FALL OF MR. ASQUITH'S MINISTRY

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 158, 29 March 1919, Page 7

FALL OF MR. ASQUITH'S MINISTRY

DIFFERENCES WITH MR. LLOYD GEORGE TEXT OF 1916 CORRESPONDENCE It ill bo recalled that early in February a cable me=s«ge was received hero sating that u sensation had been caused by the publication in the "Atlantic Monthly" of the private correspondence between Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, which led to the resignation of the iornier. Wo publish Mow the letters in question as they appeared in Hie "Manchester Guardian'' of February 3. The Correspondence. The first communication . from Mr. Lloyd George is in (he form of a brief memorandum, which is as follows:— "December 1, 1910. Memo, to "Primo Minister. "(1) That the War Committee consist of three members, two of whom must bo the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State .for War—who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to cud deciding all Departmental business—and n third Minister without portfolio. One of the three to be chairman. "(2) That tho War Committee shall have full powers, subject to the supremo control of the Prime Minister, to direct nil questions connected with the war. "(3) The Prime Minister in his discretion to have the power to refer any question to the Cabinet. "(t) Unless the Cabinet, on reference bv the Prime Minister, revises the decision of the AVnr Committee that decision t(- be carried out by the Department conco.'tied. "(5) The War Committee to have power to invite any Minister and to summon the expert advisers and officers of any Department to its meetings." to this Mr. Asquith'replied later in the same day. He wrote:— "(Secret.) 10 Downing Street, S.W., "December 1, 1916. "My' Dear Lloyd George,—l have now had time to reflect on our conversation this morning, and to study your, memornnduni, Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast of the-situation, actual and prospective, I am in complete agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the war, and that our own methods of procedure with the experience which, we have gained during the last few months cnll for reconsideration and revision. "The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done excellent work, nre:— ' "\. That its numbers are too large. "2. That'there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its decisions. I might with good reason add: "3. That it is often kept in ignorance by Departments of information essential and even vital of a technical kind upon problems that come before it. and "i. That it is overcharged with duties many of which might well be delegated to «ibordinafe bodies. "The result is that I am clearly ot the opinion that the War Committee, should be reconstituted and its relations to and authority ovor Departments, etc., more clearly defined and mure effectively asserted. <■ ■ "I now come to your specific pro posals. In my opinion whatever chnnsres are. made in the composition or functions of the War Committee the Prime Minister must be its chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter in the background or a referee to. the Cabinet.

"In regard to its composition. I asree that !!>« War Secretary and the First Lord of Hip Admiralty are necessary members. Inm inclined to add in the same category the Minister of Munitions. There, should be another mem•ber, cither without ■■■ortfolio or charged only with comparalivelv liijlit Departmental duties One cf tho members should Reappointed vice-chairman. "I purposely do not in this letter discuss the delicate and difficult question ot personnel. . "The committee should'as far as pos Bible sit de die in diem, and huve full noiver -to' son (hat its decisions, subject to an appeal to the Cabinet, are carried out promptly and effectively by the Departments. Reconstructions, of the War Coramitl"o should be accompanied by (he setting un of a Committee of Nalionil'Organisation to deal with the purely domestic, side, of war problem o . Tt should have executive power within its own domain. "The Cabinet would in all rases have ultimate nuthonhv-Yoiirs verv . siucerely H. ASQUITH." Mr. Asquith and a -'Times" Leader." After narrating the listory of the next two days from the point of view of Mr. Asquith's supporters the "Atlantic" published the next instalment of the correspondence ;:s follows:—

"10 Downing Street. S.AY., "December i, 1916. "My dear Lloyd George,—Sneli production? as Hie first leading article in today's 'Times,' showing the iiifir.ito possibilities for misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such arrangements as was considered yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its advisability. "Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being relegated to (he position of an irresponsible spectator of tli" v.;:ir I cannot possibly go on. "The suggested arrangement was to the following effect:— Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of wnr policy. "The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him, its chairman will report, to him daily, he can direct it to consider particular, topics or proposals, and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. "Ho can, of'course, at. hi? own discretion, attend the meetings of the committee—Yours sincerelv, "H. H. ASQUITH." Mr. Lloyd- George within a few minutes sent the following.renly:— "War Office, AYhitehall, ".December 4, 1910. "My dear Prime Minister,—! have not seen "i'ho Times' article, but I hope you will not attach undue importance *to those effusions. 1. havo had these misrepresentations to put up with for months.

