The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1819. THE NEW ARMY SCHEME

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 162, 3 April 1919, Page 4

The Dominion THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1819. THE NEW ARMY SCHEME

The bitter protests made by the Labour members of the House of Commons against the new Army Service proposals of the Government take little account of the gravity of the situation in Europe to-day. The Labour members and some members of the old Liberal l'arty base their protests on two grounds. lhc first of these is that the men serving with the British Army were enlisted for the period of the war or six-months after hostilities closed; and tin; second is Mi:. Lloyd (jEorgk's election pledge that the Government did not intend to retain the system of conscription. It must be obvious that both of these undertakings must be governed to some extent by circumstances. When the British forces were enlisted for the period of the war or six months after, no one could have conceived the possibility of conditions arising after the cessation of hostilities which would necessitate the Army being maintained at strength in order to safeguard the fruits of victory. No one in their senses and fully alive to the facts of the position can blame the British Government for adopting the oniy means possible to ensure that all the lives and treasure lost in the war shall not be wasted through failure to maintain a sufficient army to enforce the terms of peace imposed on the enemy. All that the Government is doing is to provide this safeguard, and it has endeavoured in doing so to minimise the hardship to the men affected in every possible way. It is from no love of militarism or desire to perpetuate conscription that vhis force is being maintained, but from sheer lor'ce of necessity. As to Mr, Lloyd George's election undertaking that the system of conscription would not be retained, that also is governed by the conditions which have arisen. Until the peace terms are finally accepted and satisfactory evidence is forthcoming. that they will be honourably carried out neither Britain nor her .allies can afford to take any risk:; with the Central Powers. No one who has followed the course of events in Russia, Germany, and Hungary in recent days can doubt the necessity for the Allied Powers maintaining their armies at such strength as to convince the enemy that should occasion arise the Allies are in a position to back their demands with superior force.

the new Army scheme which has given rise to the protests recorded in yesterday's cable, news is intended to provide for Armies of Occupation in enemy countries, garrisons of the Crown colonies and of India, and also the Home Army. To appreciate the difficulties of the position it is necessary to understand the conditions at the close of the war. At the time the armistice was signed there were about 3,500,000 Imperial British officers and soldiers on the pay and ration strength of the British Army. During the months of December and January following on the armistice something over 750,000 men were demobilised, and many more have been demobilised or discharged since. The system of demobilisation which has been followed, as described by the Minister of War, aims at reviving national industry by bringing the men home in the order of urgency, according to trades. Unfortunately, events have not permitted this demobilisation to proceed uninterruptedly. It could not be carried beyond a certain stage without imperilling the position of the Allies, and decisions had to be come to, ■ first as to the size of the force necessary to be kept under amis, and second as to the

principles to be followed in deter

mining how that foi'cc should bo socured. The military commanders hold the opinion that so far as Britain is concerned a force of some 900,000 of ail ranks be a sufficient guard for British interests in the transition period leading up to and immediately following the signing of peace. As to how this force is to be made up from the existing British armies, Mi;. Churchill has

given the following explanation: How ought we to choose the 9UO,COU who are to remain to tiiiish up the work? When men are marked for release they obviously ought to go home in the order which will most quickly restart our industries,. for otherwise they would leave their means of livelihood in tho Army, and relinquish their rations and their separation allowance only, to become unemployed in great numbers. But when men are kept back in the service to form the Armies of Occupation a choice cannot be made simply on trade grounds. It must be. made on grounds which appeal broadly to a sense of justice and fairplay. Length of service, age, and wounds must be the main considerations entitling a man to release. Tho now Army will, therefore, be com-

posed in the first instance only from those who did not enlist before January 1, HUG,' who are not over 37 years of age, and have not moro than two wound stripes. If anyone has to stay, it must be those who are not the oldest, not those who came the earliest, not those who have suffered tlm most. We, therefore, take these broad rules as our main. guide. According tu the best calculations which are possible, ther should give us about 1,300,C00 men, out of which it is intended to form the Army of 9011,000. If wo find, as we shall do in all probability, that we have in the classes chosen more men than .we actually require after dealing with a certain number of pivotfll and compassionate cases, wo shall proceed to reduce down to the figure of 900,000 first by reducing the age of retention to 36, to 35, next releasing 'the men with two wound stripes, and then on to 31.

It is not expected that this forco will be required for more than a year, and it is hoped that_ the greater part of it will be relieved within a few months. In order to minimise the hardship to the men who will be called on to serve under the new scheme the pay has been increased to a scale which is considered to be practically on a par with their avenge earnings in industrial work, and generous provision is made in the way of leave. The Government's proposals indeed appear to be reasonable in every way. It is, of course, unfortunate that the necessity should have arisen for continuing an army on so large a scale after the cessation of hostilities, but the 'stern facts of the situation leave no room for doubt that failure; to maintain a powerful force on the frontiers of the enemy would have imperilled not only all we have already gained from the overthrow of the Central Powers, but all we hope to gain for tho future peace of the world. Our Allies are sharing in this as they have shared in the other burdens ol the war. Indeed, the British Army of Occupation in Germany will oe smaller thnn that of either America or Prance.