SCAPA AND KIEL

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 285, 28 August 1919, Page 6

SCAPA AND KIEL

6 SIR PERCY SCOTT'S DISCLOSURES. Speaking at a dinner in London recently, Admiral Sir Percy Scott, responding to the toast of tho .Navy, said that from the very beginning of the. war, nearly everyone considered that so long as the British Fleet commanded the seas, the Huns were bound to lose the war. In other words, that the winning or losing of the war was to be decided by the Royal Navy in conjunction with the mercantile marine, and those magnificent men of tho fishing fleet. "In 1914, after war was declared," tho Admiral continued, "wo all slept comfortably in our beds knowiug that tho Huns could not win tho war so long as the British Navy existed, and no one over dreamt that the Navy would hot exist. When I say no one I am not quite correct, a few naval officers know that the British. Fleet midlife on any morning be found to be practically non-existent. "In November, 19H, I visited the Grand Fleet ;i they were then at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys, in an absolutely unprotected harbour. Hun submarine# could have come in and sunk them on any , night. I slept on board the Iron Duke. My last remark to Lord Jel- I licoe wne, 'Shall wo be here in the morning?' His reply,was, 'I wonder. Some people have said, to ine, 'Why did Lord Jellicooliave his fleet in an unprotected harbour?' - . The answer is that prior to tho war we had only considered submarines as toys, so we had not got a protected harbour to put our fleet in. "Then I have been asked, if that were tho case, why did not the Huns destroy our fleet, and win the war in 1914. Well, why did not they? Admiral Jellicoe in his, book 6ays that he thinks, the Hun minds could not conceive that we were such fools as to have our fleet in an un. protected harbour. There is a story told that -Hun airmen having reported in 1914 that they could see no defences at Scapa, two spies were sent, and at that timo it was very easy for . them to get over. They reported that there was no protection. The Huns promptly shot them, as they considered they were lying. They t-h'en sent two more; they wcro not going to take any risks, 60 they reported that our fleet was as safe as theirs was in the .Kiel Canal. Perhaps this is why the Huns did not win, as they could liave won, the war in 1914. "If the Huns had had half a dozen men of the stamp of our submarine commanders, we should now be a Hun colony. The knowledge of this will, I think, bo the bitterest pill that tho Huns have ever had to swallow. Lord Jellicoo has been criticised because after tho Battle of Jutland he did not pursue-the Hun fleet and fight them at night. Lord Jellicoo had a very good reason for not doing so. Tho British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German fleet was. Consequently, to fight them at niglit would havo only been ,to court disaster. Lord Jellicoe's business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, not to risk its existence. I have been asked why was- the Grand Fleet not so well prepared to fight a night action as the Hun navy. My answer is, ask tho Admiralty. The Hun fleet went back, only to come out again when they came liko a flock of sheep to surrender. Tho Hun sailors wore made in Kiel Harbour. This harbour is like the Serpentine—and you oannot make a sailor on tho Sorpentine ! and that is what was the matter with the Hun navy."