THE GERMAN HEEL IN BELGIUM

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 284, 20 August 1918, Page 6

THE GERMAN HEEL IN BELGIUM

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WERE THE

ENEMY VICTORIOUS

TEUTON PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

[Tho following article from the British Ministry of Information lias been received per favour of tho Royal Colonial Institute.]

How would' a victorious Germany Puttie tho economic future of Belgium? It is tolerably certain now that there would bo 110 political annexation, hut a kind of German protectorate; its general lines liavo been worked out by Zitelmann, von GiercKe, and many others, and form tho "conditions on which Belgium would be restored." All these legal-political treatises, however, leavo the economic aspect of the matter very vague; Zitclmann's specimen treaty con'taiucd no economic clauses, beyond llioso dealing with the control of railway administration, and von Giercke, after alluding to railway control and possible Customs and monetary unions, merely formulated the general principle that Germany would! have to shape the whole of the economic life of Belgium in her own t interests. Germany/s dealings with tho 'Council of Courland illustrate the question; there the real work was not done in the preliminary political arrangements, but was thrown upon military and economic conventions to bo concluded ' later; and something -of tho sort would happen in Belgium. Thoro are obviously differences of opinion among Germans as to whether they should "protect" thauvholo of Belgium or only Flanders, though wa are not awaro of any actual controversy on the subject. In tho latter case Germany would very probably work the economic uido of tho matter through the Council of 'Flanders; something of tho sort is foreshadowed both by tho administrative separation of FlanderS, and by the address of the Governor-General von ialkenliauson to tho Council of Flanders on March 7, when he told them that their task was to prepare tho Flemish poople for tho great decisions peace should bring them. For our purposo, however, which is t.o consider tho kind of lines on which Germany is already treating, and would (if she could) solve, tho economic sido of the problem, it js unnecessary to distinguish between Belgium and Flanders. Important material for our purpose can bo found in (among other things) a series of inspired articles 111 the "Kolnische Zeitung" in March, 1918, possibly put out ns feelers, and in a book, "Belgien's Stellung in del - Weltwirtschaft, written in 1917 by tho economist, Professor Schumnchor, of Berlin, whoso various works liavo mado him protagonist in Germany of the "Belgian idea," much ns Dr. Nnumann is of Mittel .Europa. Incidentally, there is much of value in M. Paeselecq's. great work of 1917, "Les deportations Beiges." A German Outpost. Thero aro two principles which form the guiding lines of German action. The first is the claim lroin tho economic point of view Belgium is a German outpost; the growtl) of her trado and industry really depended ou Germany; Germany .had mado har what she? was. Tho second (which we shall come to litter) is that Belgium had become to Germany an inconvenient and even dangerous competitor. As to tho first, Schumacher, indeed, admits that Belgian trade with Franco before tho war was only very slightly less than that with Gormany; the Belgian official figures for 1912 are IG6O million fr. against, 1711 •million; but this, in his view; is roilly only a survival. Tho "Walloon country was highly industrialised long ago, while Flanders was, and still largely is, agricultural; and the Irndo with Franco was great before that with Germany developed. Tho curve of tho economic development of Belgium, ho says, exactly follows ,the curve of the economic development of Germany, and departs widely now from the French curve; this prescribes what tho course of' the future must bo. Tho West-European industrial (coal and iron) field, taken as a whole, is divided between Germany, Belgium, nnd North France; but Germany believes that her destiny is to control essentially the whole of it, for Belgium is only, an "arbitury section." Rchumachet, of course, hopes to retain Briey-Longwy. To come now to details. Belgium has coal, and exported largely to Franca. But she imported still moro from Germany, for she is poor in certain qualities of coal. This will .be rectified when the new Kompen coalfield is thoroughly at work. Schumacher calls this the most favourably situated field in Western Europe, owing to its proximity _ to .Antwerp, and says "it will be very important for Germany whether this field will serve to tho .advantage or disadvantage of German development." This field has been much discussed in' Germany; and one of tho first points ill any German scheme would be the control ofthis coalfield in some _ form or otlier, perhaps by lease. This would do more for Germany than givo contrul of the Flemish coal supply; it would enable her also to keep her finger firmly on the supply of coal to France, v so far ns Continental coal is concerned. Franco might no doubt counter this by continuing to get coal after tho war from Britain; however, Germany entertains considerable hopes in tho matter.

Germany has even greater hopes .from iron. Belgium, with all her great ironworks, imported almost all the iron she used; in 1913, G.I) million tons, against 66,000 homo produced. But s'ho wu-i quite independent of Germany; her iron 'oamo from Luxenburg and French Lorraine (Briey-Longwy). Both districts are at present in German hands; and Germany looks forward to making much use of the fact,. If she can, she will, of course, annex Luxemburg; it is noef even discussed. But Briey and Long ivy are different; Tho' heavy industry in Germany hns consistently demanded their annexation; and even tho moderate "Frankfurter Zeitung" supported this in an nrticle on March 27, on the cynical ground Unit France has plenty of iron in Normandy, and that Germany can make better use of Briey and Longwy than she can. But there is another view, originally wo believe propounded by tho Socialist deputy Herr Hue, which has been gaining ground; Franco is to receive bock Briey and Longwy on terms that she supplies Germany with the output of iron in return for coal. This scheme would give Germany complete control of tho iron supply to Belgium; and one of these two alternatives as to Briey and Longwy woukKbe the second point in any German scheme. Combined wilh (he control of the Hempen and perhaps other coalfields, it would put Belgium's eoal and iron supply in Germany's hands. And that would be uine-tenths_ of tho battle. i