principle of business co-opera-tion on which the Council of National' Defence acted in the first part of the war had proved to be "fallacious."- The New York "Tribune's" Washington Bureau reports this clash between tho principles of co-opcration and of "tho one. strong man": Tho General was m<ido n sort of supplies autocrat when the confusion prevailing in the Quartermaster-General's Department reached an intolerable stage. In this way, and by co-operation with the War Industries Board, lie explained, the equivalent of a ministry of munition!} was finally readied. Having unlimited authority, ho used it to purchaso supplies for an army of 3,000,C00 men while tho General Staff was still figuring in 1,300,000. When the General Staff came up to 3,000,000, be planned for 4.,000.M0; but when the stuff jumped to 5,000,000 it got ahead, of him. Fortunately, he said, the war ended before the inevitable deficit that would other iriso have resulted was reached. A?ked if he was criticised for ordering supplies for an army twice as largo as tho Staff contemplated, General Goethals replied; "I had the authority, and I was willing to take the responsibility of gambling on my judgment." General Goethate's testimony was largely in tho nature of a commentary on tho business management of tho Army, which was organised ovi obrolete lines at tho beginning of tha war, and. so continued in some degree up to the signing of tlio armistice, because, after the new system was finally decided on, in tho spring of 191H, it took a considerable period to install; it. Under t'"> eld b'lviii -Worn nf n-n. curing supplies, half-a-dozen bureaux bought and shipped independently of each other, to say nothing of tlio Navy, with the result tViat they naid high prices, competed with each other, blocked tho railways, anxl jammed tho ocean terminals. Soon aftei; ho was called back to help straighten but tho )no«s in December, 1917, General Goeth.ife had proposed to Edward R. Stettfnius, Assistant Secretary of War, in charge of purchase and supplies, a complete consolidation of Army purchasing and transportation. Sir. Stottinius. the General explained, had come to Wanhington "heralded as the man who would save the situation." [ The direction of the consolidation would have {alien to Sir. Stettinius, and the reason it was not then anproved by tho latter was that probably ho did not card to assume such a tremendous responsibility. General Goethals said , that he had recommended tho establishment of a .Munitions Ministry, as the logiea.l way to deal with the situation. The consolidation idea (purchase, traffic, and storage combined!, recommended ngain in July, was finally adopted in September, 1018, with Gotlmels in supreme charge. With its adoption was centralised control of , purchase, procurement, nnd railway and marine transportation, Prom the factory to France there was but one authority, and one responsibility, and General Goethals was that.