PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 304, 12 September 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A. sentence in one of Sib Douglas Haig's later messages, though it is very short, is of ii nature to arrest .attention. It runs "Storms continue." This means, of course, that the Allies are at present hampered in their offensive not only because they have on a wide front closely approached the Hindenbitrg line, but by bad weather. A run of bad or broken weather at this stage, would seriously impede the Allied operations, but it probably is too early by sonic weeks at least for the Germans to have, an.v reasonable hopo of gaining indefinite relief by the luck of weather. The possibility of further important movements in the offensive before winter remains distinctly cjpon, That view

of the matter gains some support front the terms of the. Special Order of the Day in which Km Douglas Haig has addressed the British armies. Ho is concerned first and foremost to congratulate his troops on their magnificent achievement in repelling an offensive by greatly superior forces and rolling the enemy back in defeat. But if the British Commander-in-Chief considers that -the offensive is for the time being at an end . ho conceals that opinion very carefully. What he has to say bearing on the matter implies that he holds an exactly opposite opinion. He says in one place: "Already wc have passed beyond the. old battlefields of 1917 and have made a wide breach in tho enemy's strongest defences." His concluding words aro: "Tho enemy has now spent his effort, and I rely confidently on each one of you to turn to full advantage the opportunity youv skill, courage, and resolution have created." It, does not seem unreasonable to interpret these words as meaning that unless the German armies are strangely favoured by weather and other circumstances they will bo callcd upon in tho near future to endure further. tests of battle.

According to an Amsterdam message which appears to-day German war correspondents • report that Douai is being evacuated and that civilians have already left the town. At its face value this means that a military withdrawal from Douai and not merely the removal of civilians is in progress. It is in the highest degree improbable, however, that the enemy will voluntarily retire from Douai, .which is at present about seven- miles behind tho battlefront, unless he finds himself [Qompelled to retiro from Lille and undertake a general retreat in Franco and Flanders. Another report to-day states that tho enemy lias prepared or is preparing a scries of defensive lines in rear of that on which he is now halted. One runs parallel to tho Hindenburg lino from three to six miles behind it, and therefore practically constitutes a deepening of the defences of that already formidable range of fortifications. Another takes in Lille, but excludes Douai. It runs from Lille to Motz with a slight southward bulge, and therefore approximates * pretty closely to the Franco-Belgian frontier south-east from Lille. The great disadvantage of this lino is that its principal communications would run almost parallel to its length. It would thus be exceedingly vulnerable to attack. Moreover, if the enemy occupied a front following the Franco-Belgian border and then running down on. or opposite his own western frontier ho would sacrifice the advantage he now enjoys in- operating on the interior lines of a great salient. It therefore seems most unlikely that the enemy will fall back on the Lille-Metz line. If he did so this year it would almost certainly be with the intention of evacuating Belgium before the Allies could open an offensive next spring. * * * The report which has been quoted mentions still another defensive line without indicating its location. If he should decide upon an extended retreat tho enemy lias the option of occupying a line extending south from Antwerp, or a still shorter lino running south from the southern extremity of the Dutch frontier. From the purely military point of view the occupation of cither of these lines, assuming that he reached it safely, would offer the enemy considerable advantages. His front would be much shortened and would be correspondingly difficult to break. Against this, however, there is the drawback, at once military and political, that his vital industrial territories would be much more seriously exposed than at present to aerial attack and bombardment. There arc also the probably serious moral and political effects which such a withdrawal would be likely to produce upon his homo population. # * • It is probably within the facts to describe the reported transfer of largo numbers of Austrian troops to the West front as a course of desperation on the part of the enemy. Assuming that tho reports are accurate, a new and heavy strain is imposed on Austrian forbearance and loyalty to the Teutonic Alliance. That Germany is herself doubtful of _ the wisdom of the step appears plainly in tho fact that she has waited so long to make any heavy call upon Austrian reserves for service in the Western theatre. It seems not unlikely that th'c rioting which is said to have occurred already in Vienna may lead up to more serious troubles of a similar order. This apart, Germany takes obvious risks in weakening the Austrian front. Tho Austrian armies were engaged earlier in the year in what they are themselves said to havo called a hunger offensive—an effort to win food. The offensive failed disastrously, and it is estimated by the Italian General Staff that the enemy's- losses reached a. total of about 200,000. Weakened in this ill-starred adventure and disheartened by its outcome, tho Austrian armies can hardly be in good fighting trim, and any serious reduction in their slicngth by transfers to the Western theatre may leave them vulnerable to attack in spite of all the advantages of position they enjoy. The enemy forccs which face tho Italians across the Piave will in any case be somewhat precariously placed during the winter. In that season tli,c movement of men and transport of material through • the mountains which everywhere back the Austrian lino will be seriously impeded, whereas the Italians, with communications running over low country, will enjoy relative freedom of movement. The enemy forces on tho Piave, if they remain there until winter falls, may quite possibly find themselves attacked by superior forces at a time when they are to a .great extent cut off from effective aid! Even if it were found possible to maintain f a defensive stand against the Italians a heavy reduction in _ the •strength _of the Austrian armies in the Italian theatre—a reduction making it impossible- for them to attack with hope of success—would of course permit tb" transfer of a considerable body of Italian troons to France.