THE INDICTMENT OF GERMANY

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 250, 16 July 1919, Page 7

THE INDICTMENT OF GERMANY

; WAR CRIMES COMMISSION'S REPORT VARIOUS VIEWS , A LONG LIST OF ATROCITIES The report of the Paris Commission on the Responsibility of vlie Authors of tho War and on tho Enforcement of Venalties, submitted, shows signs of conflicting tendencies between the American and Japanese delegates on one sido and tho rest of llho members ,of the commission on tho other (says the "Times'" correspondent, in a review of* the findings), in fact, tho Americans have only signed the report subject to very important reservations, in which tney pronounce against the trial of the ex-Kaiser before an international tribunal on moral charges, holding that moral offences can only be visited with moral sanctions, and disagree with tiic rest of their colleagues in includiug in the scope of their inquiry breaches against tho "laws of humanity." The American delegates emphasise certain important inconsistencies in the report, and iliie whole of the memorandum they have submitted.in which their reservations are outlined shows that they fundamentally disagree with the methods proposed by tho commission for punishing those guiity of having plotted tho war. The report, summarised briefly, recommends the trial of all persons, however highly placed,- for breadies r.f the customs of wa.r and the laws of humanity, hut specifically states that the Commission does not advise that "the acts which provoked the war should 'bo charged against tlieii' authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal." The Commission is of opinion that no criminal .clitirgo can be made "against responsible authorities or individuals" (notably the ex-Kaisar) en the special head of "breaches of neutrality,", but urges, nevertheless, that iliey should be the subject of a "formal condemnation" by the Conference. 5 Terms of Hsference. . The main Commission had as its terms ot reference to inquire into, and report upon, the following points :r----(1) The responsibility of Ihe authors of the war.

. , (2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed : by the forces-of tho German Umpire and their Allies on land, on sea, «nd in the air during the present war. (3) The degree of responsibility for those .offences attaching, to particular members of the euemy forces, including, members of tho general staffs and'other individuals, however highly ..-laced, Ji) The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of those offences. (s)' Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise'in the course of the inquiry and which the Commission finds it -iseful and lelevant to take into consideration. The States represented on this mainCommission ive.re the United States (Mr. Lansing and Major Brown Scott), Great Britain (Sir Gordon Heivart or Sir Ernest l oiiiock and Mr. Masse.v, Prime Minister "^ (nv ea^fl nd), France, Italy, Japan. Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia. , The Commission,. which elected Mr. Lansing as itis president at jts first meet-, tng, decided to appoint three sub-com-missions—the first, which had Mr. Massey.as its chairman, to deal ■>ith criminal acts; the second, with Sir 'Gordon.llswart and Sir Ernest Pollock as alternate chairmen, on responsibility for the .war; .the third, with Mr. Lansing as president ■ on responsibility for tiolation of the liws and custom? of war. The reports ot -these sub-commissions having been considered by the main Commission, a report has been drawn up with conclusions in which certain -rlauses are recommended for insertion in the -Treatv of P«i«V - I The renort as-ii whole is a very valuable and _conse.i<yitious piece 'of work, and provides in succinct form what is P p 2u ps J >Rst """""wy of the proof of the Allied contention that the war was the result of a deliberate lM on ihe nart'of the Ceitral Empires that has yet been. made. In no case are statements made which are not supported- by of an offic'nl nnture". drawn either from the rainbow-lmed official papers published bv the Allies or from enemy State papers themselves. Origin of the War. The first chapter of. the report deals wuh the responsibility of the authors ot the war. Tho Commission, hnviii" examined a number of official documents relating to the origin, of the world war and to the violations of neutrality and of frontier which accompanied its keep, (ion. "has determined that the responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance uf a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the origin of this war a character of . a dark conspiracy agismst_ the peace of Europe. This responsibility rests, . first, upon Germany and Austria; secondly, on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver, by reason of the violation ofthe neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, which Prussia had herself guaranteed. It is increased with regard to both France and Serbia by the violation of their frontiers before the declaration of war." . j Tho Commission, dealing with the amtion of premeditation, thus proves "German and Austrian guilt in the matter:— Many months before the crisis of 1914 the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally believing in the overwhelming superiority of his army, he openly showed his .enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the King of tho Belgians;—" This time the matter must be settled.-" In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no lew fixed in their attitude.

