THE BOLSHEVIST ARMIES

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 221, 12 June 1919, Page 5

THE BOLSHEVIST ARMIES

NUMBERS AND DISTRIBUTION

A PASSING OPPORTUNITY

(By Iho Military Correspondent of the "Morning Post") It is one of the apparent anomalies of the present situation that European Knssia, which has suffered mure than almost any other belligerent I'ouutry during the war, has lost contact with tho outside world, is a prey to famine, has u currency utterly debused, and is surrounded by enemies, still manages to exist under the Bolshevist tyranny, and not only to exist, but also to display on alj J'routs a considerable i nd a growing military power. (This was written in April Inst.) We must trace (he causes of this slate of affairs in Hi a first place (o the great natural resources of (he country, to the largo population in the second, and, thirdly, to tho political efficiency of the Bolshevist system which, whatever its faults, anil however certain the «conomic ruin which it must entail, certainly has succeeded, in a manner which must not be under-estimated, in establishing a semblance of internal discipline, and an appearance of external strength. Soviet Russia. So long as Bolshevist armies, now nggregatiug half a million on the frontiers of Soviet Etusia, and as many behind, remain more or, less unbeaten, and the troops ■of the so-called Extraordinary Commission, composed of non-Eussi_an elements, dominate us they do the interior, there is no great chance of the Bolshevist political situation remaining anything buf strong. The resources of Soviet Hussia aru heiiin devoted to war, and while we' Allies and Associated Powers are rapidly reducing our armies and pretending that there is peace, Soviet Russia has been steadily accumulating strength .ind preparing for war. The original Soviet Army was a rabble which might havo .been dispersed by an operation of police. We must date the beginning of the more serious militarisation of this Army to July, 1918, when, we were too much occupied with Germany to attend much to Russian affairs. The fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets decided on July 4 last to introduce a regular iiiihtaiy organisation and to base it iipin conscription, not on]/ by taking nun frfr the Army frorrf eighteen to forty. ye:irfl of age, but by training youths up to tho age of eighteen. A largo number of classes have since been called out, and while the old'divisions'which'existed before this, reorganisation were retained on the frontiers and improved, there was a beginning made of creating more regularly constituted divisions, complete with all arms and administrative service?. Officers ami officials of the old Imperial Army ware called-in to help, a central. Military Ministry was formed, a General Staff completed, and powers were •telsc'ated by a not bad system of dcoeniralifnlion. Russia was full of veterans'of the war of all ranks, and thnje who had not been able to join tho anti-Bolshevist forces took service under the Soviets to save themselves and their families from want or worse. Discipline of a severe bnt effective. type was gradually re-established, and many units of the Army have become quite decently trained. ■■;■•. . ■. Twelve Armies.

From the old and the new divisions there have been gradually constituted twelve armies, each of three to. eloven divisions, numbering in all 500,000 men in the field, whilo behind are the garri6ons and the reserves of approximately equal numbers. There are something like 2COO guns of'all calibres, about double as many machine-guns,, while Sestrorietsk; Tula, and , Tamboff continue to turn out rifles, and there is no immediate- lack of small-arm ammunition and shells. ' One yroup of five armies. 125,000 stFOng, laces Kolehak in the East.-. The Gth Army with somo 50,000 men is opposed (o the Allies in thu north. There is a small force in Turkestan, and the mass of the Western, South-Western, and Southern Groups, numbering 0ver..300,000 men, occupy, tho vast front from Petrograd to the Gulf of Riga, and thence to Odessa and the Don. The Allied and anti-Bolshevist forces which immediately confront these armies are less strong in the aggregate, putting aside German, Rumanian, and Czechoslovak troops. But the difference is not very, appieciable, and the military effort now.required trom the Allied and Associated Powers so to incline the balance ■thnt decisive victory may attend the nnti-Bolshevist forces is a comparatively slight one. A couple of hundred thousand men or les?, thrown in almost anywhere, combined with adequate assistance of a mainly technical kind to the anti-Bolshevist forces, should radically alter the situation, and it is probable that with, the coliapse of its armies liolshevism itself would rapidly collapse, too. But if. on the other hand, tho existing anti-Boishevisf forces are permitted to be defeated and break lip in their turn,' then the effort required to suppress Bolshevism at its source might well become five or six times greater, and with every month's delay oi-the Associated Powers to act their task may become harder, and the chance of Bolshevism extending its ravages into fresh' fields, and of attracting fresh ndlieients, will become -greater.. Time and Tide.

We are not dealing; with Asiatic, but with European Russia, and. nearly ai many Russians are actually in the field oii ono side'as on the other. The Bolsheyik forces, though possibly as good, in i/ai'ts, us those- now opposed to them, have no pretensions to oppose success, fully a small fraction of the armies ot the'.Associated Powers properly equipped. The pacification and unilication of ltus. sia is not at present a eerioue military proposition. The orders havo only to W given, to Marshal I'och to act, and before the Kiiinmer is over the fate of Bolt shevisin will bo sealed. When at least half the men and nearly.all the Readers aro in the Bolshevik, ranks by compul. eion, and when, in the interior, there is not only no real enthusiasm but deep latent hostility, while on the side of the Associated Powers tliero are still such vast military powers,' only one end to the campaign can bo foreseen, and with this end will eomo the only settlement oj Europe at present within sight, and thb close of the chapter of the war.

But so long as a jiack of old women in Paris/go chattering 011, afraid of their own shadows and afraid even of each other, with not a policy between them nil and inconstant as water, it is not open to soldiers and sailors to close the book of war. Timo and tide wait for no man, and the short campaigning season in Russia is close at hand, and will soon pass. Strategy is the- servant ot Policy. It is Policy that has to decide. When Policy decides to do nothing, nothing in done. Strategy will find the way with the greatest ense to settle the affair of the JSolsheviki if some one with (he courage of a mouso takes charge in Paris, and takes charge now. , But so long as Policy does nothing but draft minutes and write notes Bolshevism, with no one venturing to tackle it, will continue to grow, and the eo-culled statesmen at Paris will go down to.posterity as the most pusillanimous assortment of imbeciles that over assombled round a Congress 'table.