The Dominion. FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1919. THE BAFFLED HUN

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 198, 16 May 1919, Page 6

The Dominion. FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1919. THE BAFFLED HUN

Germany has now hact a week in which to state her case against the Peace Treaty drawn up by the Allies, and so far as vociferation, is concerned she has in this period made the most of her opportunities. Her public- men have vied with one another in the invention of lurid phrases in which to denounce the "imperialism" of the Allies and their "murderous proposal." Such unbridled license has been given, to the Hun spokesmen that it may be taken for granted that nothing vital they have said on behalf of Germany has been omitted from the cablegrams. The final result is what might have been expected. The' German outcry is utterly without effect, because it is devoid of argument or of any ■ plea that bears, however remotely, on justice or reason. When noise and venom are subtracted there.is nothing left. In this way, if in no other, the outburst of the past week has. served" a useful and definite purpose. Nominally, Germany is appealing to reason, justice, and humanity. Her selected spokesmen have had an open and unhampered opportunity of advancing whatever is to be said on her behalf. Yet all that these chosen champions of Germany have to offer is'vindictive: clamour, as bestial and unintelligent in its way as the black deeds by which she earned infamy in her conduct of .the war. Not only have they failed to make out such a' , case as would war-rant"-any mitigation of the Allied terms, but ■in some instances they have openly betrayed the real source of their irritation and the inspiration of their ' abusive rhetoric, Consider, for instance, the revealing remark of Here ' SOHBEDEMANN :. "PRESIDENT WILSON, who has hitherto been, pictured as the bringer of neace, is now becoming the gaoler." Germany is literally and definitely in the hands of the officers of justice.. She is permitted more scope and license in the matter of speech and protestation than, is usually accorded to convicted criminals,' but otherwise her case , is not different. The railing of Scheidemann and.his kind finds its true parallel in the. raving threats with which a; sentenced criminal will_ sometimes leave - the- dock.

While the German leaders have failed, in a vast amount of'talk, to develop 'any ■ destructive criticism of the Allied.proposals, they have at the same time failed to show that they are in a position,,by plaving upon German national sentiment, to seriously impede the Allies in imnosine; a just peace. What they have had to say in the latter connection may almost be summed up as a confession of poverty "of resource. It is true that Germans who presumably hold widely onposed _ views have agreed in denouncing the Allied terms—Prince Lichnowsky, for example, stands in this matter with Soheidejiann and others of his type-but none of the advocates of'.resistance have been able to 'suggest a policy that looks honeful from the German standpoint. PiuffCE LicmrowsKY is Bimply deluding himself with false hopes when lie says that "our opponents need peace as" much as we do, and certainly public opinion in enemy countries will swing round if the negotiations fail." is still more obviously turning a blind eye on vital facts when hev'declares that • the rupture, of the negotiations cannot make ouv food conditions much worse:" The truth K that Germany is at present obtaining enormous food supplies from the Allies, and would suffer famine conJW'ons. if these supplies were with-, new. One of the most interesting statements lately made on behalf of ' Germanv came from Scheidemann : Fo said it would be possible to form a hovcrnment winch would ei"n the terms of peace, but it was doubtful whether such a Government would be nwnhl.le to Hie Allies. The manifesto ot the Independents showed their ivillinirness to fiien, but personally he rhousht tne present coalition was tlie only ■ possible Government. A reactionary Government would be impossible, while -in Jndenendent Socialist ' Administration would be as -unable to fulfil the conditions as the existing , one. v Scheidemann wound up by asserting that no German Government could be seciyad that would accept the terms in their present form, but this, of course, was thrown in for_ effect. Otherwise his statement is interesting for what it contains and for what it significantly omits. Ho is_ probably warranted in discounting the prospects' of the Independent Socialists. On the showing of its own spokesmen,' this party's hopes of seizing the reins of power are contingent upon a sweeping change in popujar sentiment which at least is far , from being assured. But it is the really striking feature of the German Premier's statement that he affects to believe that the political contest in Germany is between the composite party in office and the Independent Socialists, and completely ignores tendencies to division on an entirely different basis that undoubtedly exist. Tho present German Government is essentially reactionary in character, though dressed for the time and occasion. It is opposing as bitterly those sections-of the Peace Treaty which aim at the destruction of Prussian militarism as those which deal with reparation. Very probably an attempt to persist iii opposition on these lines and to brave the penalties it is in the power of the Allies to impose would unsettle the German Federation. There is some evidence also that Prussia itself is by no means as firmly knit as in the days whcii it was ruled by an iron ' despotism

popularly regarded as invincible. Schridemann's aim is to make the Allies believo that they must come to some sort of understanding with the present German Government or expect to see a Bolshevik regime established in Germany. This threat has lost much of whatever force it formerly held. Evidence on the whole suggests that a serious internal upheaval in Germany would probably lead to • the establishment of a Government which, without being Bolshevik, would be much more a Government of the people than that now in office. It is so much the more likely that Scheidemann and his colleagues will in the end decide upon meek acceptance of the Allied terms.