The Dominion. TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1918. HELPING RUSSIA

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 278, 13 August 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1918. HELPING RUSSIA

The Allied offensive in the Western theatre has monopolised attention during the last few days, but simultaneously events have taken shape in Russia, which well deserve attention and are not without promise. The Allies, America included, aro now definitely committed to intervention in and on behalf of Russia, though it is evident that tho enterprise thus far has been organised on a comparatively modest scale, and that it is intended to develop if; cautiously. Some of today's messages suggest that the situation in Siberia—still obscuro in its details—calls for the intervention of a considerable military force, but whether this is so or not it is made absolutely clear that the action taken by the Allies has nothing in common with the invasion of a "hostile The Allies have stated their objects: to stem the German penetration and to convey economic relief to a ruined and suffering country. The expeditions which have landed on the Murman coast, at Archangel, and in Siberia, are partly military in character, not because there is any thought of coercing Russia, but because the Germans and the dwindling Bolshevik faction will not be defeated otherwise than by the exercise ,of military force. The- Germans, including the former prisoners of war who have been organised to combat the patriotic forces in Siberia and elsewhere, and the Bolsheviki, aro alike preying on Russia and opposing her_ recovery and regeneration, but_ it is typical of the policy the Allies have adopted that they are endeavouring, for the time at least, to avoid an open break with) the Bolsheviki. The essential feature of their policy as far as it can be gauged at the present stage is that it aims at a, gradual approach to the results that are hoped for. No doubt many people would like to see a bolder policy adopted, but it is necessary to take account of the immensely difficult and, complex problems which await solution in Russia. It is a fallacy to regard these problems as beintr to any large extent identified with those of an ordinary military campaign, and for that reason a good deal that has been said about some millions of ■Japanese troops being available, and to a similar effect, has been ciuite beside the point. Although Japan has a big .army at disposal she could hardly employ it in an advance through Siberia unless sho received financial and material assistance on a considerable scale from tho other Allied _ Powers. This would entail a serious diversion of effort from the Western theatre, where the Allies are able to make their weight tell'with the utmost effect, and intervention on these lines would therefore be onen to absolute condemnation on military grounds. But the strongest argument against 1 such an expedition is that it would be ill-calculated to serve its intended purpose. A Japanese invasion would be more likely to kindle suspicion and resentment and to inspire resistance. than to - stimulate the political re-birfch of the Russian nation. It is for the Russian, people, as tho Allies said in their recent declaration, to "work out their own destinies," but much may be done to stimulate and assist their efforts in this direction, and it is here that scope for intervention appears.

The action now taken by the Allies is-a natural outcome of views regarding intervention in Russia which have found wide expression in America, and are said to be held by President Wilson. Outlining the attitude taken in official and other circles in Washington one correspondent observed recently that before the United States gave moral sun port to any group or faction in Russia it would endeavour to make sure that tho group or faction assisted somehow represented the ideals aiid _ princinles of the Russian revolution and was on the ro.ad, at least, to sunnort and adhesion by a considerable number of the Russian people.

principle which tho American Government prefers to follow in tlie present instance (ho added) is not only traditional, but based upefti a desire to permit the several elements originally possessing _ the sovereignty of a country to deternuno for themselves ivliich of those elements shafl be considered supreme or representative. It is true that Russia may never become a State of tho geographical status she occupicd Marc, the war, and that several srnailer States may assert ttieiv iTvAcpci\dentc. But none of these as yet has progressed to tho point where rocognitioji caa /)6 accorded a, scparnVe entity. Ivor it Bimflerstood thalt tho viewpoint of our Govern•mont is technical or extra-legal. There is a confuhnce behind )t that, only by awaiting the resurgence of authority anil centralised government can tho best help lio rendered flic infant democracy. Tim policy might easily 1 have been carried to the' foolish' extreme of allowing a_ real opportunity to help tho Ihissian people to slip by. It has now been varied, but not, to such an extent as to violate the principlcs just stated. The Allies l\tv\'c, as yet recognised no (lc facto authority in Russia, and presumably will refrain from doing so until a really representative central Government lias been established. At the same timo their intervention is o't limited scopc, and is clearly distinguished from an attempt to designate or set up such a central authority. Of necessity they are bound to come into increasing conflict with the Bolshcviki, and the arrest of the British Consul-General at Moscow seems likely to brinp; matters in this respect to a head. But there arc indications that the Bolshcviki arc almost at an end of their tether—it is reported to-day that Lenin and Trotsky arc meditating flight to Germany—and it is evidently better that these adventurers should be cast out by their own countrymen than (hat tlie Allies should undertake the task. Acceptance of the ruling consideraiions_ that the development of Al : lied intervention must bo measured by tho extent to which- tho good will of the Russian poop.le is gained, and I

that in any ease Allied action must bo definitely ' limited until such time as a stable central authority iifis been sot up in liussia might leave poor prospects open if Germany were free and unhampered to pursue her predatory schemes in the East. But with the German armies suffering one defeat after another in thq Western theatre, and I. ho allies of Germany suffering growing disillusionment, a great uprising of the Russian nation teems by no means impossible. The lauding iri Northern Russia, which has been so heartily welcomed by the local population, and the landing in Siberia, which is designed to establish contact with the Czechoslovaks, are meantime a stimulus to such a movement of liberation. Granted a- national revival in Russia the foothold gained by the Allies in these territories would enable them to speedily render the struggling nation effective aid.