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THE NAVY AT WAR

LORD JELLICOE'S BOOK

A GLIMPSE OEQRITISHNAVAL

STRATEGY

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

■Why the battle gf Jutland was not a complete aud overwhelming British yici tory, the death of Lord . kitchener, ;tha ! loss of the battleship Audacious, England's fear of German invasion during the war, and the building of submarines ; for the British Navy by Charles ,M. Schwab are a few of .the interesting tonics I upon which Admiral Viscount,. Jellicoe i casts new light in his recently "published i book,' "The 'Grand"Fleet,, 1011-16."1n ; regard to the danger of invasion it appears that'this menace had a strong. I ■ influence' upon tho disposition of Great Britain's naval strength throughout the i war. On this subject the Admiral says: ' . Such a move was not likely in the I earliest days of the war,'when the nights were comparatively short aiid the expoi ditionary force had not left the country, i It is also probable that the enemy had j then few troops to spare .for that puri pose. Chances became greater as we t dei nuded the country of men, and conditions i in other. Tespects ■ wero more favourable. I In October and November, 1914, I;held ■ and expressed the opinion that if-raids •were attempted, landings would prop- ; fibly be effected in tho rivers of the cast i ' oo'ast, tho entrances to wliioh wero cither ' unprotected or inadequately protected, i A'ooach landing on our coast ,can only | bo carried out ill fine weather.' Chances ; of encountering favourable conditions on ' . arrival off tho coast are not great, aw I ' always doubted if the attempt would bo made. In our rivers opportunities are greater and are not dependent wpon fine ■weather, I suggested-to the Admiralty that'the simple preventive in this-_.cnso ■ /".Aras ■to place merchant ships in position i ready to aoross. the channels, ■which are narrow and shallow, the sliipa

; 'being fitted with explosive charges below i .ready to blow out 'the .bottoms in case I of necessity, i. mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers who, I felt certain, would' make all necessary preparations in a very few days. I believe my proposals were jcarried out. ; . . .. Margin of Superiority. , : • When the Grand Fleet first made Scapa Plow, in the Orkney Islands, itschieJ base/there was unusual anxiety for its ; " safely, and the Admiral tells in detail the I" precautions taken dpon the first report of ! the sighting of an enemy periscope witli- ' in the harbour. In telling of the loss ? (if 'the Audacious, one of the most modep ' battleships, s by running on'a, mine while : the fleet was at Lough Swilly, Viscount & Jellicoe ■ refers to the efforts that .were made to keep this loss secret. These ' efforts included the retention, for several i days, at Lough Swilly of the steamship 01ympio, for \ the reason that American ;, ' passengers oji board had' taken ■ photographs of the battleship in a sinking condition. But the presence of Americana ; oh board the Olympic was apparently _ a > not unmitigated evil, for, says the disi . tinguished author: Among the passengers was Mr Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Conipany. It was mado known to me after a day or two that he had come over'on very important business connected with WariOlEce contracts; and he wished to proceed to Lon- ! doh. After an interview with him this, was agreed, to, and I asked lifm to call on Lord Fisher at the Admiralty, in connection with -the construction of somo snb- ; marines which, I ascertained from him, his firm was in a position to build vorv ' rapidly. This would be of the greatest value to us. He did so, and with most satisfactory - Tesults, as ten' submarines were constructed, as ho, had promised, in the extraordinarily short space of , fivo : months. Tliess vessels were most uspful to us later. The Grand Fleet' was con- ' sidered weakened at this time, apart from tho loss of the Audacious. The Ajax had developed condenser defects, the Iron Duke liad similar troubles, the Orion had . to be'sent to. Greenock for examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to be defective, the Conqueror was' at Devonport refitting, and the New Zealand ! was in dock'at _Cromarty. The Erin and Agincourt, having been newly commissioned,'' could not yet be regarded as-effi-cient, 60 that the Dreadnought fleet consisted of only seventeen effective .battleships and five battle-cruisers. At that . time'the German Dreadnought fleet,com- ' prised fifteen battleships and four battlecruisers, with the Bluoher in addition. , The margin of superiority : was therefore unpleasantly small, in view of the fact . that the German High Seas Fleet possessed oiglity-eight destroyers and the Grand Fleet only forty-two.. In rehearsing tho story of the death of Lord Kitchener in the sinking of the which, was carrying. liim . on a mission to Archangel, the Admiral mentions that all doubt as to whether the vessel was sunk by a mino or a, tor'.pedo was set at rest by sweeping .operations, which resulted, in the. discovery of moored mines of a distinctive type—the type laid in southern waters by enemy submarines) .