On June 28, 1914, occurred the assassination at Serajevo of tho heir-apparent of Austria. "It is the act of a little group of madmen," said Francis Joseph. Tho act, committed as it was by a subject; of Austria-Hungary, on Auslro-Hun-gai'ian territory, could in no way compromise Serbia, which very correctly expressed its condolences, and stooped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the Government ol Vienna thought that there was any Serbian complicity, Serbia was ready to seek out the guihy parties. But this altitude failed to satisfy Austria, and still less Germany, who,.after their firs-t astonishment had passed, saw in this royal and national misfortune a pretext to initiate war. At Potsdam ti "decisive"' consultation took place on July 5,.1!)11. Vienna and Berlin decided upon this plan; Vienna will send to Belgrade » very emphatic ultimatum witn a very short limit of time. ,

Tho Bavarian Minister, von Lerchen. feld, said in a confidential dispatcli dated July 18, (19M, the facts sin ted in which have never been officially denied: "It is clear that Serbia cannot accept demands which are inconsistent with the dignity of an independent State." Lcrcluaifeld reveals in this/ report that nt the> time it was mndo an ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by tho 'Government of Berlin and Vienna, that they were waiting lo send it until M. Poiueare and M. Vivinni should have left for St. Petersburg, and that no illusions were cherished either at Berlin or Vienna as to tho conse(|uenccs which this threatening measure would involve. It was perfectly well known that war would result.

The Bavarian Minister explains, moreover, that the only fear ol' the Berlin Government was that Austria-Hungary iui»ht hesitate and draw back at I ho ias'l minute, and that, on the other hand. Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield lo pressure put upon her. Now the "Berlin Government considers that war is necessary." Therefore, it gave full powers to Count Bcrchlold, who instructed the BaHjjlal/, on July 18, If/11, to negotiate with Bul"iiria to induce her to enter info an alliance and. to participate iu tho war. In order to mask this understanding it was arranged that tho Emperor should go for a cruise in the North Sea, and that the Prussian Minister of War should go for a holiday, so that the Imperial might pretend that events had taken if completely by surprise Austria suddenly 6ent Serbia an ultimatum that felo had carefully prepared

