The Dominion. TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1918. INFORMATION FROM THE ENEMY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 243, 2 July 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1918. INFORMATION FROM THE ENEMY

It has _ been said often and na doubt quite justly that in the present campaign in the Western theatre Germany is making her last bid for victory, and that if tho arrival of the northern winter a few months hence finds her still short of decisive military success* her defeat will ho only a matter of time. Though they lead t.o a definite conclusion so far as tho central issue of tho war is concerned, these contentions leavo some very big questions unanswered. On available evidence if Germany fails' to crush the Allied armies in the Western theatre this year her last_ hope of victory will assuredly vanish, but it does not follow that having reached that point she will find herself compellod to capitulate and to accent such terms as the Allies arc determined to impose. On the contrary, if it had to be assumed that Germany would doggedly mako the most of the human and material resources at her disposal, the definite failure of her attempt to overwhelm the Allied armies would leave tho \forld still faced by tho prospect of a lengthy prolongation of the war. Much intorest, therefore, centres in the factors which are calculated to set a period to Germany's resistance after she has been deprived of the initiative and compelled to turn finally from attack to defence. Amongst these factors those upon which the Allies will mainly rely are their own powers of military and naval aggression—powers_ based upon their ability to establish a decisive superiority in the field and in the air, and perhaps to open new chapters in the history of the naval offensive. Some very suggestive evidence has lately como to light, however, that internal iorces are operating in Germany which will in greater or less degree combine with the external pressure of the Allies to bring her to defeat. For instance, the speech delivered a tew days ago by Dk. von Ivuhlmann, tho German Foreign Minister and tho furious protests it has drawn from the Pan-Germans, aro not a uttlo interesting as they bear upon Germany's military limitations, and therefore upon the general outlook m the war.

.Reading the reports of von Kohlai.tNN's speech', it is evident that lw made only two points, and these closely-related, which are at nil calu. n arouso resentment of the Pan-Germans. He dealt with peace and peace conditions in a manner worthy of Bethmann-Holl-WE ?rn n s or of tllc present Chancellor, vox Hertliso. That is to say, he showered hypocritical professions, but offered no rcstitu- "? n > or reparation for crimes coratn.l. evaded every real issue which' the question of peace involves. But instead of inviting his hearers' as Bethmann-Hom/weq would have clone, to look at the map, or picturin the manner of von Hertuno, an indefinitely extending panorama oi German victories', von Kuhljiann was so ill-advised as to blurt out the truth about Germany's military prospccts. Not contcnt with declaring to tho Reichstag that the war could not be ended by military means, he asked: "When one makes a wide survey of events one must ask, will the_ war, according to human calculation, last beyoncf the au- . ' D o» w .' n ter, or beyond nest year f It is not surprising that this declaiyition and question awakened the fury of the Pan-Germans. Von Kuhljiann was spealung of German prospccts to a German audience. It is sufficiently obvious that Ins assertion that the war cannot be ended by military means had sole lcferencc ■ to Germany. He cannot have been speaking of war in general, for it is the leading contention oi German strategists—a contention reiterated after the experience of this war that attack is the soul of success in war. Neither is it conceivable that ho committed himself to the contention that the Allies, with ten million American soldiers available if necessary to reinforce their existing armies, aro incapable of onding the war by military means. What von Kuhljiann did in fact was to bluntly admit that Germany is incapable of ending the war by military means. That he to his admission a prediction that tho war would be indefinitely prolonged has not lightened his offence in tho eyes of the Pan-Ger-mans, and this fact, fairly considered, must bo regarded as strikingly significant in its bearing on milif;i'ry prospects. Tho angry clamour of tho Pan-Germans evidently implies not only _ that they feol it neccssary to insist upon Germany's,

ability to attain her goal in the war by a violent military offensive, but that they do not regard a prolongation of the struggle, with Germany standing on the defensive, as a practicable alternative, or one. holding any shadow of comfort. If they considered it possible that Germany, failing to win an overwhelming victory this year, might yet prolong tho war with sonic hopes of gaining an inconclusive peace, they would hardly have been roused to fury by such a speech as von Kuhljiann has delivered. They would rather have welcomed it as tending to prepare the minds of the German people for the changed conditions in prospect. Their attitude would he that which in one of today's messages is ascribed, rightly or wrongly, to Hindenbukg. It is said that he approves of von Kuiiljiann's specch because, after the experience of events on the West front, he recognises that victory is not attainable.

A report of this kind must, of course, be taken for what it is worth, as must all reports professing to disclose the inner mind of tlic German rulers. But the reported attitude of Hindenburq serves at least to illustrate the evidently sound contention that if the extremists who now dominate Germany' had more than the most limited outlook they would rather favour the prediction of a prolonged war than visit it with perfervid denunciation. From first to last the stir dccasioned by von Kuhmiann's speech distinctly suggests that these extremists are aware of narrow limitations, and that much as their hopes of early victory have' diminished they feel it impossible to consider the alternative of a long and wearing struggle for an inconclusive peace. Their doubts and fears on this point arc assuredly not to bo ascribed to any disinclination to make unsparing calls upon the endurance of the German nation, but solely to apprehensions that the calls will not he met. Even if it should be assumed that there is an clement of political stage play in the furious denunciations of von Kuhljiann's speech, and that the leading actors engaged are attempting to prepare the German people for the reception of facts which presently will defy coneealmcnt, the necessity of such an attempt would still bo in the highest degree significant in its bearing on military prospects. So far as tho next few mcjnths. are concerned the Allied armies are faced by a grim ordeal. But having survived that ordeal they will be in a position to attack Germany as no nation has ever yet been attacked. Allied command of tho sea and tho admitted failure of the enemy submarine campaign, the uiinicricttl preponderance of the Allied armies and reserves, and the jrreat and growing superiority of the Allied aerial squadrons are so many guarantees* that the possibilities of effective attack will bo fully tested. When this stage is reached much will depend upon the moral fortitude of the nations engaged, and not least upon Germany's ability to maintain a struggle in which she has nothing better to hope for than modified defeat. The outcry of tho Pan-Germans against the unpalatable facts stated by von KutriiMANN is suggestive evidence that they have little confidence in the fortitude and resisting power of' their nation under such conditions. As it bears on military prospects their clamorous outburst is, or seems to be, distinctly informative.