WHEN WAR BROKE OUT

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 226, 18 June 1919, Page 2

WHEN WAR BROKE OUT

RUSSIA'S INDECISION

AN INTERVIEW WITH SUKHOMLINOFF

(By R.C.L., in the New York "Evening Post."):.

The former Russian Minister of War. General Snkhomlinoff, who was sentenced a year ago'to life-long imprisonment for high'treason,-but . was amnestied by the Soviet Government in May, is how in Finland. At his-trial Sukhomlinoff gavo evidence- as :to the" Russian mobilisation measures which,'according to Germany's claim, precipitated the war. He has now made a' fresh Uhd more precise statement' to tho Hclsingfore "liufvudstadsblad," in which So .confirms his evidence as to the effect of Nicholas. IJ'e irresolution; but insists that Russia did not order a general mobilisation' before the German ultimatum was received. Sho ordered only'' riibbilisation of . the four military districts' directed against' Austria-Hun-gary. \ ;

: Siikliomlino'ff's statement is. summarised 'by the "Ilufvulstadsblad" as follows:'.. "Our "discussion as tothe beginning of the war was introduced by a general'' explanation; from Sukhomlinoff as to the nature apd significance of As -a r.u!e7-so his words. may be sum-' marised—people in. this.'matter confuse, two different tilings: that is, mobilisn-, ti6ii itself 'and making rendy for mobili-. cation, -or the. pre-mobilisatioVi period. Mobilisation is a mighty movement of men, a mighty apparatus .which it id hard to stop once it is'eet going. Mobilisation' i 6 like the wind;. you can protect yourself against the wind,' but yon' cannot stop it blowing. But making ready for mobilisation merely: means that every man shall be in his place; it mean» that '.mobilisation, may! take place, .so that all must be ready; persons on leavo. must return; and no new. leaves'are to. be 'granted.

, "What:happened, now, when Russia's Minister in.; Vienna; Giers, telegraphed that the Austro-Hungarian . Army had been mobilised for. the. punitive expedition, aeainst Serbia? Well, we mobilised the. four military districts which lm against Austria-Hungary's frontiers, and. the; whole 'of the rest ,of 'the ' Russian' Army was. set in a 6tate of readiness for mobilisation. 'I assume,'. said Sukhomlinoff/ 'that people in Berlin did not clearly distinguish between the mobilisation of merely four military, districts and th(f making ready for mobilisation of the l».t. of the Russian 1 Army, .for on the evening of the day. after these, measures were taken was received,; Kaiser Wilhelm's telegram' demanding the counter-, manding of the'mobilisation.' " "At midnight Sukhomlinoff- had a conversation , with Nicholas II wliich was decisive for the . outbreak of the . world war. The.Tsar,"who was then under the. impression" of the Kaiser's telegram, ordered Sukhomlinoff to 'stop the mobilisation.' Sukhomlinoff _ explained that 'stopping" the mobilisation was a technical impossibility—mobilisation could not be stopped, but niust be countermanded. To Sukliomlinbff's question 'whether the' Eni]>eror would 'countermand' tho mobill isfttion of the four military.districts at. I tho Aukro-flungarian frontier, Nicholas answered .'No—but 'stop' the mobilisation. '" .

"'ln order to make still more precisu SukhonilihoffV story of tho birth-hour of the war. we give the Russian term# which hewed. 'Stop'was expressed with the word 'prioet-tanovitji,' while 'countermand'corresponds to the term 'ol nihility,' which, terms 'Sukhomlinoff. himself translated 1 into: Germiuiy as 'abhefehlen," ''absiigen!'•''' " " ' ' "As Nicholas II could riot bo induced to give a-clear order; Sukhomlinoff told the Tsar to &U -up the Chief of the General- Staff. Januschkievitch, and fj;k Ihiiii' whether' 'mobilisation, could- be 'stopped." " Sukhomlinoff did riot * c<m;6idcr himself . authorised' to take •' any' isteps, bccause he had not received any .order to 'countermand'. tIW mobilisation. : i'®etw?en; two and three- -o'clock on the : historic:--night ■ when Europe's futo; was ebing- decided, Jannscnkievitch called up Sukhomlinoff and asked: "What shall I-do?" . . ■ "Sukhomlinoff answered:

" 'You ' are . the last- person who has spoken with the' Emperor—do as he ordered you!'' ' "Sukliomlinoff then learned that Nicholas II has riven Januschkieyitch the same indefinite directions: to 'stop' the mobilisation, but not to 'countermand it. 'As in this technical matter Januschkievitch held tho same opinion as Sukliom•linoff; that is, that mobilisation once begun could not. bo &topped> he. also was not willing to do anything. Therefore, Sukliomlinoff and Januschkie\'itch de-. cided, each for: himself and both, together to ignore th© Tsars order, because they considered the expression of it was unsatisfactory. ; ■ t "At 1. o'clock on the Moving day was received' a telegram from Russia's Am* bassodor in Berlin, Svcrbeyeff, that Germany had ordered complete mobilisation. The world war had broken out." The interviewer asked . Sukhomlinoir why, in view of'the issues at stake and of the. Tsar's obvious good intentions, he had . not interpreted "stop" _as gleaning- "countermand." _ Stikhomlinoif answefod, "If when ,it is once under Wf>y mobilisation is countermanded, Hie resulting disorder is .'eo great that it would be impossible to mobilise again withintwo: months." . Dealing with the outcome of the campaign, Sukliomlinoff ascribed the Russian defeats to failings of the Grand D.uko Nicholas Nicholaievitch, the Com-mandor-in-Cliief.. . ..

"As far as I had insight into (he Rus. sian Court's intrigues during- the world war,said Sukliomlinoff, "Nicholas Nicholaievitch was our evil genuis. It was not enough for him to £ooi away the whole campiagn, but he also got permission to report on operations to tlia Emperor without any witness being prosent. The Emperor travelled to headquarters and decided according to the Grand 'Duke's reports, without consulting tho Minister for War.

"In 1914 we advanced with three arm. ies, of which tho centre was in Poland, while the northern penetrated into Prus. sia, and the southern conquered Galicia. In the beginning nil went well, very well . indeed. Refugees from Prussia reached Berlin, and in the south our troops stood outside Cracow. After that ■ we were struck by blow after blow. On the northern flank was destroyed first cf all SamsonoffV army, and then Reimonkampf's. The greatest tactical blunder due can commit is losing contact between the' separate army units and allowing each •army to bo separately crushed toy the enemy. "Still more stupid was the conduct-of affairs on tho southern part of tho frort. Instead of marching into Silesia from the Cfaoow district wo advanced southwards over the' Carpathian. If I liad taken part in the deliberations wo would never have sent our | troops over the" Carpathians.-' While Germany, thanks to!her railrdt-ds, could cost the whole of hei forcßS against our army, we had ths cloud-high 1 niotuitain cliaiii at our bnck, and in that way wero separated from our' base; 1 The result was that all the forces which marched across the Carpathians were cut up. "After these 1 misfortunes, through which wo lost both our flanks, our centre was exposed. It was endosed by tho enemy from both sides and with diffii culty saved itself. So took place the retreat of 1915.".