in such a way as to make it impossible to accept:. Nobody could be deceived. "The whole world understands that this ultimatum means war" (Lichnowsky Memoirs). According to M. Sazonoff, "Aus-tria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia." Entente Policy. Tho report then deals very lucidly with [til endeavours made by the Entente Powers to prevent the outbreak of war and to gain time for calm discussion of the matter, and shows beyond all question tho steady purpose of tihe Central Empires to make peace impossible. When, contrary to tho expectation of AustriaHungary and Germany, and yielding to the urgent representations of France, Great Britain, and Hussia, Serbia accepted the ultimatum, what happened is shown by the report:— A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time-limit, at; 5.45 on the 25th. M. I'ashitch, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Giesl, the Austro-llungarian Minister. On M. Pashitch's return "to lu9 own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Cliesl, sayinc tihat he was not satisfied with tho reply. At G.SO the latter had left Belgrade, and even before ho had arrived in Vienna the Austrollungarian Government had handed his passports to 31.' Yovanovitch, the. Serbian Minister, and had prepared 33 mobilisation proclamations, which were published on the following mornim; 111 tho "Budapesri Kozloni," tlie official gazette of the Hungarian Government. . On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey:—"This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia." At midday on the 28th Austria declared war oil Serbia. On the 2J!th the Austrian Army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier. Dealing with the German preparations for war, ilhe report continues Ae early as July 21 German mobilisation had commenced by the recall of a certain number-of classes of reserve, then j of German officers in Switzerland, and, ! finally, of the 3fetz garrison on the 25th. On July '26 tho German Fleet was called back from Norway. ... On A.uguat 1 the German Emperor addressed a telegram t-o the King of England containing the following sentence:—"The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier." Now war was not declared till two days after that date, and 'as the German mobilisation orders were issued 011 ' that same day, August 1, it follows that, as j a' matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilised and concentrated in purI suance of previous orders. The attitude !of the Entente, nevertheless, remained j stili to the very end so conj dilatory that at tho very "time j at" which the German Fleet was, boini barding Libau Nicholas II gave his word | of hpnour -to William IL that Russia would, not undertake any aggressive ac- ! tion during the pourparlers, and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier 31. Viviani telegraphed to all 1 the French Ambassadors: "We must not stop working for accommodation." . . . Moreover, to be manifestly above reproach, Franco was careful to withdraw iier troops 10 kilometres from the German frontier. Notwithstanding his prc:aution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded tho declaration of war. The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of tho Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that, in view of the aggressive character of the wair, the casus foederis ceased to apply. Alter detailing similar evidence with regard to tlie entry o* Bulgaria and Turkey into the war, the report continues :— "It. was, indeed, nothing but a plot engineered by the heads of the four States against the. independence of Serbia and the peace of Europe." The conclusions of the Commission 011 this portion of its work are:— (1) The war was premeditated by tho Central Powers, together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of'acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable. (2) Germany, in agreement with Aits-tria-Huii(r*\ry, deliberately worked to defeat all. the many conciliatory proposals made,by the Entente Powers and.their, 'repeated efforts to avoid war. Invasion of Bolgium. Tho Commission's report v.ith regard to. the violation of Belgian end Luxemburg neutrality folio .vs at some length Uie various steps that wero taken by Belgium to .protect her leutr.ility, and (shows once again the complete hollowof the German (ontention that they we're forced to violate Belgian neutrality because they had certain knowledge that the I 1 rench intended to do so themselves. All interesting point is made with regard to-Angina-Hungary. The use of Austro-Hungivrian motor batteries around rsatnur shows that Austria .Hungary violated Belgian neutrality without having even- accomplished the formality of having previously 'declared war. The conclusion of tho Commission on this portion of tho task entrusted to it roads: "The neutrality »of Belgium, guaranteed by the Treaties of April 19/1B3 ( J, and that of Lnxemburcr, guaranteed bv the Treaty of May 11, 1887, wero deliberately violated'by Germany and AustriaHnngaiy.