Battle of Jutland. * ' Before describing tho Battle of Jutland, Admiral Jellicoe sets forth that tho German ships wore better protected than the British, that they had a delayed- '■ action fuse, whloh insured the bursting of their highly-efficient armour-piercing shells within the armour of their op : ponents, and that they were far less vulnerable, to torpedoes or jnines than 1 the British ships of the larger classes, which . rarely" survived when mined or ! .torpedoed, whereas German Ghips were able to make port after being stitfck by more than one torpedo. Of this portion of his book tho New .York "Times".says:—■' Tho disclosures of Admiral Jellicoe's book,'"The Grand Fleet, 191-1-16," explain. why Jutlahd was not a decisive British victory, and the wonder is that if the Grand Fleot was inferior in destroyers, in range-finding appliances, in armour-piercing projectiles, in directfiring gear for secondary batteries,' and in searchlights, as Admiral Jellicoe declares, the Germans vero worsted and ran for their base in Tout. Ho seems to make* out a good case for his decision not to fight a night battle with the retiring High Seas Fleet, because ho mußt bo -staking his professional reputation upon the accuracy of his statements. But Pollen and other critics of the . 'Admiral's tactics mil still contend that he should have done more fighting before darkness fell, and that his attack was • not sufficiently aggressive. Pollen has always insisted that the British Fleet i was toTpedo-shy at Jutland, and Admiral Jellicoe admits it, . , Further, having cited Admiral Jellicoo s i statement that the German Fleot at Jutland had eight-eight destroyers and the British Fleet only forty-two, and other remarks by the Admiral upon the disadvantages of the fleet then under his command, the "Times" naval critic concludes:— The impression made by Admiral Jellicoe in his estimate of the two fleets is that lie oxalts the German strength and minimises tho British. Now It is'a fact that at Jutland tho gun-power of, tlie British Fleet was greatly superior. If the Admiral's estimates are unassailable, the Germans had a fino opportunity to wrest mastery of the sea from Great Britain nntV stupidly let it slip. And what else is to b<s concluded from the British Admiral's admissions of the superiority of tho German equipment in many respects, but that the Admiralty had let the Navy run down or had allowed the Gsrmans to steal a march upon thorn ? With the publication of Lord ■Jellicoo's book a bitter controversy will begin to rage, for his analysis of the fleeb will piorce British pride to the (jtuck. He will have to defend, his figures, and his leadership in tho Jutland fight will be challenged.

Saved by Seamanship, * In tho Jutland battle the Germans had apparently counted largely upon their great torpedo attacks. AVriting of this attack and of tlio manoeuvres that insured its failure, Admiral Jellicoe says; As the result of this attack and another that followed immediately, some twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the track of the battle fleet. In spilo of our tuim, a large majority of them passed ships of the first and third battle squadrons at the rear of the line. It was fortunate that, owing to the turn-away of our fleet,, the torpedoos wero apparently near the end of their run, and wsra consequently not running at high

speed. They were all avoided by very skilful handling of tho ships by their cuptaius, to whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in avoiding torpedoes, but also for the manner in which tho ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each ot.hor, prevented risks of collision and kept their stations in line, 'l'ho captains wero most ably assisted by an admirable lookout kept by the organisation that existed for dealing with this danger. T 'doubt, however, whettier tho skill shown would have saved seventfl' ships from 'being torpedoed bad the range been less, and if, consequently, the torpsdpes had been running at higher speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Seapa Flow had shown conclusively tJiat the percentage of torpedoes that would hit ships in lino when fired from destroyers at ranges up to 8000 yards ; was comparatively high, even if the tracks wero seen and-the ships were manoeuvred to avoid them. Ono reason for this is that the torpedoes aro always considerably ahead of the line of bubbles; following their trades, and this makes it difficult to judge tho position of a torpedo from the bu'bbles in its wake. Many ships escaped from torpedo'and other attacks. Thus tho. Hercules reported that she turned away six points to avoid torpclloe?, one of which passed along her starboard sido and forty yar(ls across her bow, while another passed close to the stern. The Neptunn reported that tho tracks of three torpedoes were seen from tho for.etop, one of which passed very close and was avoided by the use of the. helm. >

In .the Aginconrt's 'statement it appeared that at 7.8 p.m. a torpedo passed astern and just missed. Its approach had been reported from aloft nnd the ship's course was altered to avoid it. Again at 7.38 p.m. tracks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed approaching. Tue course was altered and the torpedoes pawed ahead. At S.-25 a torpedo track was seen on the starboard side and the ship was turned at full speed. The torpedo broke the surface at about 150 yards off the starboard bow.^ Tiie Revenue reported (having altered its courso at 7.30 to avoid two. torpedoes, one of which passed about ten yards ahead and tlie other about twenty yards astern. At 7.43 the course was altered again to avoid torpedoes, two of thciii passing astern, i The Colossus reported that at 7.30 it turned to port to avoid a torpedo coining from tho starboard side. At this time tho BarJiam reported that at least four torpedoes had passed close by. Tho Collingwood reported a torpedo track twenty, degrees abaft tho beam and coming straight at the ship. The helm wa3 put down and the torpedo passed very close astern. At the same time another was seen to pass about thirty yards ahead.

The captain of tho Colling\vo r ( j» commenting on the destroyer attack, is quoted by Admiral Jellicoe as earing: "The great value of this form of attack on a line of ships is to me the outstanding feature of the battle of Jutland."

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19190430.2.64

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 184, 30 April 1919, Page 8

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,897

THE NAVY AT WAR Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 184, 30 April 1919, Page 8

THE NAVY AT WAR Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 184, 30 April 1919, Page 8

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