"\'ortlip,lih"o frankly wants a smash. Xorthcliffe wuuld like to make this and any other rearrangement: under your Premiership''impossible. Lord Derby and .1 attach great importance to your retaining- your pi'j'sent position effectively. I carnor. restrain or, I fear, influence NorlhcliA'o. . . "I. fully accept in letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested arrangement —subject, of course, to personnel.— Ever sincerelv, , "LLOYD GL'OItGE." The Prime Minister's Powers. M'r. Asquith. in the words of the chronicler, felt thai, ho "could lake holder measures and without defying Lloyd George firing his restless lieutenant, into lino, so he plucked up courage" and sent; him this letter:— "in Downing Street, S.W., Dec. 1, I'.Mtl. "Mv deal 1 Lloyd George,—Thank you fn" your loiter 'of this morning. "Tho King gave me 10-day authority to ask you lo accept tho resignations nf all my colleagues ,and to form a new Government, on such lines as 1 should submit to-him, and start, therefore, with a clean slate. • . I "The. first question which I have lo consider is the constitution of tho row War Committee. "After full considernlinn of l.ho mntlor in al! its aspects I have come decidedly to- I he conclusion that, it is not possible tnSit such a commiltee. could bo made workable and effective without the Primo Milliliter a* its chairman. "I quite agree that it will he necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon his time and energy, to delegate from time to time tho chairmanship to another ..Minister as his representative and locum tonens. but if he is to retain the authority which corresponds with his responsibility as Prime Minister lie must continue lo be. as he always has been, its permanent, president. "1 am satisfied on reflection that any | other arrangement, such, for instance, as the one indicated to you in my letter

of to-day, would be found in experience impracticable and incompatible with tho retention of the Prime Minister's final and supreme control. "Tho other question which you have raised relates to tho personnel of the committee. Here, again, after delibcrato consideration I find myself unablo to agree with some of your suggestions. "I think we both agree that tho First Lord of the Admiralty must of necessity, bo a member of the committee. I cannot, as I told you yesterday, bo a. party to any suggestion, that (here n word is missing) or Balfour should be displaced. "The technical side of tho Board of Admiralty has been reconstituted with Sir John" Jell icoe as the First Sea Lord.

"J. believe (here again a. word is missing) or Balfour to be under existing conditions necessary as head of the board.

"1 must add that Sir Edward Carson (for whom personally and in every way I have the greatest regard) is not, from the only point of view which is significant to me — the most effective prosecution of the war—the man best qualified among my colleagues, present or past, io lie a member of the War Committee.

"1 have only to say in conclusion that I am strongly of opinion that tho War Committee (without any disparagement, of the. existing committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient, body and has done and is doing valuable work) ought in bo reduced in number so that it can sit more frequently and overtake mora easily tho daily problems with -which it lias to deal.. "But in any reconstruction of the committeo such .as I have and have; for some timo past had in view, the governing consideratton is the special capacity of the men who are to sit on it for the work which it has to do. "That is a question%'hich T must reserve for myself to decide—Yours very sincerely, "H. If. ASQUITH." Mr, Lloyd George Resigns. "War Office, S.W., December li, 11)16. "My dear Prime Minister.—l received .your letters with some surprise. On Friday I made proposals which involved not merely retention of the Premieiship, but the supreme control of the war,, while the executive functions, subject to that supreme control, were left to others. I thought you then received these suggestions favourably. In fact, you yourself proposed, that I should be chairman of this executive committee, although, as you know. I never put forward that demand. On Saturday you wrote me a letter in which you completely went tack on that proposition. "You sent for ine on Sunday, and put before me other proposals; these proposals embodied in a letter to me writton on Monday: "Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy agenda. Attend meetings of committee.' These proposals safeguarded your position and power as. Prime Minister in every particular. I immediately wrote you accepting them 'in letter and in spirit.'' It is true that on Sunday I expressed views as to the constitution of the committee, but these were for discussion. .To-day you have gone back on your proposals.

"I have striven my utmost to cure the obvious defects of the War Committee without overthrowing the Government. As you are aware, on several occasions during the last two years I have deemed it my duty to express profound dissatisfaction with the Government's method of conducting the war. "Many a. time .with the road to victory open in front of us wo have dei.nyiid and hesitated while the enemy were erecting barriers that finally cheeked the approach. There has been delay, hesitation, and lack of forolhought and vision.

"I have endeavoured repeatedly to warn the Government of the dangers, both and in written memorandum and letters, which I ciave ' your leave now to .publish, if my action is challenged. But I liavo either failed to secure decisions or I have secured them when it was too late to avert the evils. Tho latest illustration is our lamentable failure to give timely support to Kuluonia. ■ "Wo have thrown away opportunity after opportunity, and 1 am convinced alter deep and. anxious reflection that it is my duty to leave the Government in order to inform the people of -the real condition of affairs, and to give them the opportunity before it is too late to save their native laud from thb disaster which is inevitable if the procent methods are longer persisted' in. As all delay is fatal'.in war, I place my office without further parley at your disposal. "It is with great personal regret that I havo come to this conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to tho contrary—insinuations which, I fear, are always inevitable in the case of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in.any Administration,—l have felt strong personal attachment to you as my chief. As you yourself said on Sunday, we have acted together for ten years and never had a quarrel, although we have had many grave differences on questions of policy.