The Commission, having thus examined the question 'f moral responsibility for the outbreak of (he war and for the violations of-neu-trality which accomoanied it, then discusses in its report the violations of the laws and customs of war by land, sea, and air. The Commission examined (treat masses of documentary evidence of unimpeachable character, 'and it declares:— l ,^ e le esprit regulations of established customs and the clear dictates' of humanity Germany and her allies have piled outrage upon outrage. . . It is impossible to imagine a list, of cases so diverse and so painful. \ lolations of the rights of combatants, of the rights of civilians, and of the rights of both are multiplied in this list of the most cruel practices which primitive barbarism, aided by all the resources of modern science, could devisefor (lie execution 'of a system of terroi-' ism carefully planned and carried out to the end. Not even prisoners or wounded, or women or children, have been respected by belligerents who deliberately sought to strike .terror into every heart for the purpose of repressing all resistance. Catcnories of Crime. The Commission has drawn up a list of 32 different categories of crimo perpetrated by enemy belligerents, and it thus upon that list:—• It constitues the-most striking list of crimes that luis ever been drawn up, to (lie eternal shame of those who committed them. The facts are established. They are numerous and so vouched for that they admit, of no doubt and they cry for justice. The list is as follows: — 0) Murders nnd massacres; systematic terrorism. (2) Putting hostages to death. (!)) Torture of civilians. ■ri) Deliberate starvation of civilians, (li) Rape. ' (6) Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution. Ci) Deportsiou of civilians. (8) Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions. (0) Forced labour o? civilians in connection with the military operations of j the enemy. i (10) Usurpation of sovereignty during j military occupation. _ • ; (11) Compulsory enlistment of soldier.? j among the inhabitants of occupied terri- ! lory. . . j (1.2) Attempts to denationalise the inhiii»tnnts of occupied territory. (13) Pillage. j (II) Confiscation of properly. (15) Exaction of illegitimate or of ex- : urhilant contributions and rct|uisitions. I (1(1) Debasement of (he currency, and issue of spurious currency. (17) Imposition of collective penalties. (18) Wanton devastation and destruction of property. (I!)) .Deliberate'bombardment (if undefended places. . - (2(1) Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monument!;. (21) Instruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without warning and without provision for the safely of passengers or crew. (22) Destruction of fishing bonis and of relief ships. (23) Deliberate bombardment of hospitals. (21) Attack on and destruction of hospital ships. (25) Broach of other rules relating to tho Red Cross. (26) Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gtt'CO.

(27) Use of explosive or expanding bullets, and other inhuman, appliances. (28) Directions to give no quarter. (20) 111-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war. (30) Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorised works. (31) Misuso of flags of truce. (32) Poisoning of w'ulls. Tho conclusions of lae commission on the criminal acts of tile enemy are:— (1) The war was carried on by the Central Empires, together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate uietTiotis in violation of the estaolished laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity. (2) A commission should bo created for the purpose of collecting and classifying systematically all (lie information already had or lo be obtained, in order in prepare as complete a list of facts as possible concerning the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its l ilies, on laud, on sea, and in the air m the coursei of the present war." Personal Responsibility. Tho third point submitted to the Commission was to define tin- degree of resixmsibilitv for offences aitacning to particular members of Hie enemy forces. The conclusion of the Commission, which ivns not readied without a great deal of dismission, was that:— "All persons belonging to enemy countries without distinction of rank including chiefs of States, who liavo been guilty Of offences against the laws and customs uf war or the - laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." The weightiest points of international law were balanced against the arguments of commou-sensls and justice in the course of the discussion which led to the adoution of tho above conclusion. It was urged by somo members of the Commission that tho heads of States ought to enjoy immunity by reason of their nosition. The Commission, - however, "desires to state expressly that in tho hierarchy of persons in authority thoro is no reason -why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been established before ,a properly constituted tribunal. This extends even to the case .of heads of States." The Commission rejects the plea of immunity raised on the ground that this privilege is one of practical expedience .in municipal law and is not fundamental.

"However." continues the report, "even if in some countries, a Sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted in u national Court of his own country, the nosition from an international point of view is auite different." The extension til' the Di-ivllege of immunity beyond tho national limits would, the report points out. lav down the principle that the grossest outrages against international law and custom ami against laws of tiumanitv ,could be committed' without fear of minishment. Tho report adds:— "Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilised . mankind. In view of tho grave charges which may be preferred against—to take one case—the ex-Kaiser, the vindication of tho princiule.s of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity which have been violated would bo incomplete if he were not brought to trial and if other offondors less highly placed were punished. "Moreover, the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if they attemuted and were able to plead the superior orders of c Sovereign against whom no steDS had been taken or were being taken. Thero is littlo doubt that the cx-Kaiser and others in high authority were cognisant of, and could at least have mitigated, the barbarities committed during tho course of tho war. A word from them would have brought about a different method in tho action nf their subordinates on land, at sea, and in the air. We desire to say that civil nnrl military authorities cannot be relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might havo been convicted of the same offence. It will be for j'l'e Court to decide whether a nlea of superior orders is sufficient to ncouit the person charged from responsibility."