"Nothing would have induced me to part now except the, overwhelming sense that the course of action-which has been pursued has put the country, and not mcrelr the country, but tho world principles for which you and I. have always stood throughout our political lives, in the greatest peril that has ever overtaken lliem.-

"As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national unity, 1. propose to give your Government complete support in a vigorous prosecution of the war, but unity without action is"nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for that. Yigour and vision are the supreme needs at this hour.— Yours faithfully, "LLOYD GEORGE." The Serbian Tragedy, The chronicler of tho "Atlantic Monthly" here interpolates the text of the memorandum oa Rumania which Mr. Lloyd George wrote on September 4. Ho says the present Prime Minister is rightly proud of this document, which reads: "War Office, 4-9, 1916. "I have just seen telegrams announcing the. declaration of war by Bulgaria against Rumania. .'This is additional ground for the anxiety, which I expressed to you on Saturday, as to the possibilities in the immediate future in the Balkans. "We cannot afford another Serbian tragedy. Wo were warned early in 1915 that the Germans meant, in con federation with the Bulgars, to wipe Serbia out. In spite of that fact, when the attack came .we had not purchased a single mule to aid the Serbians through Salonika. The result was that; when our troops landed there, owing to tho lack of equipment and transport, they could not go inland and Serbia was crushed. "1. hope tliat we shall not allow the same catastrophe lo befall Rumania through lack of timely' forethought. There are three disquieting facts in the situation:—

"(I) Hindenburg's well-known eastern inclinations.

"(2) The -declaration nf war by Bulgaria against Humania. I cannot believe that Ferdinand would have taken this risk where it was quite unnecessary unless ho. had received substantial guarantees of German assistance in an attack on liumania.

"(3) The slackening of the German attack'on Verdun. Ilindenburg will certainly give up this foolish attack at the earliest, opportunity. The abandonment of thi's operation will release hundreds' of heavy guns and hundreds nf'lhousands of good troops. If, in addition t» this, lie were prepared gradually !o give ground on the Sommc, making us pay for it as ho.retires, he. could transfer several more divisions from west to east. He could givo us four or five times as much ground as we have won during tho nasi, two .mouths without surrendering any. vital positions. I. can hardly think that I he equipment of llie Rumanian Army would enable us long to re.sist nn attack from an AustrcJ-Germanic-Bulgarinn force, armed with hundreds of heavy guns, and plied with enormous quantities of heavy shell. "[ Ihcreforo once more urge that the General Slaff should carefully consider what action we could, in conjunction with Ernnce and Italy, talco immediately to relieve the pressure on Humunia if a formidable attack developed against her. "(Signed) D. LLOYD GKOJJGK" Mr. Asquith and the Publication of the Correspondence. Mr. Asriuilll's icply to Mr. Lloyd George's ultimatum was as follows:— (Private.) "lfl Downing St., S.W.. Dec. 5, lOlli. "I need not tell you that. 1 have read

your letter of to-day with much regret. I do not comment upon it fori tho moment except to say that I cannot wholly accept your account of what passed between us in regard to my connection with tho War Committee. Jii particular you have omitted to quolo tho first and most material part ot my letter of yesterday.—Yours very sincerely. "H. H. ASQUITH. "In the meantime I feel sure that you will see (he obvious necessity in tho public interest of not publishing at (his moment any part of our correspondence." Mr. Lloyd George's reply was as follows :— "War Office, December 5, 1916. "My dear Prime Minister— 1 cannot announce mv resignation without assigning the reason. Your request that I should not publish tho correspondence that led up to aud necessitated if places mo theroforc in an embarrassing and' unfair position. I must give reasons for tho grave 6tep I have taken, if you forbid the publication of the correspondence do you object, to my stating in another form-my version of the causes Hint led to mv resigning?— Yours sincerely, "D. LLOYD GEORGE." Mv. Asquith wrote in answer to this:— "10 Downing Street, Dec. 5, 191 S. "Mr dear Lloyd George,—lt may make a difference to you (in reply to your last letter) if I 101 l you at once that I have tendered my resignation to the King. "In any case I. should deprecate m the public interest publication in its present lorn) at. this moment of your letters to me of this morning. Of,course, I havo neither power nor wish io prevent your stating m some other form tha course*) which you have taken—Yours very sincerely, "11. H. ASQUITH."